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Preface
This thesis consists of three chapters, each derived from an individual paper.
Although each of these chapters deals with a unique research question, there
are similarities that are strong between Chapters 1 and 2 and weak regarding
the third. First, all chapters raise questions in the field of microeconomics
and touch on the Swiss system of Vocational Education and Training (VET).
Second, all chapters apply quantitative methods widely used in the field.
And finally, all chapters are embedded in the Swiss context. Whereas this
Swissness merely concerns the data in chapter three, it additionally includes
the outcome of interest and the fundamentals of the empirical methodology
in chapter one and two.
Both Chapters 1 and 2 investigate firms’ engagement in the Swiss
VET system. Within this system firms’ voluntary participation is crucial
– they help design curricula, hire apprentices, pay their wages, and are
responsible for most of their training - and remarkable: Setting a world
record, Switzerland’s dual VET system accepts around 60% of all pupils
after compulsory schooling each year. It thus seems fair to say that Swiss
firms bear a large proportion of the investments needed to secure their own
future skill demand.
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Andreas Kuhn, investigates what
happens to this voluntary engagement in the skill formation process if firms
are permitted to secure their skill demand from another source: we focus
on immigration. In recent years, this channel has changed substantially,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Through mutual agreements, foremost
the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons implemented in 2002, the
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labor markets of Switzerland and the European Union have increasingly
integrated, and the non-Swiss workforce has grown by roughly 50% or 600,000
workers since 1995. Meanwhile, most immigrant workers today hold a
vocational or tertiary degree, whereas in the 1990s fewer reached educational
attainments higher than compulsory schooling. Overall, we hypothesize that
this enlargement of skills provided by the non-native to the Swiss labor
market may incentivizes firms to substitute their investments in VET by
hiring immigrant workers.
To examine this claim empirically, Chapter 1 focuses on crossborder
workers, who work in but live outside Switzerland. Today, crossborder
workers account for 6% of the total Swiss workforce and 20% of the immigrant
workforce. Moreover, their numbers doubled between 1995 and 2018,
an increase twice as large in relative terms as the simultaneous increase
in resident immigrant workers. To understand Switzerland’s particular
attraction for crossborder workers, it is first worth picturing a map of
Switzerland’s distinct language regions. The triangle on the left pointing
towards France forms the French-speaking part. The much smaller triangle
hanging upside down into Italy covers the Italian-speaking, and the rest,
mostly bordering Germany and Austria, the German-speaking part. One
notices that all three main Swiss language regions border countries in
which they are the sole official language. Evidently, language is not a
major barrier at the Swiss border within the institutionally relatively well
integrated European labor market, which together with the comparatively
high Swiss wages makes Switzerland attractive for workers from neighboring
countries. Second, Switzerland’s comparatively high cost of living together
with assumed personal preferences for residing in one’s country of origin
makes it relatively unattractive to work and live in Switzerland.
Quite obviously, the resulting high numbers of crossborder workers are not
evenly distributed across Switzerland. Swiss firms’ opportunities to employ
them is substantially constrained by their distance from the border. The
empirical approach presented in Chapter 1 exploits this setting by comparing
firms close to the border with large and firms far from the border with limited
access to crossborder workers that are otherwise similar. Overall, we find
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that the increase observed in crossborder workers between 1995 and 2008
led to a decrease of about 3,500 apprenticeship positions, corresponding to
roughly 2% of the total number of apprentice positions. Although the exact
channel through which this substitution works remains ambiguous, policy
makers designing institutions in either immigration or VET might want to
pay attention to this trade-off, especially because it involves two goods that
are in general positively valued by many employers.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Andreas Kuhn and Jürg Schweri,
sticks with firms’ investments in VET and, moreover, also investigates the
spatial distribution of it across Switzerland. The focus lies on the varying
proportions of firms providing apprenticeship positions across Switzerland’s
language regions (that you remember when recalling the map pictured
above). Note first that we do not claim there is any direct link between
different languages and different levels of firm engagement in VET. However,
the distinct languages in Switzerland also maintain cultural differences within
a small country, despite the fact that national institutions are well accepted
and people increasingly mobile. It may be due to exclusive communication
with same-language peers, selective media consumption, or varying exposure
to Switzerland’s neighboring countries with whom each Swiss language
region forms a distinct supranational linguistic region: French speakers
are most open to immigration and international cooperation and eat more
meat than their German-speaking counterparts. German speakers have a
more traditional understanding of gender roles than their French-speaking
counterparts and donate the most for charity of all linguistic groups. Italian
speakers use public transport the least and value leisure more than their
German-speaking counterparts.
In Chapter 2, we focus on a clear discontinuity that analysis of voting
results reveals among the language-cultural regions constituting Switzerland:
Whereas French and Italian speakers approve of strong state involvement,
for example in the health insurance sector, for pension schemes, and in the
VET system, German speakers prefer private engagement over the states in
the same domains. From this starting point, we ask whether a favorable
attitude towards private engagement expressed at the ballot box is actually
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accompanied by higher levels of the privately provided good apprenticeship.
Chapter 2 reveals the answer to be yes: firms located in German-speaking
municipalities are about 10% more likely to train apprentices than firms
in very nearby French- and Italian-speaking municipalities. Altogether, we
argue that norm-guided behavior is a complementary explanation for why
some firms train apprentices and others do not. One can draw two policy
implications from this finding. First, persistent norms might strengthen the
sustainability of the Swiss VET system against potential shocks to firms’ cost-
benefit ratio. Second, behavior bound by norms might hinder the export of
a Swiss-style VET system with its strong focus on firm engagement to other
countries even if they set up the institutional framework to foster it.
Chapter 3 focuses on the adult labor market, where skills acquired,
e.g. in the VET system, are applied. Many economists claim that recent
rapid technological change penetrating the labor market has shifted firms’
skill demand and altered the nature of jobs. Given individuals’ skills,
these demand shifts potentially foster horizontal skill mismatches, such that
someone’s acquired skills do not match the skills needed in their current
occupation. In line with previous mismatch literature, Chapter 3 shows that
such horizontal skill mismatches are a multi-faceted phenomenon. First,
whereas only about half of all individuals work in exactly the occupations
that they learned formally, the degree of mismatch among the other half
varies widely. Second, many individuals actually realize wage gains when
becoming mismatched; this suggests that objectively identified mismatches
are not bad per se. Based on these general findings and on the task-
based approach, I hypothesize that horizontal skill mismatches are harmful
to the wages of individuals who mostly hold skills substitutable by new
technology, whereas they are not harmful in general. I account for this
heterogeneity of mismatches in the empirical analysis of Chapter 3 by
exploiting detailed occupational task data to measure the strength of
mismatches and to focus on mismatches presumably caused by skill demand
shifts due to new technology. The main result yields a wage penalty of
roughly 12% for mismatched individuals with high shares of substitutable
skills. Applying other methods to the same dataset suggests that objectively
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identified horizontal mismatches have zero wage implications on average,
even after accounting for unobservable individual characteristics. From
a policy perspective, it thus seems important to bear the heterogeneity
of the mismatch phenomena in mind; otherwise, revealed average effects
might mask negative effects on certain subgroups. In this spirit, I estimate
mismatch wage penalties for different educational subgroups including VET
diploma holders.
And in this sense, all chapters of this thesis deal with the Swiss system of
vocational education and training, a system that is recognized by many as one
of the key contributors to the country’s economic success. However, as this
thesis shows, it is also a system that contains frictions, even contradictions
at first sight, a system regularly challenged by pupils entering it and labor
markets demanding its outcomes, and therefore a system that must remain
agile. Thus, the recognition that the Swiss VET system receives from inside
and outside the country must motivate constant reflection, adjustment, and
amelioration, and should never tempt to rest on its laurels. I hope this thesis
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Chapter 1
Open Labor Markets and Firms’
Substitution between Training
Apprentices and Hiring Workers
joint work with Andreas Kuhn
1.1 Introduction
One of the key objectives of the European Union has been the integration of
its member countries’ labor markets. The main rationales of these efforts is
to spur gains in innovation and productivity and, consequently, growth (e.g.
Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Peri, 2012). However, economic theory
also predicts distributional effects from immigration, at least in the short
run. This implies that some groups will presumably suffer from immigration,
even when its overall effect on the host country is positive (e.g. Bansak et al.,
2015; Borjas, 2014). Consistent with this, several empirical studies have
documented that recent waves of immigration have been accompanied by a
rise in right-wing parties that seek to restict further immigration in various
European countries (e.g. Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Edo et al., 2019; Halla
et al., 2017).
In this chapter, we estimate, against this broader background, employers’
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short-run substitution between the training of resident apprentices and the
hiring of cross-border workers (hereafter CBWs), i.e. nonresident immigrant
workers who live in one of the neighboring countries but who work regularly
in Switzerland. Prospective apprentices are not yet in the labor market,
they are not organized or politically represented, and they therefore have low
bargaining power. They may thus be especially at risk of being substituted
with CBWs. Moreover, training apprentices is costly for employers: average
training costs over the full training period equal almost 100,000 Swiss
francs, equivalent to about 1.28 times the annual median wage in 2016.
Consequently, we hypothesize that access to CBWs will decrease the costs of
hiring skilled workers and will therefore lead some firms to substitute away
from training their own workforce to hiring more CBWs. Similar to Kerr et al.
(2015) and others, we focus on employers’ decisions using comprehensive firm-
level data from the Swiss business census. We believe that the substitution
of training with hiring workers by employers is a relevant topic from
an educational-policy perspective for two reasons. First, apprentices are
quantitatively important within the Swiss educational system: around two
thirds of young people attend some kind of apprenticeship after compulsory
schooling; and second, the Swiss apprenticeship system is often viewed as
one of the key sources of the country’s economic success.
We focus on substitution with CBWs for both substantive and method-
ological reasons. First, and in contrast to many immigrants both working
and living in Switzerland (resident immigrant workers, henceforth1), CBWs
presumably have skills similar to those of natives, and they have the
advantage that they usually speak the same language as natives (e.g. Stöhr,
2015). We therefore expect that substitutability between apprentices and
CBWs will be higher than between apprentices and non-native workers in
general, many of whom are low skilled and/or do not speak any of the
country’s official languages.2 Second, CBWs are quantitatively relevant
1This group also includes persons born in Switzerland with non-native parents, because
citizenship is not automatically granted for persons born in the country.
2In general, immigrant inflows may have very different effects, depending on whether
they are substitutes or complements with natives (e.g. Peri and Sparber, 2009). For
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in the Swiss labor market: CBWs made up about 4.8% of the total
workforce in 2008 (i.e. the year which marks the endpoint of our empirical
analysis), representing about 18.2% of the total foreign workforce in that
year. Moreover, in relative terms, the increase in CBWs has recently been
much greater than in resident immigrant workers; between 1995 and 2008
(our analysis period), the total number of CBWs increased by about 46.1%
(from 146,773 to 214,377); then, between 2008 and 2018, it increased by
an additional 46.4% (to a total of 313,926 CBWs).3 Third and finally, the
focus on CBWs gives us the opportunity to implement a simple but powerful
instrumental-variable approach based on the country’s geography. Obviously,
a firm’s opportunities to employ CBWs depends on its location relative to the
national border. The closer to the border a firm is located, ceteris paribus,
the larger the pool of CBWs potentially available for this firm. Thus, we
consider the shortest travel time from a firm’s location (i.e. the municipality
it is located in) to the country border as a valid instrument for the share of
CBWs a firm employs, as we will argue in much greater detail below.
Our empirical approach is very close to that used by Dustmann et al.
(2017), who exploit the introduction of a policy in 1991 that led to a
sudden and large influx of Czech CBWs into the German labor market.
Specifically, the policy allowed Czech workers to seek employment, but not
residence, in border municipalities (see also Moritz, 2011). They find a
moderate negative effect on native wages and a rather large negative effect
on native employment: a one percentage point increase in the number of
Czech CBWs decreased native employment by about 0.93% three years after
the policy was implemented. They also find that the employment effects are
more pronounced for unskilled workers, who represent a closer substitute for
Switzerland, Gerfin and Kaiser (2010) argue that natives and resident immigrant workers
are imperfect substitutes, for example.
3These figures are taken from the employment statistics of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office, available at https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/work-
income/surveys/es.html. Note that there are slight discrepancies between these figures




Our empirical strategy is also close to that of Beerli et al. (2018), who use
a difference-in-differences approach to study how the removal of all remaining
immigration restrictions for workers from the European Union increased the
number of CBWs to Switzerland and how this in turn affected employment
and wages in the regions close to the border. Overall, they find that the
removal of the remaining restrictions led to an increase in overall native
employment, arguing that the policy increased firms’ overall labor demand.
Broadly consistent with this evidence, we find that firms which have
easier access to skilled workers partially substitute the training of resident
apprentices by hiring additional CBW. Our ordinary least square (OLS
henceforth) and two stage least square (2SLS henceforth) estimates are
consistent with each other and are robust across a wide range of robustness
checks. Moreover, as expected, 2SLS estimates are larger in absolute value
than the corresponding OLS estimates, and they are estimated precisely
enough to rule out statistical equivalence between OLS and 2SLS estimates.
Our preferred 2SLS estimate implies that an increase in the average share of
CBWs across firms of 1.14 percentage points, corresponding to the increase
observed in the share of CBWs in our analysis period, between 1995 and 2008,
leads to a corresponding decrease in the number of apprenticeship positions
of about 2%, equal to about 3,500 apprenticeship positions in absolute terms.
In contrast to our study, previous studies on the effects of immigrants
on the Swiss labor market have mainly focused on the overall effect of
immigration on either wages and/or employment among residents (i.e.
natives and previous immigrants).4 For example, Gerfin and Kaiser (2010),
using the structural skill-cell approach, estimate the wage effects from
immigration for the period 2002 to 2008. Their findings are mixed: Whereas
natives face no wage pressure on average, previous immigrants’ wages are
negatively affected. Across educational subgroups, highly educated workers
incur the largest wage losses. Favre et al. (2013) reach similar conclusions,
4To save space, we refrain from discussing the voluminous international empirical
literature on the effects of immigration. Among many others, both Borjas (2014) and
Bansak et al. (2015) contain such an overview.
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applying a shift-share instrumental-variable approach and focusing on the
period between 2002 and 2010. Moreover, their analysis also covers CBWs.
They find no overall negative effects of immigrants or CBWs on employment,
neither for Swiss-born nor for previously immigrated workers. However,
they find statistically significant effects for certain subgroups. A one
percent increase in the workforce due to immigration leads to a drop in
the employment rate of high skilled Swiss-born workers of 0.3 percentage
points. Moreover, whereas immigration does not affect the employment
rate of previously immigrated workers, CBW inflows do: a one percent
increase in the workforce due to CBWs decreases the employment rate of
previously immigrated workers by 0.2 percentage points. Similarly, Basten
and Siegenthaler (2019) find that immigration had limited negative effects
on natives’ employment as well as on their wages. Ruffner and Siegenthaler
(2016) explicitly focus on the increase in the number of CBWs in a difference-
in-difference approach and conclude that CBWs helped firms overcome their
skill shortages and increased firms’ productivity without crowding out native
employment. The study by Beerli et al. (2018) mentioned above also finds
that the overall effects of immigration were positive. Our study complements
this literature by providing estimates on the substitution of apprentices
with CBWs, a question which has not yet been addressed in the empirical
literature so far.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2
introduces Switzerland’s immigration policy during the analysis period,
describes the institutional background of the Swiss apprenticeship system,
and formulates our main hypothesis. Section 1.3 presents the data sources
and the construction of the key variables, along with descriptive statistics
of the key variables. Section 1.4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section




1.2.1 Immigration to Switzerland
Ever since the end of World War II, the proportion of immigrants in the
Swiss labor market has been increasing more or less steadily. Starting in
the boom of the 1950s, Switzerland became the host country for a large
number of immigrants.5 Consequently, in 2016, the share of non-native
residents in Switzerland reached nearly 25%. Initially, and until about
the 1980s, immigrants tended to be unskilled laborers (e.g. construction
workers), and a majority of them came from geographically close countries
(most importantly, from Italy and Spain). Afterwards, the composition of the
immigrant inflow changed in two notable ways. First, from about the 1990s
onwards, immigration became more heterogeneous; for example, a significant
influx of immigrants from former Yugoslavia occurred during and following
the Balkan wars. The other notable shift was towards more highly skilled
workers, starting in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Then, in 1999, Switzerland signed the bilateral Agreement on the Free
Movement of Persons (AFMP) with the European Union, which Swiss voters
approved in the national plebiscite in 2000. It took effect in 2002 and secured
the same legal labor status for both immigrants and CBWs6 as for native
employees. This new system displaced annual quotas, further eased the
opportunity for foreign individuals to work within Switzerland, and boosted
the numbers both of resident immigrant workers and of CBWs (see figure 1.1).
In 2008, at the end of our analysis period, most of the total of 217,011
CBWs lived in France (119,685), followed by Italy (47,904), Germany
5For a long-term overview of Swiss immigration legislation, see Ruedin et al. (2015),
for example.
6In 2002, restrictions on CBWs were first lifted in so-called border regions, which
contained municipalities close to the border and were defined in a political process at the
state and cantonal levels. The AFMP removed all restrictions on CBWs in border regions
in 2004 and in nonborder regions in 2007. However, Ruffner and Siegenthaler (2016) show
that the share of CBWs between border and nonborder regions differs only slightly once
they control for a firm’s distance to the border.
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Source: Federal Statistical Office 2017; own calculations.
(42,753), and Austria (6,670). No other country is mentioned in the official
statistics on CBWs for 2008. Within Switzerland, 67% percent of all CBWs
worked in only three cantons in 2008. The largest group, 54,808 CBWs
(25%), worked in the Canton of Geneva, which is located in the far west
of Switzerland and almost entirely surrounded by France. In the north
of Switzerland, bordering both Germany and France, the two half-cantons
of Basel hosted another 22% of the total of CBWs. Italian is the official
language in the Canton of Ticino in the south of Switzerland, which due to
its proximity to Italy attracted 44,941 CBWs in 2008 (20.7%).7
7All numbers in this paragraph are taken from the official statistics
on cross-border commuters by the Federal Statistical Office; available at
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/work-income/surveys/ccs.html. Note
that there are slight discrepancies between these figures and those derived from the data
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Beside the removal of the remaining legal hurdles in the course of the
implementation of the AFMP, there are two main reasons for this large
influx of CBWs into the Swiss labor market. First, differentials in real
wages are substantial (especially when also considering costs of living, which
are considerably lower outside Switzerland) and employment opportunities.8
Second, the country is landlocked and, due to its small size, the majority of its
settlement regions can be reached by car within one hour from a neighboring
country (although this ignores the time from a CBW’s home to the border).
Finally, Switzerland is not a linguistically homogeneous country, nor are its
national languages indigenous to the country. In fact, the official language of
each of the four countries that border Switzerland is also an official language
of Switzerland.9 Thus, language as a potential remaining barrier for labor
market integration after removing legal regulations is basically irrelevant at
the Swiss border. Thus, we argue that CBWs’ skill mix is relatively similar
to that of the resident workforce (cf. Appendix Table B.1).10
1.2.2 The Swiss apprenticeship system
In Switzerland, about two thirds of a cohort enter some kind of apprenticeship
training after compulsory schooling, which makes apprenticeship training
the most important educational track at the upper-secondary level (SERI,
2014). There are presently about 230 occupations to choose from, and regular
apprenticeship durations vary between two and four years. In most cases,
apprentices sign an apprenticeship contract with a training firm that also
pays them a wage, which is however considerably lower than that of a trained
used in the analysis below, due, for example, to different sample definitions).
8In fact, there is suggestive evidence that CBWs are paid substantially less than similar
native workers (SECO, 2019).
9Lichtenstein, a very small country located between Switzerland and Austria, is as good
as fully integrated in the Swiss labor and other markets. For this reason, it is considered
part of Switzerland in many statistics, including the official statistics on CBWs.
10Consequently, mean wages of CBWs (gross monthly median wage of 5,591 CHF) are
also more similar to natives’ wages (median wage of 5,872 CHF) than those of resident
non-native workers (median wage of 4,961 CHF); all wages are computed from the Swiss
Earnings Structure Survey of 2004.
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worker in the same occupation. The firm is responsible for the practical part
of the apprenticeship training. Most apprentices attend vocational school
for one or two days a week and spend the rest of the week in their training
firms. The alternative, a school-based apprenticeship program, is much less
common.11
Employers’ motives to provide apprenticeship positions: The costs
and benefits of apprenticeship training in Switzerland
The Swiss apprenticeship system relies heavily on the participation of mostly
private firms, which voluntarily decide whether they want to train apprentices
or not. From the employer’s point of view, there is a key trade-off between
the costs and the benefits of training apprentices (e.g. Mühlemann and
Wolter, 2014; Wolter et al., 2006). Training firms bear quite substantial costs,
including wages paid to the apprentices and wages for instructors providing
the institutionally required on-the-job training for the apprentices. In 2016,
these costs averaged roughly 100,000 Swiss francs per apprentice over the full
training period, equivalent to about 1.28 annual median wages Gehret et al.
(2019). However, training firms may profit from the apprentices’ productive
output during their time spent within the firm; by the end of the training,
this output is often not substantially different from that of other employees.
Consistent with this, empirical studies on the costs and benefits of
apprenticeship training in Switzerland (e.g. Gehret et al., 2019; Wolter
and Strupler, 2012) show that the benefits exceed the costs during the
apprenticeship period for about two thirds of all Swiss training firms. Thus,
the cumulative benefits from apprentices’ productive work by the end of
the training period equals or surpasses the cumulative costs of training for
these firms. The main reason for this is that apprentices in many occupations
become relatively productive early in their apprenticeships, while their wages
remain relatively low compared to those of fully trained workers.
11See Wettstein et al. (2014) for additional background information on the Swiss VET
system and how it fits into the country’s overall educational system. See also Wolter and
Ryan (2011) for a more general discussion of apprenticeship systems.
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The costs of hiring skilled workers
At the same time, empirical studies show substantial costs associated with
the hiring of skilled workers. In their study focusing specifically on Swiss
employers, for example, Blatter et al. (2012) document that hiring costs
for skilled workers, depending on firm size, equal about 10 to 17 weeks of
wage payments on average. Thus an alternative and possibly complementary
motivation for training apprentices, especially among those firms incurring
net training costs, is the retention of fully trained apprentices by employers to
satisfy their demand for skilled labor (e.g. Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner,
2010). This motive for training apprentices appears to be especially relevant
for firms operating in tight labor markets (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009;
Mühlemann and Leiser, 2018).12
In line with this argument, Blatter et al. (2016) show that Swiss firms that
face higher costs for hiring skilled workers from the external labor market
tend to train more apprentices and vice versa. They document relatively
large effects of hiring costs on the number of training positions, finding that
a one-standard-deviation increase in average hiring costs is associated with
an increase in the number of apprentices by about half a standard deviation.
1.2.3 Substitution between training apprentices and
hiring workers?
Taken together, there are two main motives for training apprentices that
are potentially affected by the ease of access to CBWs. First, during their
training, apprentices perform productive tasks that otherwise either unskilled
or skilled workers perform. Because apprentices earn a much lower wage than
either skilled or unskilled workers do, firms may exert a considerable cost
advantage when using apprentices for productive work (e.g. Mühlemann and
12More recent studies have argued that other motives are relevant as well. For example,
firms may use apprenticeship training to screen workers (Mohrenweiser et al., 2017) or as a
signaling device (Backes-Gellner and Tuor, 2010). More recently, Kuhn et al. (2019) have
argued that local norms describing the role of the state also have an influence on firms’
decisions to provide apprenticeship positions (cf. chapter 2.
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Wolter, 2014). However, this cost advantage of hiring apprentices shrinks if
labor becomes more widely available, so wages of skilled or unskilled workers
decrease relative to apprentices’ wages.
Second, because both the training of apprentices and the hiring of skilled
workers from the external labor market are very costly for employers, we
expect that easier access to CBWs reduces the hiring costs for employers
and may thus tip the balance in favor of hiring workers externally instead of
training apprentices.
Overall, both arguments predict partial substitution between training and
hiring, and we therefore expect that easier access to CBWs will lead some
employers to hire additional CBWs instead of training their own apprentices.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Firm-level data from the Swiss Business Census
The empirical analysis in this chapter relies mainly on information drawn
from the Swiss Business Census (“Betriebszählung”). The Business Census
covers the population of all firms active in either the second or the third
sector in Switzerland, and it includes information on a number of firm-level
characteristics, such as the number of employees, industrial affiliation, legal
status, geographic location, the number of apprentices, the number of CBWs,
and the number of resident immigrant workers (i.e. workers without Swiss
citizenship). We have to limit our analysis to the waves of 1995, 2005, and
2008 because only these three include information on the number of CBWs.13
After 2008, the Business Census was replaced by the firm register dataset
STATENT, which no longer includes information on apprentices and is thus
unsuitable for our purpose. The availability of data thus restricts the analysis
to the period between 1995 and 2008.
The only sample restriction that we additionally impose is that we exclude
all firms with fewer than three employees (thus excluding a total of 492,278
13However, we do use additional waves of the Business Census to approximate firms’
age, as described in more detail below.
12 Immigration
observations across the three waves). These firms constitute a significant
fraction of all firms (about 43% of all firms in the three waves covered by our
analysis), but they cover only a small fraction of all apprenticeship contracts
(only about 1.5% of all apprenticeship contracts). Thus, these observations
are not really useful when studying firm-provided apprenticeship training,
because most of them do not train any apprentices, and we therefore follow
the practice of other studies on the subject and exclude these firms from our
empirical analysis.14
As shown in Table 1.1, our analysis covers a total of 645,137 observations
at the firm×year-level, representing a total of 342,323 unique firm observa-
tions and 10,595,201 employee observations (see also Appendix Table B.2).
In the empirical analysis below, we use the absolute number of apprentices
employed by a given firm as our main dependent variable and the share
of CBWs as our main regressor (but we will show that these choices are
innocuous; see Section 1.5.2 below). Panel (a) of Table 1.1 shows that
there are, on average, 0.8 apprentices per firm (however, also note that less
than one-third of the firms train any apprentices). Apprentices constitute
about 4.8% of the total workforce in our sample in 2008. CBWs represent
only about 5.3% of the workforce but about 20% of all non-native workers.
Overall, the total number of apprentices in Switzerland grew by 37.3% from
1995 to 2008, while the number of CBWs increased by 50.5%. The total
workforce rose by 11.5% in the same period (cf. Table B.2).
Furthermore, we use the Business Census to construct several firm-level
controls (descriptives for most of these are shown in panel (b) of Table 1.1).
The controls include firms’ size by total number of employees and firm size
squared, 18 industry dummies, a dummy taking the value 1 if firm i is a
private firm and 0 if it is a public firm, and a dummy indicating foreign
ownership. Moreover, we add firms’ approximate age15 and firms’ share of
14For example, in their study on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in
Switzerland, Wolter and Strupler (2012) also focus on firms with at least three employees.
Of course, we will show that our main results are robust with regard to this decision (see
Table 1.9).
15Specifically, we include a factor variable Si for the number of sample appearances of
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Sample Standard Level of
Mean deviation Minimum Maximum aggregation
(a) Key variables
Number of apprentices 0.775 3.692 0 623 firm
Number of CBWs 0.795 10.592 0 2,503 firm
Share of apprentices 0.059 0.118 0 1 firm
Share of CBWs 0.034 0.116 0 1 firm
Any apprentices (yes = 1) 0.286 0.452 0 1 firm
Any CBWs (yes = 1) 0.131 0.337 0 1 firm
(b) Firm-level controls
Total number of employees 16.42 66.76 3 10,789 firm
3 - 10 employees 0.710 0.454 0 1 firm
11 - 50 employees 0.239 0.426 0 1 firm
51 - 100 employees 0.030 0.170 0 1 firm
> 100 employees 0.022 0.148 0 1 firm
Share resident immigrant workers 0.170 0.246 0 1 firm
Public firm (yes = 1) 0.116 0.320 0 1 firm
Foreign owned (yes = 1) 0.004 0.065 0 1 firm
Sector III (yes = 1) 0.782 0.413 0 1 firm
(c) Location-specific controls
Log inhabitants 9.35 1.68 3.09 12.64 municipality
Population density 1,906 2,548 0.740 12,214 municipality
Log firms 8.58 0.902 5.68 10.17 LM-region
Log firms same industry 5.14 1.42 0 8.20 LM-region
% of population working 62.39 2.10 55.61 67.48 LM-region
% Employed in sector III 71.00 10.74 27.08 91.45 LM-region
Median income (CHF) 7,139 691.0 5,500 9,000 LM-region
% Romance 0.290 0.454 0 1 municipality
Social norm 0.196 0.075 0.010 0.956 municipality
(d) Distance to schools in km
High school 6.60 9.24 0 134.15 municipality
VET school 4.45 6.50 0 70.35 municipality
Full-time VET school 8.78 10.71 0 136.83 municipality
(e) Distance to border
Travel time by car in minutes 35.38 18.90 3.52 106.26 municipality
Log travel time by car in minutes 3.394 0.634 1.258 4.666 municipality
Observations (year-firm) 645,137 - - - -
Observations (firms) 342,323 - - - -
Observations (municipalities) 2,331 - - - -
Observations (LM-region) 106 - - - -
Sources: Business Census 1995, 2005, 2008; SLFS 2014; Census 2000; Federal Office of Topography
2014; own calculations.
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resident immigrant workers to our firm specific controls. The intuition for
including these two last control variables is set out in the Appendix A dealing
with the validity of the instrument.
1.3.2 Additional regional-level controls
Panels (c) and (d) of Table 1.1 show descriptives for our additional location-
specific controls. We also derive the log number of firms within the same
labor market region, the log number of firms in the same industry within
the same labor market, and the share of employees in the third sector within
the respective labor market region from the Business Census. We employ
some additional variables from the Federal Statistical Office to control for
regional variation in the composition of the residents, such as the logarithm
of municipalities’ inhabitants and their population density. Furthermore, we
calculate the median income for every labor market region from the Swiss
Labor Force Survey 2014 (“Schweizerische Arbeitskräfteerhebung”) to control
for regional income differentials. Finally, we include 26 cantonal and three
language dummies. Note that the regional variables are measured at either
the municipal level or at the level of 106 labor-market regions (cf. last column
of Table 1.1).
Moreover, following the analysis by Kuhn et al. (2019), we also control
for a local norm favoring the private over state provision of public goods
and consequently influencing firms’ investment in apprenticeship training.
Controlling for this norm could be important in our context because there is
a pronounced regional pattern in the strength of the norm. We follow Kuhn
et al. (2019) and use the municipality results from two national-level votes
on the role of the state within VET policy to measure this norm.16
firm i, e.g. for firm i we do not observe in the waves 1991 and 1995 but in the waves 1998
to 2008, Si = 3 in 2005 and Si = 4 in 2008. Note that waves 1998 and 2001 are not part
of our sample because they lack information on CBWs; however, we observe whether a
firm existed in these waves.
16We use the mean share of supporting votes from two popular initiatives that demanded
a stronger role of the state in the VET system (i.e. smaller values on this variable denote
a stronger norm towards the private provision of training). See Kuhn et al. (2019) for
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Although the principal aim of this chapter is to analyze the effect of
CBWs on firms’ supply of apprenticeships, note that we observe concluded
apprenticeship contracts, the number of which is likely affected by pupils’
demand for apprenticeships as well.17 For this reason, we also include a
firm’s distance from the nearest high school, VET school, and full-time VET
school as exogenous demand shifters in most of our estimations.
1.3.3 Distance to the national border
A final variable of interest is a firm’s distance from the national border, which
we will use as instrument for the share of CBWs within a firm (this idea is
discussed in Section 1.4 below in detail). To construct this variable, we use
the matrix of travelling times put together by the Federal Office of Spatial
Development, which contains the average travel time by car in minutes
between any two Swiss municipalities (it also contains average travelling time
when moving from one place to another within the same municipality). We
set the minimum distance from the national border for every firm equal to the
minimum travelling time by car from the municipality within which a given
firm is located to one of the 138 different municipalities with a navigable
border crossing. See Figure 1.2 for a graphical representation of this variable.
On average, firms included in our analysis lie 36.7 minutes by car away
from the border. There is large variation in the travelling time to the border:
The minimum travel time is only 3.5 minutes (for the municipality of Le
Grand-Saconnex in the Canton of Geneva), whereas the maximum is 106.3
minutes (for the municipality of Innertkirchen in the Canton of Bern; cf.
Figure 1.2). In the analysis below, we use the natural logarithm of this
variable, which ranges from 1.26 to 4.67 (see panel (e) of Table 1.1 for the
corresponding descriptives).
additional details.
17Note in this context that we deviate from the standard notation in labor economics as
we distinguish between firms’ supply of and pupils demand for apprenticeships, whereas
in labor economics firms usually demand labor and workers supply it. This also applies in
Chapter 2.
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Notes: The figure shows the minimum travelling distance from each municipality to the
national border. The green dots indicate the center of a bordering municipality; the red




To estimate the effect of CBWs on firms’ training incidence, we start with
the following basic regression equation:
Ai = α + βCBWi + γxi + δzj[i] + ψt[i] + εi (1.1)
The dependent variable Ai corresponds to the absolute number of apprentices
employed by firm i, and the regressor of main interest is the share of CBWs
working in firm i, denoted by CBWi in Equation (1.1).
18 Most specifications
18More specifically, the share of CBWs is the ratio of the number of CBWs to the total
number of employees including apprentices. Because apprentices are different from fully-
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will control for several firm-level characteristics described in Section 1.3.1,
denoted by xi. The characteristics of region j (see Section 1.3.2), where firm
i is located in, enter as zj[i] on the right-hand side of Equation (1.1). Finally,
we also include a full set of census-year fixed effects, denoted by ψt[i].
Whatever the exact set of controls, β is the parameter of main interest,
because it quantifies the partial association between a firm’s share of CBWs
and its number of apprentices. Throughout the analysis, we present robust
standard errors that are clustered at the municipality level to account for
potential correlation in the error terms of firms located within the same
municipality (e.g. Cameron and Miller, 2015).
1.4.2 Instrumental-variable estimates
However, even after controlling for a large set of firm- and regional-level
controls, OLS estimates of the parameter β from Equation (1.1) may suffer
from endogeneity bias. Assume, for example, that firms hire additional
CBWs to satisfy an increasing demand for their products during an economic
upswing. For the same reason, firms concurrently hire more apprentices
performing productive tasks. In this case, OLS estimates would reveal
a positive correlation between firms’ share of CBWs and the number of
apprentices they employ, though no causal interpretation applies.
To account for potential endogeneity issues of this kind, we propose an IV
approach exploiting the fact that commuting distances impose considerable
costs on CBWs, and distance to the border therefore constrains firms’ hiring
of CBWs.19 Consequently, we instrument the share of CBWs employed by
firm i with the minimum distance to the national border of municipality j
firm i is located, measured by the log travel time by car, ln(Dj[i]).
20 Thus,
trained workers, and because they implicitly appear on both sides of Equation (1.1), we
also checked that our results are robust to an alternative construction of this variable not
counting apprentices as part of a firm’s workforce (see Section 1.5.2 below).
19More specifically, commuting costs consist of both direct transportation costs and the
opportunity costs arising during the commuting time.
20We chose this parameterization of the instrument because it yields the highest fit
in the first-stage regression. We also checked that other parameterizations yield similar
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we argue that variation in municipalities’ minimum car-driving time to the
national border induces quasi-experimental variation in firms’ possibility to
employ CBWs. The following two equations capture the essence of this
approach:
Ai = α + β ̂CBWi + γxi + δzj[i] + ψt[i] + εi, (1.2)
where Ai, xi, zj[i], and ψt[i] are the same as in Equation (1.1) discussed above,
but where ̂CBWi comes from the following first-stage regression:
CBWi = π0 + π1 ln(Dj[i]) + π2xi + π3zj[i] + ψt[i] + υi. (1.3)
As usual in such a setup, we use Equation (1.3) to empirically test
the strength of the instrument (first-stage estimates, and associated test
statistics, are discussed in Section 1.5.1). The instrument should also
meet the additional requirements of being as good as randomly assigned
(possibly conditional on some set of controls) and not having a direct effect
on the outcome (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). We
discuss these two additional requirements, which cannot directly be tested
empirically, in Appendix A, and we present some robustness checks related to
the concern of endogenous locational decisions of employers in Section 1.5.2.
Figure 1.3 shows the spatial distribution of the share of CBWs at the
district level. Supporting our argument above, it is immediately evident
that the density of CBWs decreases strongly with a region’s distance from
the national border. As a consequence, variation among the 148 districts is
large and ranges from the district of Gersau in in the Canton of Lucerne
in central Switzerland with no CBWs at all to Mendrisio in the Canton of
Ticino with a share of CBWs of 34 percent.
results (see Table 1.5.2 below).
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Notes: The figure shows the spatial distribution of the share of CBWs (i.e. the ratio of





Table 1.2 shows OLS estimates of a series of regressions that relate a firm’s
number of apprentices to its share of CBWs, according to the setup of
equation (1.1).
First, the raw association between the number of apprentices and the
share of CBWs, shown in column (1) of Table 1.2, is negative but not
statistically significant (β̂ = −0.220). The next column adds census-year
dummies, leaving the relevant estimate virtually unchanged (β̂ = −0.250).
Column (3) adds firm-level controls, which yield a negative and statistically
significant estimate (β̂ = −1.039). Thus, compared to the previous two
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Table 1.2: Main results (OLS estimates)
Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of CBWs -0.220 -0.250 -1.039∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -0.709∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.173) (0.114) (0.133) (0.133)
[-0.010] [-0.011] [-0.045] [-0.031] [-0.031]
Census year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Location controls No No No Yes Yes
Distance to schools No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.298 0.300 0.300
Observations 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by
municipalities.
columns, this specification points to a possible substitution by of training
apprentices with hiring CBWs. The change in the estimated coefficient
also suggests that those firms that are, ceteris paribus, more likely to hire
apprentices are also more likely to hire CBWs. Further adding regional
controls, including the full set of cantonal dummies, yields a comparable,
yet somewhat smaller estimate of β̂ = −0.710, suggesting that some of
the regional-level characteristics are correlated with both the incidence of
training and the likelihood of hiring CBWs. More precisely, the change in
β̂ suggests that regional features that make firms in these locations more
likely to train apprentices are negatively correlated with the share of CBWs.
Finally, we add the three distance-to-schools variables in the fifth, which
again yields an estimate very close to that in the previous column. The
estimate of β̂ = −0.709 in the fifth column implies that a 10 percentage
point increase in employers’ share of CBWs is associated with 0.071 fewer
apprentices per employer on average (we provide a more detailed discussion
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of the economic size of the estimated effects further below).
2SLS estimates
We next turn to the instrumental variable approach introduced in Sec-
tion 1.4.2, using a firm’s distance to the national border as an instrument for
its share of CBWs.21
Table 1.3: Main results (2SLS estimates)
Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of CBWs -1.778∗∗∗ -1.790∗∗∗ -1.958∗∗∗ -1.319∗∗∗ -1.445∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.438) (0.301) (0.291) (0.272)
[-0.077] [-0.077] [-0.085] [-0.057] [-0.062]
Census year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Location controls No No No Yes Yes
Distance to schools No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.300 0.300
Observations 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137
F-statistic (first-stage) 201.6 201.8 174.4 170.7 183.0
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by
municipalities.
Table 1.3 presents the resulting 2SLS estimates and also starts with a
simple specification that includes no control variables at all. Instrumenting
a firm’s share of CBWs with its minimum distance to the border yields
a negative and statistically significant estimate (β̂ = −1.778). Moreover,
21Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4 show the corresponding first-stage and reduced-form
estimates, respectively. Both effects are statistically significant and, more importantly,
sizable and rather precisely estimated. Also note that both are relatively stable across the
various specifications.
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in comparison with the corresponding OLS estimate, the 2SLS estimate is
considerably larger, and the increase in the estimate also makes up for the
parallel increase in the standard error relative to the OLS estimate.22
We include census-year fixed effects in column (2) to account for changes
in Switzerland’s immigration policy during our sample period. However, this
hardly changes the relevant estimate (mirroring the pattern from Table 1.2
above), which equals β̂ = −1.790 in this specification.23 In column (3), we
add our full set of firm-specific controls. The resulting estimate of β̂ = −1.958
is somewhat smaller, but still close to that in the previous column, and it
remains highly statistically significant. Column (4) of Table 1.3 adds our
set of regional controls. This yields a somewhat smaller (i.e. less negative)
estimate of β̂ = −1.319, which, however, remains highly significant.
Finally, the specification shown in column (5) also includes a firms’
minimum distance to three schooling facilities (dual VET school, full school
VET institutions, and high school). This specification, including the full
set of controls, yields an estimate of β̂ = −1.445, which remains highly
statistically significant. This is our preferred estimate of the effect of
CBWs on firms’ provision of apprenticeship positions. Compared to the
corresponding OLS estimate from column (5) of Table 1.2, the 2SLS estimate
is about twice as large (i.e. more negative). Moreover, note that both
OLS and 2SLS estimates are quite precisely estimated (the OLS and 2SLS
estimates have similar t-values).
Quantifying the economic size of the estimated effect
Taken together, the estimates shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 support our
hypothesis that firms tend to substitute between training resident apprentices
and hiring CBWs when access to CBWs is easier. Also consistent with our
22Consistent with this estimate, Appendix Figure B.1 shows that firms located in regions
closer to the national border tend to train fewer apprentices on average than firms in
regions further away from the border.
23We also estimated a model that included the interaction terms between the census-
year dummies and the share of CBWs. The resulting 2SLS estimates on the interaction
terms are positive, but statistically not significantly different from zero.
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prior expectations, 2SLS estimates are larger (i.e. more negative) than the
corresponding OLS estimates. Before providing additional robustness checks,
we discuss the economic size of the estimates.
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations may illustrate the economic size
of the estimated effect. Our preferred 2SLS estimate (i.e. that from column
(5) of Table 1.3) of β̂ = −1.445 implies that a ten percentage point increase
in the mean share of CBWs decreases the number of apprentices trained
by employers by 0.1446 on average. However, most firms presumably employ
much smaller shares of CBWs (see Table 1.1 again). Thus, as a more realistic
benchmark, we may use the change observed in the share of CBWs between
1995 and 2008, the time period covered by our analysis. Within this time
period, the observed share of CBWs for the average firm increased from
2.73% to 3.87%: an increase of 1.14 percentage points (cf. Table B.2).24
Everything else constant, our baseline 2SLS estimate thus informs us that
this will translate into a decrease of 0.0164 apprentices by each employer.
There were 212,081 firms in our sample in 1995, and 219,950 in 2008. Thus,
approximately 3,500 apprenticeship positions were substituted by CBWs
within this time period (-3,493 to -3,629, depending on whether we use the
absolute number of firms in 1995 or in 2008). This corresponds to about 2%
of the total of apprenticeship positions in relative terms (-2.498% to -1.891%).
24Note that the share of CBWs at the level of the firm differs from the share of CBWs in
the workforce (compare the statistics from Tables 1.1 and B.2). Apparently, larger firms
tend to hire more CBWs than smaller firms.
24 Immigration
1.5.2 Robustness
We next probe the robustness of our estimates.
Alternative specifications
As a first check, Table 1.4 presents a series of alternative specifications of
our baseline model from column (5) of Table 1.3 (note that the first column
of Table 1.4 simply replicates this specification for the ease of comparison).
We estimate specifications that use a slightly different parameterization of
the instrument. Instead of using ln(Dj[i]) as in the baseline specification,
we use either Dj[i], a quadratic in ln(Dj[i]) or a quadratic in Dj[i] (columns
(2) to (4) in Table 1.4). Evidently, all these alternative specifications yield
estimates of β close to our baseline estimate; in these three specifications, β̂
varies between -1.637 and -1.086.
The remaining four columns use different parameterizations of either the
endogenous variable or the dependent variable. Specifically, we use the
absolute number of CBWs (instead of the share of CBWs) as endogenous
variable in column (5). By construction, this yields a somewhat different
estimate of β̂ = −0.068; however, note that the associated elasticity is
similar to that in column (1), -0.07 versus -0.062. Another variation, shown
in column (6) of Table 1.4, uses a slightly different definition of the share
of CBWs. While we do count apprentices as employees in the baseline
specification, we construct the share of CBWs in this specification as the ratio
of the number of CBWs to the number of employees excluding apprentices.
Again, this yields an almost identical estimate (β̂ = −1.392) as our baseline
specification. In column (7), we regress the share of apprentices on the share
of CBWs. The resulting estimate of β̂ = −0.110 is substantially smaller than
that from the baseline specification. Note, however, that this is primarily
due to the difference in the scaling of the dependent variable (also note that,
again, the implied elasticity is virtually identical to that from the baseline
specification). Finally, we construct a dummy being 1 for training firms and
0 otherwise in column (8), which we then regress on the share of CBWs.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































apprentices on the extensive margin. Thus, easier access to CBWs leads
some firms to stop training apprentices altogether.
Overall, our estimate of the substitution between CBWs and apprentices
appears robust to some obvious alternative parameterizations of the instru-
ment and to the endogenous and the dependent variables. We next turn to
some more subtle issues.
Unobservable firm characteristics
In our baseline estimates (Table 1.3) we include various firm-specific controls
in an effort to account for the fact that the potential to hire apprentices
varies substantially among firms, for example of different size or across
different industries. However, other firm characteristics interacting with
firms’ provision of apprenticeship positions might be unobservable.25 To
dispel concerns to that effect, Table 1.5 applies our estimation approach to
differenced data in a subsample of 212,730 firms surveyed at least twice within
our sample.26
The regressions underlying the estimates shown in Table 1.5 deviate
slightly from the conventional instrumental variable setting using difference
data because our instrument does not vary at all over time. We therefore
instrument the change in the share of CBWs with a firm’s distance to the
border as well. This implies that we assume that the distance to the border
not only predicts the share of CBWs in a given year but also the change in the
share of CBWs between two consecutive waves of the business census.27 The
25In this context, Beerli et al. (2018) present evidence that the inflow of CBWs affected
firms in many dimensions, e.g. increasing their size and productivity. Exploiting within-
firm variation in the share of CBWs in this section also addresses concerns that such
changes in firm characteristics threat our identification strategy.
26The total of 332,456 observations in Table 1.5 consist of 20,246 observations from firms
observed in 1995 and 2005, 72,758 observations from firms observed in 2005 and 2008, and
239,452 observations from 119,726 firms observed in all three waves.
27That is, we estimate regressions of the following form:
∆Ai = β∆CBWi + γ∆xi + δ∆zj[i] + ∆εi,
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corresponding first-stage F-statistics in Table 1.5 displaying values between
45.28 and 52.60 confirm this.
Table 1.5: First-differenced data (2SLS estimates)
∆ Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Share of CBWs -1.572 -3.000∗∗ -3.006∗∗
(1.215) (1.189) (1.195)
[-0.045] [-0.086] [-0.088]
∆ Firm controls No Yes Yes
∆ Location controls No No Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.066 0.066
Observations 332,456 332,456 332,456
F-statistic (first-stage) 45.28 51.18 52.56
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses and are clustered by municipalities.
The estimate in column (1) of Table 1.5 has about the same size as the
baseline estimate from Table 1.3 but is statistically insignificant due to its
large associated standard error. In contrast, the estimates in columns (2)
and (3) of Table 1.5 suggest that an increase in the share of CBWs leads to
substitution away from apprentices. Taking into account that these estimates
are relatively imprecisely estimated, they appear in line with the baseline
estimate from Section 1.5.1. This in turn suggests that our main finding
remains robust when accounting for unobservable firm characteristics.
Firms’ age and endogenous locational choices by employers
Endogenous location decisions by firms pose a potential threat to our
identification strategy. We discuss this issue in some detail in Appendix A
where ∆ denotes that a variable has been differenced. As in the main analysis, we
instrument ∆CBWi with ln(Dj[i]).
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and argue that the evidence points towards relatively large differences in the
provision of apprenticeship positions between different types of firms. For
example, newly established firms, as well as firms changing their location,
tend to train fewer apprentices than existing and non-moving firms.28 At
the same time, these differences in training behavior also appear to correlate
with locational choices of employers, even though the differences in distance
from the border are relatively small. In combination, these two findings may
imply that endogenous location decisions could impact our 2SLS estimates.
Table 1.6 first tackles concerns regarding endogenous location decisions
by estimating our baseline specification within various subsamples of firms
of similar age; consequently, the time at which and the duration since these
firms made their initial location choices are comparable. In order to assign
firms to any of the three subsamples of columns (2) to (4) in Table 1.6,
we approximate their age by identifying firms throughout our sample period.
Concretely, we identify three types of firms. Firms included in all waves enter
the subsample of column (2). These firms were already established in 1991
(first wave) and remained within our sample until 2008. The approximation
of firms’ age within this subsample remains relatively vague, because we
can only state that these firms were present in our sample for the same
duration, but we are unable to estimate the duration of their existence
prior to 1991. The column (3) subsample of newly established firms only
considers observations of firms appearing in our sample for the first time;
hence, these firms are between zero and three years (the maximum number
of years between two waves) old. In column (4), we construct a subsample
of middle-aged firms by restricting the sample to observations of the 2005
and 2008 waves, respectively, and only include firms which appear for the
first time in our sample either in 1995 or 1998. This limits the subsample in
column (4) to firms of age seven to sixteen years.29 All estimates in Table 1.6
28However, the finding that newly established firms train fewer apprentices is not new
(see Müller and Schweri, 2012, for example).
29Among these firms, the youngest possible firms appeared for the first time in the 1998
wave (founded in 1998) and are observed in 2005. The possibly oldest firms (founded in





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































are statistically significant. The size of the estimates in column (2) and (4)
are fairly similar to our baseline specification in column (1), whereas the
estimate in column (3) is somewhat smaller. Given the lower number of
apprentices across newly established firms in the subsample of column (3),
this smaller estimate seems plausible and corresponds to a similar effect in
relative terms.30
Finally, column (5) focuses on the small subsample of firms which move to
another municipality between two consecutive waves of the business census
(see also Appendix A for additional details). We find β̂ to be of similar
size to the baseline estimate when using only this subsample of moving
firms. Overall, we conclude that the negative effect of CBW inflows on
firms’ training provision pertains across firms of various ages and is therefore
neither biased by the establishment of new firms nor the moving of existing
firms.
Additional robustness checks
Table 1.7 presents some additional robustness checks. Again, the first column
of Table 1.7 simply replicates the baseline specification column (5) of Table
1.3. In column (2) of Table 1.7, we first enlarge the sample by also including
492,278 observations from firms with 2 or fewer employees (cf. Table B.2).
The resulting 2SLS estimate of β̂ = −1.065 becomes less negative than our
baseline specification because firms’ average number of apprentices among
this subsample is smaller. However, considering the statistical imprecision,
the estimate in column (5) is again close to our baseline specification.
Column (3) of Table 1.7 limits our sample to 256,040 firms located within
30 minutes’ car driving from the border (i.e. Dj[i] ≤ 30 or ln(Dj[i]) ≤ 3.40,
respectively). We argue that regions within this small bandwidth are
comparable, e.g. in geography or economic structure. Reassuringly, the
30The average number of apprentices per firm among the subsamples of columns (1) to
(4) are 0.78, 1.05, 0.33, and 0.66. Multiplying the estimates with a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of CBWs yields a substitution of 18% to 20% of the total number of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimate of β̂ = −1.828 applied for firms located close to the border is again
of similar magnitude as in our baseline specification.
Next, we limit our sample to private for-profit firms in column (4). The
coefficient of β̂ = −1.363 in column (4) pertaining for for-profit firms is
comparable to the baseline estimate in column (1). This assures us that
our results are not driven by state authorities, which arguably face different
budget restrictions than privately-run firms.
In column (5) we control for a full set of local labor-market fixed effects
(using a set of 106 dummies) instead of including cantonal-level dummies.
While cantons are Switzerland’s most important jurisdictional entities, labor
markets are often not bound to their borders and are alternatively defined by
the Federal Statistical Office by commuting patterns. The resulting estimate
of β̂ = −1.688 in column (5) thus yields the effect of CBW inflows on the
provision of apprenticeship positions by firms that operate in the same market
in terms of product demand and labor supply.
In the last three columns of Table 1.7, we check whether the negative effect
of the share of CBWs on firms’ training provision is persistent throughout
all three waves of the Business Census covered by our sample. The three
corresponding estimates of columns (6) to (8) vary little (between β̂ = −1.373
to β̂ = −1.501), their confidence intervals overlap widely, and they are almost
identical to the estimate in the baseline specification of column (1).
1.5.3 Heterogeneity
In the final part of the empirical analysis, we check whether we find
heterogeneous effects conforming to prior expectations to further corroborate
our main finding.
Training costs
In this subsection, we test whether varying apprenticeship costs among
firms translates into heterogeneous substitution effects between CBWs and
apprentices. A priori, we expect the substitution effect to increase with
firms’ apprenticeship costs for two reasons. First, roughly two thirds of all
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Swiss training firms profit financially from training apprentices.31 Arguably,
the incentive to substitute apprentices with CBWs is relatively low for firms
that profit financially from their apprentices. Second, firms bearing net costs
during an apprenticeship often seek to satisfy their future skill demand by
retaining fully trained apprentices (Blatter et al., 2016). Inflows of CBWs,
which enlarge the supply of skilled workers and increase the possibility to
recruit on the external labor market, lower this particular incentive of firms
to provide apprenticeship positions.
We test this hypothesis by first estimating β across subsamples defined
by the average net cost of an apprenticeship ck[i] in industry k firm i operates
in (see Table 1.8, columns (1) to (3)).32 Whereas the first two columns
aggregate firms operating in industries that display either strongly negative
(column 1) or moderately negative (column 2) net costs (i.e. net profits in
these cases) from apprenticeship training, column (3) aggregates industries
in which firms on average bear positive net costs from offering apprenticeship
positions.
The estimate of β̂ = −0.580 in column (1) is relatively small and
statistically insignificant. This suggests that firms that tend to profit
financially from training apprentices are less likely to substitute apprentices
with CBWs. In contrast, the estimate from column (2) suggests a
negative association between the share of CBWs and the number of
apprentices. Apparently, these firms partly substitute apprentices with
31This applies especially in occupations where training curricula require few instructions
and little time for practicing. In these occupations, the productivity gap between
apprentices and regular workers is therefore relatively low. Another third of the Swiss
training firms bear sometimes substantial net cost during an apprenticeship; see Gehret
et al. (2019) and Section 1.2.2 for details.
32Ideally, we would like to calculate the apprenticeship net costs at firm level or at least
occupational level because training curricula, which partly determine firms’ VET costs,
are occupation specific. Unfortunately, we do not observe occupations in the Business
Census. As a second-best solution, we approximate firms’ apprenticeship costs by the
average net costs within 82 industries (at the NOGA 2-digit level) derived from the most
recent data on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training available (Gehret et al.,
2019).
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity by costs of apprenticeship training (2SLS
estimates)
Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ck[i] < p25 ∈ [p25, p75] > p75 Full sample
Share of CBWs -0.580 -1.257∗∗∗ -3.344∗∗∗ -1.724∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.303) (0.726) (0.285)
[-0.022] [-0.057] [-0.150] [-0.074]





Census year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to schools Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.333 0.243 0.462 0.304
Observationsa 159,274 373,078 111,988 644,340
F-statistic (first-stage) for:
Share of CBWs 180.0 144.2 210.5 95.16
Share of CBWs ×ck[i] 131.15
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by
municipalities. ck[i] denotes the average costs of an apprenticeship in the NOGA-2-digit
category k firm i operates in. p25 and p75 denote the 25th and 75th percentile of the
distribution of ck[i], respectively.
aBecause we do not observe at least one apprenticeship
in every NOGA-2-digit industry in the cost/benefit data, we lose some observations
compared to our baseline sample.
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CBWs even though they also tend to make a profit from training. One
potential explanation for this pattern might be that firms usually recruit
teenagers with no previous work experience at all for open training positions.
This considerably limits firms’ ability to assess apprentices’ productivity.
Therefore, the employer is often very uncertain about the expected costs
and benefits. The fact that about 20% of all apprenticeship contracts
end prematurely further adds to this uncertainty. In contrast, CBWs
with a formal degree and positive work experience likely represent a more
predictable alternative to firms. Column (3) focuses on industries in which
firms bear net costs from offering an apprenticeship on average. The estimate
of β̂ = −3.344 reveals that the rate of substitution is much higher in this
particular subsample of firms.
Finally, we return to the full sample in column (4) but simply interact
the share of CBWs, and consequently also the instrument ln(Dj[i]), with
the industry average costs of an apprenticeship ck[i]. Consistent with the
estimates from columns (1) to (3), the negative coefficient associated with
the interaction term implies that the effect of CBWs on firms’ VET provision
increases with respect to apprenticeship net costs of industry k in which firm
i is operating.
Additional subsample results
As a final robustness check, we provide several additional subsample results
in Table 1.9 and compare them to the baseline specification displayed in
column (1) for ease of comparison.
First, columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.9 present subsample estimates
among small (50 or less employees) and large (more than 50 employees)
firms, respectively. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1%
level, but β̂ = −11.523 in column (3) appears much larger than β̂ = −0.874
in column (2). These differences arise largely due to different levels of the
outcome variable across the two subsamples, however. In the baseline sample
of column (1), firms employ an average of 0.78 apprentices, while this number












































































































































































































































































































































































































(3). Consequently, β̂ = −1.445 in column (1) and β̂ = −11.523 in column
(3) associates a ten percentage point increase in the share of CBWs with a
decrease in Ai of 17.5% among firms in the baseline sample and 21.8% among
firms with 50 or more employees.
Another contrast of interest is based on the observation (cf. Appendix
Figure B.2) that the majority of CBWs in the German, French, and
Italian language regions stem from Germany or Austria, France, and Italy,
respectively. These differences in CBWs’ countries of origin combined with
differences across the educational systems of Germany, Austria, France, and
Italy likely translate into different skill compositions of CBWs across Swiss
language regions. Germany and Austria have VET systems similar to that in
Switzerland, so, from a firm’s perspective, hiring CBWs from these countries
represents a relative close substitute for investments in VET.33 In contrast,
the Swiss vocational track differs both in size and type from the French
or Italian vocational tracks. This limits the possibility to substitute VET
investments by hiring CBWs for firms that rely on skills provided specifically
by a Swiss-type VET system and that are located in the French or Italian
language regions of Switzerland.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1.9 test these hypotheses by applying the
baseline specification (column 1) separately to a subsample of firms located in
German language (column 4) and Romance language (column 5) regions.34
In line with the hypothesize put forth above, the estimate of β̂ = −1.351
among firms in the German language region exceeds the estimate of β̂ =
−0.883 among firms in the Romance language regions by roughly 50%. Note,
however, that the confidence interval of the German-subsample coefficient is
relatively large, and it is questionable whether the differences between the
33According to Field et al. (2010) a dual VET system, in which pupils spend most of their
time within a firm, is especially common in the German-speaking countries Switzerland,
Germany, and Austria. In contrast, France and Italy have lower overall numbers of VET
pupils at the upper secondary level and low shares of combined school and work-based
VET programs.
34The Romance language parts of Switzerland consist of the French, Italian, and
Romansh language regions of Switzerland.
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language regions are indeed statistically significant.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 1.9, we check that our results are
not entirely driven by those regions with a disproportionate share of CBWs
(i.e. the two half-cantons of Basel and the cantons of Ticino and Geneva).
Column (6) first shows the 2SLS estimate when these regions are excluded
from the sample, yielding an estimate of β̂ = −1.412, which is again very
close to the baseline estimate, though less precisely estimated. Finally, we
estimate the same specification using only firms from these regions, again
yielding a similar estimate of β̂ = −1.342 (note that this estimate remains
statistically significant even though it uses a much smaller sample than the
baseline specification).
1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the potential substitution of employers between
hiring CBWs and training apprentices of firms operating in the Swiss labor
market. To account for potential biases and reverse-causality issues related
to employers’ hiring decisions, we focus on CBWs and apply IV approach,
using a firm’s distance from the national border as instrument for its share
of CBWs. Within our sample period, we argue that firms’ location choice is
largely unrelated to the distance to the border, and we thus argue that our
instrument induces quasi-random variation in firms’ shares of CBWs. We
apply this empirical strategy to three waves of the Business Census (1995,
2005, and 2008), including a total of 645,137 observations stemming from
342,323 firms.
Our preferred 2SLS estimate implies that the increase of 1.14 percentage
points in firms’ shares of CBWs within our sample period from 1995 to
2008 led to a substitution of roughly 3,500 apprenticeship positions (about
2% of all apprentice positions in relative terms). This effect is statistically
significant. Moreover, various robustness specifications show that this result
is not sensitive to the exact specification of either the dependent or the
exogenous variables, that it holds in different subsamples and for different
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sets of control variables, and that 2SLS estimates using differenced data also
suggest our result to be robust to unobservable firm characteristics.
The present chapter is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyze
the effect of immigration on firms’ provision of apprenticeship training. The
potential substitution of firms between training apprentices and hiring CBWs
is not only interesting from an economic point of view but also bears political
relevance, because the apprenticeship system is a key pillar within the
country’s educational system. Importantly, however, our results do not imply
that young natives do not receive any education or training because firms
substitute for apprenticeship positions. In fact, our results are consistent
with the finding from other studies that immigration pushes natives into
other educational tracks and occupations (e.g. Foged and Peri, 2016; Peri
and Sparber, 2009). Our results do, however, suggest that immigration
undermines the incentives of firms to participate in the firm-based system
of education and training.
Moreover, our results also raise the more general question of substitution
between firms training their own workforce versus hiring immigrant workers,
whether cross-border or not. However, we believe that the answer to that
question cannot directly be inferred from our results. On the one hand, we
suspect that the general immigrant population in the Swiss labor market
differs from CBWs in their degree of substitutability. On the other hand,
resident immigrants tend to constitute a much larger share of the workforce
than CBWs. This applies especially for Switzerland, where roughly 25%
of the working population are foreigners, whereas CBWs make up only
about 5% of the workforce. We thus motivate further analyses focusing on
immigration as a whole and not limit the analysis to CBWs as this chapter
does.
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A Assessing instrument validity
In this appendix, we discuss the validity of our instrument, i.e. a firm’s
minimum distance from the national border. While we can use the first-
stage estimates to assess the partial correlation between our instrument and
the endogenous variable, the other two requirements for an instrument, i.e.
the assumption concerning the (quasi-)random assignment of the instrument
and the exclusion restriction, cannot be tested empirically (e.g. Angrist and
Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010).
A.1 Endogenous location and training decisions by
employers
Quite obviously, a firm’s distance to the border is not random. Rather, firms
decide where to locate. Within our instrumental variable approach, firms
deliberately choosing their location with respect to its distance from the
border may violate the assumption of the instrument being quasi-randomly
assigned. If these firms differ systematically from other firms in their
provision of apprenticeship positions, our 2SLS estimates will be biased. We
thus first try to assess whether newly established and/or moving firms are
any different in their training behavior. To that end, we estimate regressions
of the following form:
Ai = γ0 + γ1Ni + γ2Mi + γ3xi + γ4zj[i] + ψt[i] + εi, (1.4)
where the dependent variable Ai denotes, as in the main text, the number
of apprentices trained by firm i. Ni and Mi denote whether firm i has been
newly established or whether firm i has changed its location between two
consecutive waves of the business census, respectively.35 The controls are
otherwise the same as those used in the regressions discussed in the main
text, i.e. we include both firm- and regional-level controls.
35That is, the dummy variable Ni equals 1 if firm i is observed in wave t, but not in
wave t− 1. Similarily, Mi is equal to 1 if the location (i.e. municipality) of firm i in wave
t differs from the same firm’s location in wave t− 1.
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Table A.1: Number of apprentices and sample appearance
Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3)
Newly established firm (yes = 1) -0.525∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Moving firm (yes = 1) -0.292∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Constant 0.877∗∗∗ 0.013 1.651∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.062) (0.368)
Census year dummies No Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Location controls No No Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.298 0.300
Observations 645,137 645,137 645,137
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are
clustered by municipalities.
The resulting estimates of γ1 and γ2 are shown in Table A.1. Column (1)
indicates that both newly established and moving firms train significantly
fewer apprentices than existing and nonmoving firms. These substantial
differences in the number of apprentices remain when including control
variables, as evident from columns (2) and (3). Altogether, Table A.1
suggests a substantially different training behavior among newly established
and moving firms. This finding threatens our identification strategy if firms’
location choice also differs in these types of firms.
We thus next analyze the location choice of newly established and moving
firms with respect to our instrument by running several regressions of the
following form:
ln(Dj[i]) = δ0 + δ1Ni + δ2Mi + δ3xi + ψt[i] + εi, (1.5)
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where the dependent variable now is the log distance of a firm to the border,
ln(Dj[i]). The regressors of main interest in the above equation are again the
two dummies Ni and Mi, and the controls are also the same as in Equation
(1.4), except that we do not include regional-level controls here, because
these are, at least in part, determined by a firm’s choice of ln(Dj[i]), i.e. the
dependent variable in equation (1.5).




Newly established firm (yes = 1) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011)




Census year dummies No Yes
Firm controls No Yes
Location controls No No
R-squared 0.001 0.013
Observations 645,137 645,137
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses and are clustered by municipalities.
Table A.2 shows the resulting estimates of the two parameters of interest.
Column (1), in which we do not include any control variables, reveals that
newly established firms are located, in terms of driving time, about 4.6%
closer to the border than existing and nonmoving firms. Similarly, moving
firms are located 5.1% closer to the border than existing and nonmoving
firms. In absolute terms, however, these differences are relatively small and
only amount to about 1.6 and 1.8 car driving minutes. It seems questionable
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whether such small differences in commuting durations affect the supply of
CBWs for newly established or moving firms.
However, because Table A.1 documents large differences in the number
of apprentices, the fact that firms choosing their location within our sample
tend to train fewer apprentices nonetheless deserves greater attention. We
address such concerns in three steps. First, we control for various observable
firm characteristics, e.g. industry dummies to account for industrial clusters
that may have evolved dependent on the distance from the border (cf.
Section 1.3.1). Second, Table A.1 shows that firms’ numbers of apprentices
is especially low at the beginning of their lifecycle. This motivates us to
consider firms’ age as an additional firm-specific control variable (as discussed
in Section 1.3.1). Third, we estimate our baseline specification within various
subsamples based on firms’ approximate age in Section 1.5.2 in the main text.
A.2 Other threats to our identification strategy
Besides firm behavior, other channels potentially pose a threat to our
identification strategy by violating the exclusion restriction. For instance,
municipalities close to the border may systematically differ from regions
further away. Suppose, for instance, that urbanization is higher in border
regions. Presumably, this might affect the supply of apprentices because
general education facilities (e.g. high schools and universities) are mostly
located in or close to cities; the instrument ln(Dj[i]) might therefore be
correlated with the error term εi. To mitigate these concerns, we control
for various municipality characteristics, such as size and population density.
Moreover, the distance between firm j’s municipality and the nearest
municipality hosting any of the three educational facilities at the upper
secondary level (high school, dual VET school, full-time VET school)
accounts for exogenous apprentice supply shifts. All these location specific
controls are described in Section 1.3.2 in the main text (descriptives are
shown in Table B.1).
Another factor potentially interfering with the distance from the border
are the number of resident immigrant workers. On the one hand, immigrants
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from neighboring countries might choose to settle close to the border and thus
to their countries of origin. On the other hand, the labor supply of CBWs
might crowd out resident immigrant workers and encourage them to move
to more central regions of Switzerland. Assuming complementarity between
resident immigrant workers and CBWs, both these associations would bias
our results in a violation of the exclusion restriction. To mitigate concerns
to that effect, we add firms’ share of resident immigrant workers to the firm-
specific controls (for details see Section 1.3.1).
A final threat to the exclusion restriction that we consider stems from
cross-border apprentices. Any positive correlation between the supply of
cross-border apprentices and the distance from the border would weaken
the reduced-form association between firms’ apprenticeship positions and
their distance from the border (shown in Table B.4) and would bias the
2SLS estimate downwards. However, data from the Federal Statistical Office
indicates that foreign apprentices commuting into Switzerland are extremely
rare, almost nonexistent.36
36In the year 2012 (2013; 2014) only 37 (50; 42) out of 311,070 (313,853; 320,883)
apprentices commuted from outside Switzerland to a firm within Switzerland (LVA data
2016).
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B Additional tables and figures











Notes: The map shows the spatial distribution of the ratio of apprentices to total work
force at district level (there are 148 unique districts).
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Figure B.2: Cantonal numbers of CBW by country of residence
a) German CBWs b) French CBWs
c) Italian CBWs d) Austrian CBWs
Notes: The figure shows cantonal-level means of the absolute number of CBWs from 2002
to 2008, by their country of residency.
Source: Official Statistic on Crossborder Commuters by the Federal Statistical Office.
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Table B.1: Educational attainment by population groups
Swiss Immigrants CBWs
University degree 11.80 12.40 13.65
Tertiary-B degree, teaching diploma 10.97 5.12 8.79
High school degree 2.21 1.74 3.17
Vocational qualification (basic level) 63.45 41.12 53.11
Compulsory schooling 9.05 29.49 12.37
Remaining category 2.53 10.14 8.90
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Immigrants refers to resident immigrant workers (i.e. non-natives
working and living in Switzerland). There are slight discrepancies between
these figures and those derived from the data used in the analysis below (due,
for example, to different sample definitions).
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Table B.3: First-stage estimates
Share of CBWs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Dj[i]) -0.067
∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Census year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Location controls No No No Yes Yes
Distance to schools No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.132 0.134 0.159 0.242 0.244
Observations 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137
F-statistic (first-stage) 201.6 201.8 174.4 170.7 183.0
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by
municipalities.
Table B.4: Reduced-form estimates
Number of apprentices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Dj[i]) 0.118
∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.017) (0.016)
Census year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Location controls No No No Yes Yes
Distance to schools No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.298 0.300 0.300
Observations 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137 645,137
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,




Train to meet the norm: Local
norms towards private engage-
ment and the provision of ap-
prenticeship positions
joint work with Andreas Kuhn and Jürg Schweri
2.1 Introduction
Marge, I can’t wear a pink shirt to work. Everybody wears white
shirts. I’m not popular enough to be different...
Homer Simpson, Season 3, Episode 1
Vocational education and training (VET) is Switzerland’s most important
upper-secondary track, with over 60% enrolments per cohort (FSO, 2017).
This VET system relies heavily on voluntarily participating firms which hire
apprentices, pay their wages, and instruct and teach them at the workplace.
Gehret et al. (2019) estimate the total VET costs borne by firms to be up
to five billion Swiss Francs in 2016. Even though firms also profit financially
from their apprentices being partly productive, many firms incur substantial
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net costs or realize only small net benefits during an apprenticeship. Classical
profit-maximizing behavior seems therefore unable to entirely explain firms’
motivation to offer apprenticeship positions repeatedly every year.
In this chapter, we therefore present a complementary explanation for
firms’ provision of apprenticeship positions based on prevalent norms. More
specifically, we hypothesize that a locally persistent norm favoring private
over state provision of goods enhances private investments in these goods,
in our case VET. This claim stems from the study by Kuhn et al. (2019),
who show that firms’ decision to participate in the apprenticeship system is
influenced by local attitudes towards the role of the state. In the context
of firms’ VET investments in Switzerland, local norms might thus help to
explain why some firms train and others do not, even though they have similar
characteristics and would thus bear similar monetary costs from offering an
apprenticeship.
In contrast to Kuhn et al. (2019), we use administrative data and a
different empirical approach. Empirically, we follow the approach proposed
by Eugster et al. (2017) and profit from a language-cultural border within
Switzerland evoked by its multilingualism. Because norms, as a part of
culture, are mainly transmitted by language (Guiso et al., 2006), they
likely spread relatively homogeneously throughout language regions but
deviate sharply at language borders. Applying a fuzzy spatial regression
discontinuity design at this border thus permits us to evaluate the association
between diverging norms concerning private provision of goods and firms’
training incidence. Crucial for the validity of this approach, Switzerland’s
language borders mostly do not coincide with institutional borders, which
limits bias emerging from confounding factors.
Three main findings emerge from our empirical analysis. First, voting
results yield remarkable differences in attitudes to private engagement in
the provision of goods among Swiss language regions. German speakers
regularly oppose state interventions and value the private provision of goods,
whereas Romance-speaking (French, Italian, and Romansh) voters favor state
engagement in the provision of the same goods. This contrast appears both
as a difference in average voting results across language regions and as a
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discontinuity at the language border. Second, the difference in the share of
training firms on either side of the language border is remarkable. As many
as 31.9% of all firms across German-speaking regions train apprentices, but
only 25.7% of all firms in Romance-speaking regions train. This difference
decreases slightly when evaluated close to the language border but remains
statistically significant. Third, our preferred estimate associates a one-
standard-deviation difference in the norm demanding private provision of
goods with a 3.6 percentage point higher share of training firms. These results
are robust throughout various specifications and subsample estimations.
Moreover, the estimates remain widely unaltered when controlling for
canton fixed effects, firm and location characteristics, and demand for
apprenticeships. Altogether, we argue that norm-guided behavior is a
complementary explanation for why some firms train apprentices and others
do not. This finding adds to the existing literature on firms’ training
behavior, which is based mostly on financial considerations and is discussed
in more detail in Section 2.2.1.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides
some background information on the Swiss apprenticeship system and on the
country’s different language-cultural regions and introduces the theoretical
framework on which we base our norm hypothesis. Section 2.3 presents
the main data sources and discusses the construction of the key variables,
and Section 2.4 sets out our empirical strategy. Section 2.5 discusses our
main results, including several robustness checks, and Section 2.6 presents
additional evidence on the underlying mechanisms. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 The Swiss apprenticeship system
Over 60% of a Swiss youth cohort attend VET, which makes this the most
popular track at the upper-secondary level (FSO, 2017). Usually, youngsters
apply immediately after compulsory schooling, at around the age of 16, for
an apprenticeship position offered voluntarily by a firm. If successful, the
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apprentice works and trains three or four days per week within the training
firm and spends the other one or two days at a vocational school. Most
apprenticeships last for three years, some for two or four. While vocational
schools are publicly financed, participating firms cover the costs incurred
during the apprentices’ period of training at the firm. These costs amount to
roughly five billion Swiss Francs and consist primarily of apprentice wages,
time spent on instruction, and training equipment.1 Participating firms
also profit from their apprentices, who work partly productively during the
training period. Roughly one-third of the training firms incur net costs over
the whole training period, whereas about two thirds of all training firms in
Switzerland earn net benefits. However, these benefits are often small and
unpredictable at the beginning of the training period for many of the firms
ever (Gehret et al., 2019).
Beside financial gains during an apprenticeship, training firms can try
to recoup their training investments by retaining fully trained apprentices
within their firm after the training period. This allows them to save search
and recruitment costs (e.g. Blatter et al., 2016; Gehret et al., 2019; Wolter
and Strupler, 2012).2 However, standardized curricula in Switzerland ensure
up-to-date apprenticeship training content in firms and the transferability
of accumulated skills to other firms. As a likely consequence of this policy,
Müller and Schweri (2015) find no wage penalties for former apprentices
leaving their training firm within one year after completing VET but
remaining within the same occupation. They thus conclude that human
capital accrued during an apprenticeship in Switzerland is widely transferable
1Public costs for VET amount to roughly three billion Swiss




2Moreover, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) model how investments in general skills might
be beneficial for firms if labor market frictions allow them to employ trained workers at
wages below their marginal productivity. Based on this work, Mühlemann et al. (2010)
show how the differing strengths of labor market regulations in Switzerland and Germany
can partly explain observed differences in firms’ VET investments across the two countries.
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within the occupational field.3 This, combined with Switzerland’s weakly
regulated labor market, makes it relatively easy for firms to poach fully
trained apprentices from other firms and thus limits firms’ possibilities
to recoup training investments after the training period. Accordingly,
Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) document that the labor market density
measured as local number of firms per hectare in the same industry lowers
firms’ training probability by 0.18 percentage points.
Altogether, we surmise that financial incentives alone, whether during
the training period or after it, cannot entirely explain the high and constant
apprenticeship provision by Swiss firms. In Section 2.2.3, we will thus put
forth a complementary explanation for this pattern based on locally prevalent
norms. Before doing so, however, we introduce Switzerland’s language
regions in the next, Section 2.2.2, and demonstrate why these are well suited
for studying the association between diverging norms regarding the private
provision of goods and firms’ apprenticeship provision.
2.2.2 Language-cultural regions
Switzerland is a multilingual country with four official languages. According
to the 2000 Population Census, German is the first language for a majority of
its resident population (63.7%). In the western part of Switzerland, bordering
France, French is the official language and at 20.4% the second most prevalent
first language in Switzerland overall. The Italian language (6.5%) is closely
associated with the Canton of Ticino in the south of Switzerland, where
it is the sole official language. The fourth official language, Romansh
(0.5%), is only spoken in parts of the Canton of Grisons. This canton in
southeastern Switzerland is the only trilingual canton; in addition to the
Romansh population, a majority speaks German and another minority speaks
Italian. The remaining 8.9% of residents state that they do not speak any of
the four official languages.
For our empirical analysis, we group these different language areas into
3However, workers who change occupation face a wage differential of roughly 9% (Müller
and Schweri, 2015).
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Notes: This is a map of Switzerland showing the breakdown into the two main language-
cultural regions at the level of municipalities (see also Appendix Figure B.1, which shows
the four language regions). A municipality is considered a German- or Romance- speaking
municipality if the majority of its inhabitants speak German or one of the Romance
languages, respectively, according to the Population Census from the year 2000. The
black lines delineate cantonal borders.
two main language regions, one German speaking and the other Romance
speaking (i.e. French-speaking region, Italian-speaking region, and Romansh-
speaking region).4 Figure 2.1 shows the two language regions along with the
cantonal borders (see also Appendix Figure B.1). Cantons are Switzerland’s
most important institutional entities, enjoying a considerable amount of
autonomy, for instance over taxation and the educational system. Crucially
4A municipality is considered German-speaking or Romance-speaking when the
majority of its inhabitants speaks German or a Romance-language respectively.
According to the 2000 census, 71.7% of the resident population lived in German-
speaking municipalities, 23.6% in French-speaking municipalities, 4.4% in Italian-speaking
municipalities, and 0.3% in Romansh-speaking municipalities. Brügger et al. (2009),
Eugster et al. (2017), and Cottier (2018), which papers are discussed shortly in Section
2.2.3, all proceed similarly.
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for our econometric approach, the language border runs largely through the
multilingual Cantons of Bern, Fribourg, Grisons, and Valais, and mostly
does not coincide with cantonal borders, which implies that it is possible to
net out institutional differences by including fixed effects at the cantonal
level. Moreover, neither important geographical territories nor economic
hubs spread homogeneously across one or the other language regions. The
dominant language border (German/French) runs from north to south in
western Switzerland, while the most important geographical separators run
from west to east: the Alps (south) and Jura (north) mountain ranges. In
between them, the densely populated Swiss Plateau ranges from the far-west
French-speaking part to the far-east German-speaking part and hosts the
majority of Switzerland’s people and economic activities.
Figure 2.2 plots the share of German speakers with respect to the distance
from the language border and displays a clear discontinuity around the
language border.
2.2.3 Local norms favoring private over public engage-
ment
Social scientists, including economists, have argued since the establishment of
their field that human behavior is, in addition to rationality, based on beliefs,
customs, and norms. The early works of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill
bear witness to this (Mill, 1929; Smith, 1761).5 More recently, Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004) state that “cooperation in human societies is mainly based
on social norms” (p.185). According to them, this is even true in modern
societies in which cooperation is often enforced by legal rules, because rules
lack their normative legitimacy if social norms do not back them. Generally,
social norms are prevalent when individuals conform their behavior to the
standard behavior within a group, e.g. a family, a group of peers, or a whole
society (e.g. Burke and Young, 2011; Ellickson, 1999; Elster, 1989b). Very
similarly, Postlewaite (2011) use the term social norms to describe why agents
5Guiso et al. (2006) for an introduction to research on the effect of culture on economic
outcomes and a historical overview of it.
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Notes: The figure shows the share of German speakers among the resident population,
aggregated in bins of 1km width, by their distance from the language border in terms of
actual travelling distance. The dashed line shows smoothed values from a locally weighted
regression.
in one group behave differently from agents in another, even when the groups
are similar in their composition and the physical environment they face (for
empirical applications see Cole et al., 1995, 2001). According to Burke and
Young (2011), social norms emerge and are sustained through a positive and
thus self-enforcing feedback loop echoing between individuals’ behavior and
the reactions they receive to it from their peers. Because it is not ex ante
clear which norms materialize, this feedback loop leads to local uniformity
within groups but can evolve into substantial behavioral differences across
groups (global diversity) (for an empirical application see Burke and Heiland,
2007). In the view of Elster (1989a) social norm do not necessarily require
feedback to sustain. However, he agrees that norms, to be social, must be
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shared by others and partly sustained by their approval or disapproval.6
Altogether, the key feature of social norms seems to be their material-
ization through social interactions within social groups. Based on the fact
that social interactions, as with any other cultural expression, most often
occur in one form of language or another (Guiso et al., 2006), we argue that
Switzerland’s language regions also form separate regions in terms of culture
and consequently in terms of norms.7
Other papers embedded in the context of the different language regions
in Switzerland argue similarly but focus on other cultural and economic
differences. Eugster and Parchet (2013) document deviating preferences
for tax competition at the German-French language border. Both Cottier
(2018) and Eugster et al. (2017) find differences in work attitudes at the
Swiss language border that translate into contrasting levels of unemployment
durations and diverging retirement decisions. Finally, Steinhauer (2018)
shows that different norms regarding working mothers along Switzerland’s
German-French language border correspond to varying work participation
rates and fertility among women.
In this chapter, we focus on a norm preferring private engagement in the
provision of goods in contrast to state provision. As we will show, this norm
is more prevalent among German-speaking regions than among Romance-
speaking regions. We argue that in the Swiss institutional setting, where
private (firm-provided apprenticeships) and state (high schools, school-based
apprenticeships) investments in education are to some extent substitutes, the
spatially varying dispersion of this norm eventually translates into contrast-
ing levels of firm-provided apprenticeships. Specifically, we hypothesize the
probability of firms’ providing apprenticeships is higher among regions where
people favor private over state provision of goods.
6He adds that social norms can also be sustained by personal feelings, such as anger,
guilt, and embarrassment.
7In this context, one should note that the aim of this chapter is not to evaluate any
direct association between language and firms’ apprenticeship provision; we genuinely
believe there is none.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Firm-level data from the Swiss Business Census
Our main data source is the Swiss Business Census, which covers all Swiss
firms operating in the second or third sector, and we use the four most
recent waves (1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008) for our empirical analysis.8 There
are two reasons to use several waves of the Business Census. First, our
empirical approach is very observation intensive (cf. Section 2.4). Second,
using several waves also ensures that the time period from which we draw
firm-level observations approximately overlaps with the time frame implicit
in our measure of private engagement, discussed in Section 2.3.2 below. The
only sample restriction that we impose is that we exclude very small firms
with less than three employees, because only a tiny fraction of these firms
train any apprentices. For that reason, these firms do not add much useful
variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, as previous studies on similar
subjects (e.g. Gehret et al., 2019; Kuhn et al., 2019; Wolter and Strupler,
2012) have done, we decided to remove these firms from the sample; however,
we will show that our results are robust to this sample restriction (cf. Section
2.5.3). This restriction narrows our sample down to 842,146 observations at
the firm×census-year level.
Our main dependent variable is a dummy variable Tit, indicating whether
firm i trains at least one apprentice in census year t.9 In the full sample,
about 30% of the firms are involved in apprenticeship training, as shown in
panel (a) of Table 2.1. The table also shows descriptives for a subsample
of firms located within 20 kilometers from the language border, henceforth
referred to as the regression discontinuity sample or RD sample. As we
8The Business Census was superseded by an alternative firm-related data collection
(STATENT), which, however, does not include information on apprentices anymore.
9In the empirical analysis, we essentially focus on the cross-sectional variation in T ,
mainly because the main regressor does not vary across time (cf. Section 2.3.2). We thus
suppress the t index in what follows, but we include fixed effects for census years in most


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































discuss in Section 2.4 below, most of our empirical analysis focuses on this
much smaller subsample of 69,619 observations. Within this subsample, the
share of training firms is 32.3%, somewhat higher than in the overall sample
(see also Appendix Table B.1, which breaks down the descriptives for the
RD sample by language region).
2.3.2 Measuring local norms towards private engage-
ment
To measure the local norm favoring private over public engagement, we
use municipal voting results from eight national-level plebiscites that took
place in Switzerland between 1986 and 2014 (Appendix Table B.2 contains
some additional information regarding these votes). Although dealing with
quite distinct substantive issues, these eight votes all share the overarching
question of whether citizens should confer more responsibility on the state.
For example, one of these votes (vote 503; cf. Table B.2) called for state
action in the apprenticeship system (in that period, the Swiss economy was
in recession, and firms’ supply of apprenticeship positions temporarily could
not meet demand).
In what follows, Nj[i] will refer to our measure of the local norm favoring
private engagement, measured by the mean share of votes in support of
more private engagement, and thus less engagement by public authorities, in
municipality j within which firm i is located. Note that there is no temporal
variation in this measure, because we aggregate the votes from the different
years. For each vote, we use the share of the votes in support of more
private engagement. Because plebiscites tend to demand additional state
action, we thus use the share of no-votes in the construction of our measure
in seven out of the eight plebiscites (as detailed in Appendix Table B.2). As
shown in panel (a) of Table 2.1, the mean share of votes in support of more
private engagement equals about 60% in the full sample; focusing on the RD
sample, the mean value of Nj is 56.9%. This implies that there is a majority
in support of private, rather than public, engagement in both the full and
the RD sample.
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Reverse causality in the norm measurement
The strategy described above for measuring the local norm Nj[i] raises one
particular concern: the norm favoring private engagement for the provision
of a good prevalent in municipality j, Nj[i], might be endogenous to the
actual level of this good in municipality j. For instance, people living in
regions where firms provide apprenticeship positions on a large scale may
not recognize any need to strengthen VET and therefore disapprove of state
investments in VET. We attenuate concerns about this potential reverse
causality issue in two steps.
First, we decide not to focus exclusively on votes dealing explicitly with
VET policies (votes nr. 340 and 503) to measure Nj[i].
10 Since the approval
rates across these other votes are likely independent of the apprenticeship
provision of local firms, using non-VET votes helps to measure Nj[i] in a way
that it is exogenous to the local level of apprenticeship provision of firms.11
Second, we analyse data from an exit poll related to the “apprenticeship
initiative” (vote 503, cf. Appendix Table B.2), which explicitly demanded
that the state should take more responsibility within the apprenticeship
system in Table 2.2. Apparently, the share of voters who at least
partly approved of the apprenticeship initiative due to a perceived lack
of apprenticeship positions was roughly equally prevalent across language
regions, though actual apprenticeship provision by firms is, as we show
later, lower in Romance-speaking regions. This suggests that lower levels of
firms’ apprenticeship provision in Romance-language regions did not trigger
the higher approval rate in the apprenticeship initiative among Romance-
speakers than among German-speakers.12
10The main result of our analysis (cf. Section 2.5.3 below) are not sensitive to whether
Nj[i] is measured with the two votes dealing with VET policies or with the other six votes.
11Note that a spatial correlation in the provision of VET and the goods discussed in the
other votes, e.g. because the general financial endowment across regions varies, appears
unlikely because the other votes demanded public engagement in the provision of goods
which were, at the time the votes took place, more or less evenly accessible throughout all
Switzerland. Mainly this was the case because they were already provided by the national
state, though at generally lower levels than the votes demanded it.
12In contrast, and in line with the arguments in Section 2.3.2, Table 2.8 suggests that
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Table 2.2: “Apprentice initiative”, reason for ‘Yes’: more
apprenticeship positions
Mean answer Conditionala
All Romance German Difference difference
0.624 0.614 0.630 0.016 0.060
(0.034) (0.054) (0.044) (0.070) (0.079)
[202] [83] [119]
Notes: This table shows the share of yes-voters indicating they
approved vote 503 either because “Pupils need apprenticeship
positions” or “There are not enough apprenticeship positions”
or “It is a general right to have an apprenticeship position” or
“More possibilities for apprentices”. The square brackets indicate
the number of observations. aOLS-regression of a dummy with
1 for yes-voters stating one of the motives above on a German-
speaking region dummy, demographic (age, age squared, sex,
civil status, employment status) and municipality (22 categories)
characteristics.
Source: VOX exit poll.
2.3.3 Distance from the language border
As we will detail below (cf. Section 2.4), our empirical approach focuses on
firms that are located relatively close to the language border. For that reason,
it is also crucial that we are able to precisely determine firms’ proximity to
the language border. To do so, we use additional data from the Federal Office
for Spatial Development (which uses the data for traffic planning on behalf
of the Federal Government). These data record actual average travelling
distances by car (i.e. not simply linear distances) from a given municipality
to any other municipality as of the year 2010 and based on actual commuting
patterns.
These additional data on travelling distances can be merged with the firm-
level data from the Business Census at the municipality level. To compute a
a more favorable attitude towards state engagement in the provision of VET contributed
to the higher share of yes-votes in Romance-language regions.
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given firm’s distance from the language border, we proceed as follows. First,
based on the Population Census from the year 2000, we define all of the
2,352 Swiss municipalities with a majority of Romance (German)speakers as
belonging to the Romance- (German-) language region.13 Then, for every
Romance-speaking municipality, we keep the shortest travelling distance to
any German-speaking municipality situated at the language border and vice
versa, and we set the distance to negative values for all Romance-language
municipalities. Across all Swiss municipalities, the travelling distance from
the language border for Romance-speaking municipalities ranges from -1.4
to -141.8 kilometers and from 1.4 to 160.8 kilometers for German-speaking
municipalities (see Appendix Figure B.2 for a graphical representation of this
variable).
2.3.4 Control variables
The remainder of Table 2.1 contains descriptives for most of the covariates
used later on (except for a firm’s industrial affiliation, to save space). As
indicated in the last column of the table, all firm-level characteristics are
taken from the Business Census, and the location-level characteristics and
variables controlling for the demand for apprenticeship positions are for the
most part derived from various additional sources of data.
Firm-level characteristics
Firm-level characteristics available in the Business Census include a firm’s
number of employees, its industrial affiliation, and its legal status. In the
empirical analysis below, we include a firm’s number of employees and its
square, 19 dummies representing the industry of a firm, and three dummies
mapping the legal status of a firm as control variables.
13As Eugster et al. (2017) did, we exclude the two bilingual cities of Biel/Bienne and




Because of the spatial nature of our empirical design, we also include several
location-level controls at different levels of regional aggregation (cf. Table
2.1). To map the general structure of a labor market, we include the log
number of residents and the population density at the municipality level, the
share of the resident population in employment, the share of people working
in either the second or the third sector, and the median income at the level
of local labor markets. We also control for the total number of firms and
the number of firms within the same industry in the respective labor market.
These last two locational characteristics map a labor market’s density and
account for three potential mechanisms affecting a firm’s willingness to
train. First, given the number of young people, other locally present firms
potentially lower the number of apprenticeship applicants for a specific firm.
Second, instead of training and retaining apprentices, a firm can meet its
demand for skilled workers by poaching trained apprentices from other
same-sector firms (e.g. Mühlemann and Wolter, 2011). And third, a firm
might lower its training investments because it fears such poaching by local
competitors.
Demand for apprenticeship positions
One concern with our identification strategy is that there may also exist
a discontinuity in the demand for apprenticeship positions at the language
border. To study the association between local norms and firms’ provision of
apprenticeship positions, we would like to observe a firm’s training intention
no matter whether it ultimately employs an apprentice or not. In contrast,
our dependent variable, a firm’s training status, captures the outcome on
the apprenticeship market. We target this issue mainly by also including
variables which control for variation in the demand for apprenticeship
training.14 Specifically, we include a firm’s minimum distance from any of the
14We are not able to fully control for differences in the demand for apprenticeship
positions, but at least we can check whether the parameter estimates change when we also
include demand-side controls. Additional checks related to differences in the demand for
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three main upper-secondary schooling types (i.e. vocational school, full-time
vocational school, and high school) in our model. Moreover, we also control
for a firm’s potential number of apprenticeship applicants by including the
proportion of people between the age of 15 and 25 in the labor market where
the firm operates.
2.4 Empirical design
The sharpness in the language border that runs across the country opens
up the possibility of estimating the association between local norms favoring
private engagement and firms’ training behavior using a spatial regression
discontinuity design. This approach was first used by Brügger et al. (2009)
and Eugster et al. (2017) to estimate the language-border contrast in
attitudes towards and demand for social insurance and in unemployment
duration, respectively.15
2.4.1 Basic setup
To motivate our own empirical approach, we start with the goal of estimating
the reduced-form contrast in firms’ training probability at the linguistic-
cultural border in Switzerland, i.e. the language-border contrast in the
probability of providing apprenticeship positions among employers. Our
starting point is thus the following simple regression:
Ti = α0 + α1Gj[i] + εi ∀ i ∈ {i : |dj[i]| ≤ bw}, (2.1)
apprenticeship training are discussed in Section 2.6.2 below.
15Using a similar design, Basten and Betz (2013) estimate the effect of religion on
preferences towards leisure and towards governmental intervention; Egger and Lassmann
(2015) study the impact of a common native language on trade, and Cottier (2018) explores
the effect of culture on labor-force exit of older workers. Examples of studies using a spatial
regression discontinuity design outside the context of the Swiss language border include
Keele et al. (2015), who look at whether ballot initiatives have an impact on voter turnout,
MacDonald et al. (2016), studying the effect of private police on crime, and Hidano et al.
(2015), who estimate how information about seismic hazards affects property prices in the
Tokyo area.
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where the binary dependent variable Ti indicates whether firm i trains any
apprentices or not, and with Gj[i] also a dummy variable denoting whether a
majority of people speak German in the community j in which a given firm
i is located. Note that the estimation sample only includes firms located
in a community within a small band along the language border (i.e. the
RD sample). Specifically, we focus on those communities not farther away,
measured in travelling distance dj[i] (in kilometers), from the language border
than a given distance bw in either direction. In the empirical results reported
below, we mostly focus on the case where bw is set to 20 kilometers, implying
that the language border can be reached in about 15 minutes or less by car.16
Setting bw = 20 implies that our analysis focuses on those 379 communities
located along the language-cultural border (about 16.1% of all communities),
which provide about 8.3% of all observations (cf. columns 3 and 4 of
Table 2.1). Parameter α1 quantifies the difference in the training intensity
among firms close to the language border but located on different sides of
the language border and therefore exposed to different norms regarding the
role of firms in the provision of training. For that reason, and assuming
that individuals in the German-speaking regions are more favorable towards
private engagement, we expect the training probability among firms to be
lower on the Romance-speaking side of the language border, and thus we
expect to find that α1 > 0.
2.4.2 Non-standard features due to the spatial nature
of the data
Equation (2.1) relies on the assumption that observations from either side
of the language border are on average identical in every respect except
16Remember that the selection of firms close to the language border can only be
implemented indirectly by selecting municipalities close to the language border because
travelling distance is only available at the community level (cf. Section 2.3). This, however,
potentially biases conventional inference methods (e.g. Moulton, 1990). For that reason,
we show standard errors that are clustered at the community level throughout in the
regressions below.
2.4. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 69
that they belong to different cultural regions and are therefore exposed to
different norms regarding the role of the state.17 While observations close
to the threshold but from different sides of the cutoff are usually assumed
to be comparable in this sense in conventional applications of the regression
discontinuity design (RDD), at least if individuals lack perfect control over
the assignment variable, this assumption is clearly less innocuous in the
context of a spatial RDD because the spatial distribution of firms and larger
aggregates (e.g. cities) is nonrandom (Keele et al., 2015, among others, make
a similar argument).18 In most of our regression specifications, we therefore
also include control variables at both the firm- and the regional-level, denoted
by Xi and Zr[i], respectively:
Ti = α0 + α1Gj[i] + α2Xi + α3Zr[i] + λt[i] + ψc[i] + εi
∀ i ∈ {i : |dj[i]| ≤ bw},
(2.2)
Moreover, in most of our specifications, we also include a set of census-year
dummies, denoted by λt[i], because we pool data from several waves of the
Business Census. The census-year fixed effects pick up any shifts in the mean
training incidence among firms over time. More importantly, we also include
a set of regional fixed effects at the cantonal level, denoted by ψc[i]. These
allow us to control for institutional differences between the cantons (note
that it is possible to include these fixed effects because there are several
bilingual cantons; as evident from Figure 2.1). The inclusion of the cantonal
fixed-effects may turn out to be important because cantons have considerable
leeway in both educational and financial policy. Again, parameter α1
quantifies the difference in firms’ propensity to offer apprenticeship positions
at the language-cultural border, but in this case conditional on observable
firm- and community-level controls. As above, we still expect that α1 > 0.
17Table B.1 in the Appendix broadly confirms this.
18In our case, for example, larger communities tend to have a lower training intensity.
The location of these communities is presumably rooted in both geography and history, but
has most likely nothing to do with distance from the language border by itself. However,
whatever their distance from the language border, these communities will have a significant
impact on the RDD estimates. For this reason, we believe that it is important to include
additional control variables.
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We further deviate from the conventional setup used in an RDD in
that we do not include dj[i] itself as a control variable, at least not in our
baseline specifications. There are several partially intertwined reasons for
not doing so.19 The first and most important argument is that we do not
expect any direct effect of dj[i] on the likelihood of providing apprenticeship
positions because each community basically belongs to either the German-
or the Romance-speaking cultural region, whatever their distance from the
language border.20 Secondly, and related to the first argument, it appears
that any trend in the training intensity over distance to the language border
is driven by variation in firm- and/or community-level characteristics rather
than by the distance from the language border. Third, and finally, because
we generally use quite a narrow band, including a potentially mis-specified
trend in the assignment variable would probably do more harm than good
(Gelman and Imbens, 2019, and also illustrated in Appendix Figure A.2).
2.4.3 Fuzzy RD estimates
Estimation of equations (2.1) and (2.2) further assumes that there is a sharp
discontinuity in attitudes towards the role of the state at the language border
(which, in our context, would require that the share of supporting votes
jump from 0 to 100 percent). While the evidence provided in Section 2.5.1
unambiguously shows that there is a strong discontinuity in these attitudes at
the language border, it also shows that the discontinuity is considerably less
than 100 percent. To properly take this issue into account, we first estimate
the contrast in local attitudes towards the role of the state at the language
border. The corresponding first-stage regression is given by the following
19We show, however, that our estimates are robust to the inclusion of dj[i] as an
additional control. These additional results are presented and discussed in Appendix
A.
20Several pieces of evidence support this claim. First, the discontinuity in the share of
Romance-speaking individuals is quite sharp at the language border, as shown in Appendix
Figure 2.2. Second, Figure 2.3 shows that the mean value of Nj[i] is relatively constant on
both sides of the language border. Finally, we find that dj[i] has no direct effect on either
Nj[i] nor on Ti, as shown in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2.
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equation, whose right-hand side is the same as in Equation (2.2):
Nj[i] = π0 + π1Gj]i] + π2Xi + π3Zr[i] + λt[i] + ψc[i] + εi
∀ i ∈ {i : |dj[i]| ≤ bw},
(2.3)
where Gj[i] again denotes whether a given community j belongs to the
German-speaking part of the country. The dependent variable Nj[i] reflects
the local norm towards private engagement prevailing in municipality j. As
discussed in Section 2.3, Nj[i] is constructed such that higher values are asso-
ciated with a stronger support of private engagement; Nj[i] reflects the share
of votes rejecting more/additional government intervention. We therefore
expect that π̂1 > 0 because individuals living in the German-speaking regions
are expected to show stronger support for private engagement, but also that
π̂1 < 1 because there are no sharp discontinuities in attitudes at the language
border.
An additional issue in this context is that the estimated size of π̂1 likely
depends on the choice of vote(s) used to measure local attitudes towards the
role of the state. We will take up this issue in the empirical analysis below,
showing 2SLS estimates using different sets of votes to measure citizens’
attitudes towards the role of the state. Another issue to be considered at
this point is that the dependent variable in Equation (2.3) is only available at
the municipality level, inducing clustering at this level (i.e. all firms within
the same municipality are exposed to the same local norm). Given that
we report standard errors that are clustered at the level of the community
(because a firm’s distance from the language border is also only available
at the community-level, as mentioned above), this issue is simultaneously
addressed.
Finally, we estimate the following structural equation, which relates firms’
training decisions with local attitudes towards the state at the language
border, using two-stage least squares (2SLS):
Ti = β0 + β1Nj[i] + β2Xi + β3Zr[i] + λt[i] + ψc[i] + εi
∀ i ∈ {i : |dj[i]| ≤ bw}.
(2.4)
Specifically, in estimating the equation above, we instrument Nj[i] with
the language-cultural background of a community using the first-stage
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regression from Equation (2.3) above (i.e. we use Gj[i], indicating whether
a given community belongs to the German-speaking part of Switzerland, to
instrument for communal attitudes towards the role of the state, Nj[i]). The
resulting 2SLS estimate of β1 corresponds to the language-border contrast in
the training intensity among employers within the discontinuity sample while
also taking into account the lack of sharp discontinuity in attitudes towards
the role of the state (i.e. the 2SLS estimate of β1 represents a fuzzy regression
discontinuity estimate, which in turn can be understood as a rescaled version
of the reduced form estimate α1 from Equation (2.2) above; see for example
Angrist and Pischke (2008)). Given that we expect both α1 and π1 to be
positive, it follows that we expect that β1 > 0 as well.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Graphical evidence
Moving on to our results, we start with a graphical description of the
discontinuities in the local norm favoring private engagement and in the
share of training firms at the language border.
First, Figure 2.3 shows that there is, as expected, a very clear and
sizable discontinuity in the local norm favoring private engagement exactly
at the language border (Appendix Figure B.3 shows the corresponding
discontinuities for each of the eight underlying plebiscites). On average,
individuals living in the German-speaking municipalities are much more
supportive of private engagement than those residing in the Romance-
speaking part of the country. Also note that the mean of Nj[i] is relatively
constant on both sides of the language border, consistent with the idea
that the two language regions are characterized by different, relatively
persistent norms regarding the question on how responsibilities should be
shared between private and public actors (see also Appendix Figure B.4).
Analogously, Figure 2.4 shows the discontinuity in the share of training
firms at the language border. A first thing to note is that the share of training
firms over the full sample amounts to 25.7% in the Romance-speaking regions
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Distance to language border
Notes: The figure plots mean values of Nj for municipalities aggregated within bins of 1km
width by their distance from the language border in actual travelling distance. German-
(Romance-) speaking regions are associated with positive (negative) travelling distances.
The dashed line shows smoothed values from a locally weighted regression.
and to 31.9% in the German-speaking regions. As is also evident from Figure
2.4, the gap in the training probability narrows somewhat when approaching
the language border. Within 20 kilometers of the language border, 30.2%
of firms located on the Romance-speaking side of the language border train
apprentices, while 34.2% of the firms do so on the German-speaking side.
Second, the shapes of the distance trends displayed on either side of the
language border are ambiguous: while the overall concave pattern on the
Romance side becomes more linear close to the language border, the higher
training commitment among firms in German-speaking regions dips around
30 to 40 kilometers and again around 90 and 100 kilometers distance from
the language border. It turns out that these patterns are mainly driven by
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Notes: The figure shows the share of training firms aggregated within bins of 1km width by
their distance from the language border in actual travelling distance. German (Romance)
speaking regions are associated with positive (negative) travelling distances. The dashed
line shows smoothed values from a locally weighted regression.
metropolitan areas, which are situated within these specific distance ranges
and which attract large numbers of firms operating in industries where the
share of training firms tends to be low.21
21Specifically, Bern is located 31 km away from the language border on the German-
speaking side of the language border, Basel 37 km, Lucerne 86, and Zurich 99 km. In the
Romance language regions, Lausanne (68 km), Lugano (87 km), and Geneva (128 km)
contribute to the decline in training firms at greater distances from the language border.




Moving on to our main estimates, Table 2.3 first shows the estimated
discontinuity in Nj[i] at the language border. More specifically, the table
shows estimates of parameter π1 from Equation (2.3), using the RD sample
only and an expanding set of control variables. The specification shown in the
first column does not include any controls and yields an estimate of π̂1 = 0.04,
with a robust standard error of 0.011. There is thus a large relative difference
in the norm favoring private engagement between the two language regions
of about 31% (= 100% · (0.147/0.474)). As expected, and consistent with the
results from Eugster et al. (2017) among others, individuals in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland are much more in favor of private engagement
than those from the Romance-speaking regions.
Table 2.3: First-stage estimates (OLS estimates)
Local norm favoring private engagement, Nj[i]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gj[i] 0.147
∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Cantonal dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census–year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Location characteristics No No No No Yes Yes
Demand controls No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.643 0.821 0.821 0.823 0.873 0.880
Observations 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by municipality.
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The remaining columns of Table 2.3 show that the estimate of π1 remains
broadly stable when we take various sets of control variables into account (we
discuss the different sets of controls in some detail below when discussing
the fuzzy RD estimates). Overall, the estimates from Table 2.3 are thus
consistent with Figure 2.3 (which, however, uses municipality-level data;
therefore the results do not exactly match with each other) and confirm that
there is a substantial and statistically significant discontinuity in the local
norm favoring private engagement exactly at the Swiss language border.
Reduced-form estimates
We next check whether there is a discontinuity in the share of training firms at
the language border as well. With that aim, Table 2.4 presents reduced-form
estimates comparing the share of training firms on either side of the language
border (i.e. the table shows estimates of parameter α1 from Equation (2.1)
and (2.2), respectively). As above, we start with a model without any
controls, and then we expand the set of control variables included step by
step.
Column (1) of Table 2.4 shows that the share of training firms is about
four percentage points higher on the German-speaking side of the language
border. This implies a relative difference in the probability of training
apprentices of about 13.2% (= 100% · (0.04/0.302)) at the language border.
Again, the remaining columns of Table 2.4 show that the estimate of α1 also
remains robust to the inclusion of various sets of control variables. Thus, the
estimate of parameter α1 remains pretty much the same whatever the set
of controls, as expected when the observable characteristics on either side of
the discontinuity are balanced (e.g. Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Fuzzy RD estimates
However, Figure 2.3 and the estimates from Table 2.3 also show that there
is no sharp discontinuity in the local norm favoring private engagement; the
estimated discontinuity in Nj[i] is much smaller than 100 percent. To take
this feature into account, we next estimate a fuzzy RD model, in which we
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Table 2.4: Reduced form RD-estimates (OLS estimates)
Training firm, Ti
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gj[i] 0.040
∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Cantonal dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census–year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Location characteristics No No No No Yes Yes
Demand controls No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.122 0.124 0.125
Observations 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by municipality.
instrument Nj[i] with Gj[i], a dummy variable indicating whether municipality
j belongs to the German-speaking part of Switzerland.
Column (1) of Table 2.5 shows the estimate from a first specification
without any controls. The resulting point estimate of β̂1 = 0.27 yields a
positive relation between our norm measurement Nj[i] and firms’ training
propensity. Moreover, the estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The remaining columns of Table 2.5 show that this estimate is robust to
the inclusion of several sets of controls. Column (2) and column (3) add
dummies for canton and census year, respectively. Again, including the
cantonal dummies changes the interesting parameter estimate somewhat,
suggesting that institutional differences across cantons are relevant, but
including census-year dummies has no discernible impact on the size of β̂1.
Next, column (4) further adds firm-level controls, such as firm size and
industrial affiliation. The inclusion of the firm covariates hardly changes the
point estimate of β1, which remains of similar size and statistically significant;
78 Norms
Table 2.5: Fuzzy RD-estimates (2SLS estimates)
Training firm, Ti
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nj[i] 0.270
∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.106) (0.106) (0.095) (0.093) (0.087)
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Cantonal dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Location characteristics No No No No Yes Yes
Demand controls No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.121 0.123 0.125
Observations 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619 69,619
F-statistic (first-stage) 92.23 116.7 116.7 118.2 134.1 124.0
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by municipality.
the inclusion of firm-level controls decreases the standard error associated
with β̂1. Next, in column (5), we add several locational controls. Again, this
leads to a somewhat smaller standard error without much impact on the size
of the point estimate.
Finally, column (6) accounts for factors shifting the demand for appren-
ticeships and displays our baseline specification. As outlined in Section 2.3,
we struggle to fully disentangle firms’ supply of apprenticeships under
discussion from youngsters’ demand for apprenticeships. Including exogenous
apprenticeships demand shifters in column (6), namely the minimum distance
to any upper-secondary schooling type and the share of the populace between
the age of 15 and 25, mitigates this concern. Compared to the previous
specifications, the point estimate remains fairly stable at 0.36.
All specifications considered, the estimates shown in Table 2.5 suggest
a positive association between a locally persistent norm favoring private
provision of goods and the training propensity of locally present firms. This
finding is not sensitive to the step-by-step inclusion of firm characteristics,
locational characteristics, or controls for variation in the demand for
apprenticeship training.
It is also worth comparing the estimate in column (6) with those
from Kuhn et al. (2019), who report a baseline estimate of 0.393 (as well
as somewhat larger 2SLS estimates). Since the norm measurements are
calculated very similarly and the outcome variable Ti is virtually the same in
both studies, this estimate can be directly compared to our baseline estimate
of 0.355. Thus, the two identification approaches yield estimates that are
very close to each other, and therefore also consistent with each other, even
though they are based on different data sources (and thus different samples
of firms) and different empirical approaches. This further corroborates our
results.
2.5.3 Robustness
We next provide several alternative specifications and subsample estimations
to ensure the robustness of our results.
Alternative specifications
We start with some alternative specifications, shown in Table 2.6 (for ease of
comparison, the first column replicates the baseline specification from column
(6) of Table 2.5).
As a first robustness check, we use a bandwidth of 50 (instead of 20)
kilometers around the language border, which increases the number of
observations substantially. Compared to our baseline estimate, however, this
hardly changes the resulting estimate of interest (β̂1 = 0.31). As expected,
though, the estimate in column (2) is more precisely estimated than the
baseline estimate. A second check includes the travelling distance from the
language border, dj[i], and the interaction between dj[i] and Gj[i], as additional




















































































































































































































































































































































































































estimate of β̂1 = 0.429.
22
Column (3) reports the resulting estimate of β1 when we also include the
smallest firms in our sample (those with less than three employees). This
leads to a large increase in the sample size and, because these firms are much
less likely to train any apprentices, to a reduction in the point estimate of
β1. However, the relative size of the estimate remains about the same as in
the baseline specification. To illustrated this, one can compare the estimates
in columns (1) and (4) with the share of training firms in the two samples of
0.32 and 0.20, respectively.
As a next robustness check, the specification shown in column (5) includes
fixed effects at the level of local labor markets instead of cantonal-level fixed
effects.23 The resulting estimate is fairly close to the baseline estimate,
suggesting that our results are not driven by differences in product demand or
labor supply that the firms face at the level of local labor markets. However,
the point estimate is less precisely estimated than those in the other columns.
This comes as no surprise, as only nine out of 106 MS regions are bilingual
and only three MS regions have a linguistic minority of at least a quarter of
the total population.
Finally, the last three columns of Table 2.6 report estimates that use
slightly different parameterizations of our norm measurement, Nj[i]. The
construction of Nj[i] used in column (6) uses only the results from votes 458
to 543, such that the time period implicitly covered by Nj[i] is closer to that
in the Business Census. In column (7), we only use the results from the votes
not directly related to VET policies (i.e. all votes except 340 and 503; cf.
22In Appendix A, we provide a more thorough analysis related to the choice of bandwidth
and the inclusion of a distance term.
23Local labor markets correspond to the MS regions defined by the Federal Statistical
Office (where MS stands for spatial mobility in French, mobilité spatiale). While cantons
are arguably Switzerland’s most important institutional entities, labor markets do not
often coincide with these institutional borders. MS regions are therefore defined by the
FSO as regions with common commuting patterns towards their centers. We thus argue
that the coefficient from column (5) yields the correlation between the local norm regarding
private engagement in the provision of goods and the training behavior of firms that
operate in the same market in terms of products they sell and labor supply they require.
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Appendix Table B.2), while column (8) is based on using these two votes
only. Column (7) yields an estimate of β̂1 = 0.315, which is again very close
to our baseline estimate. In contrast, the estimate from column (8) turns out
to be somewhat larger (β̂1 = 0.572) than in the baseline specification, but
the difference between the two estimates is not statistically significant.
Subsample estimates
We next turn to estimates for various subsamples in Table 2.7 (again, the first
column simply replicates our baseline estimate from column (6) of Table 2.5).
As above, the aim of these additional estimates is to probe the robustness of
our main finding.
First, columns (2) and (3) show that the point estimate of β1 is similar
to the baseline estimate when we restrict the sample solely to either 1998
or 2008. The resulting estimates are both close to the baseline estimate,
suggesting that there is no problem in pooling data from several waves of the
Business Census (we find broadly similar estimates for the other two time
periods; results not shown).
The next two columns show that the relation between a norm favoring
private engagement and firms’ training participation is persistent among both
small and large firms (where small firms are defined as firms with three to 10
employees). Note that in relative terms the estimate in column (4) is actually
larger than the estimate in column (5) due to different training participation
rates between the two subsamples (0.26 among small firms versus 0.50 among
middle and larger firms).
In column (6) of Table 2.7, we restrict the sample to for-profit firms by
excluding not-for-profit and public employers. This accounts for the fact that
the share of for-profit and public firms is not entirely balanced across the two
language regions (see Table B.1). The resulting point estimate of β̂1 = 0.40
is close to our baseline estimate and remains highly significant: it shows that
our results are not driven by state authorities, which arguably face different
budget restrictions than privately-run firms.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ple of firms located in the three bilingual Cantons of Bern, Fribourg, and
Valais. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the language border partly coincides
with cantonal borders. Due to the extensive political autonomy Swiss
cantons exhibit, this may threaten our identification strategy. Restricting the
sample to bilingual cantons allows us to tackle this concern.24 The resulting
point estimate of β̂1 = 0.317 is very close to our baseline estimate and
relatively precisely estimated. This makes our model appear to be robust to
institutionally shaped demand for apprenticeships (for additional discussion
on demand-side effects see Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.2).
Finally, as outlined in Section 2.2.2, Switzerland consists of four language
regions. The two largest of these regions are the German-speaking and the
French-speaking speaking regions, separated by the so-called Röstigraben
(named after the Swiss-German potato dish Rösti and the German word
for rift, Graben). In a final subsample specification, we focus only on this
specific part of the language border, which again reduces the sample size
somewhat. Column (8) in Table 2.7 suggests that our results are not driven
by other minor language borders within Switzerland but remain persistent
when evaluated solely at the Röstigraben.
2.6 Additional evidence on mechanisms
In the final section of the empirical analysis, we provide evidence supporting
our argument that local norms partially determine training behavior among
employers, and we also try to rule out some alternative explanations.
2.6.1 Norm internalization
A norm favoring private provision of common goods should, not only be
visible in voting results but also in other aspects of peoples’ lives and through
their actions. Obviously, it is hard to differentiate whether any action,
preference, or belief in line with a norm contributed to the norm’s evolution in
24Note: In addition to the educational system, cantons determine other labor market
relevant policies, such as personal and corporate taxation and unemployment schemes.
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the first place, or whether the norm was the origin of the action, preference,
or belief. However, we argue that actions and expressed preferences and
beliefs conforming to a norm demanding private provision of goods can serve
as evidence for individuals’ internalization of this norm. In order to evaluate
this claim, we analyze four additional data sources.25 For each outcome
considered, Table 2.8 shows the contrast between the two language regions,
both without and with additional controls.
First, panel (a) of Table 2.8 shows that the share of individuals that
prefer state over private ownership of businesses is lower among German-
speaking regions than among Romance-speaking regions (item 1). Second,
panel (a) reveals that German-speaking individuals trust other people more
than Romance-speaking individuals (item 2). Both differences remain
widely unchanged when evaluated conditional on various individual and
municipality covariates in the last column. We argue that these findings are
in line with a norm valuing private provision of goods and possibly reveal two
mechanisms supporting it: Individuals who are critical towards state-owned
business are more likely to assume responsibility in providing goods. And
larger trust towards others might mitigate concerns that peers are purely
financially incentivized and thus stop contributing to a good (Fischbacher
et al., 2001; Kollock, 1994). In the context of VET, this lowers negative
poaching externalities for firms offering apprenticeship positions.
Next, panel (b) of Table 2.8 compares three measures of individuals’
private engagement across the two language regions. These three items
ask whether people (3) actively participate in associations (sports, social,
or cultural), (4) worked voluntarily during the last four weeks, and (5)
25First, the World Values Survey allows comparison of average language region
differences because the only spatial information the survey contains for Swiss respondents
is the language region they live in. Second, the Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006 conducted
by the Swiss Society for the Common Good (SSCG) asks people about their voluntary
commitment; results are available on municipality level. Third, the Swiss Household Panel
is a longitudinal data set composed of two cohorts of randomly chosen Swiss households,
surveyed annually. As a spatial indicator, it includes 106 Swiss labor market regions.
Fourth, we use data from an exit poll related to vote 503 from the year 2003 (cf. Appendix
Table B.2).
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Table 2.8: Evidence on norm internalization
Mean answer Conditional
Question N Romance German Difference differencea
(a) Trust
(1) “State vs. private ownership of business”: WVS 1994/98 and 2005/09
2,249 4.263 3.884 -0.379??? -0.382???
(0.077) (0.063) (0.099) (0.099)
(2) “Trust other people”: SHP 1999-2012b
3,892 5.440 6.224 0.784??? 0.574???
(0.063) (0.045) (0.076) (0.084)
(b) Voluntary commitment
(3) “Membership in associations”: Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006/10
4,648 0.664 0.775 0.111??? 0.120???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.027)
(4) “Voluntary work during last 4 weeks”: Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006
2,753 0.412 0.512 0.100??? 0.093?
(0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.039)
(5) “Donated during last year”: Swiss Volunteering Survey 2006/10
4,648 0.721 0.832 0.112??? 0.066??
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.025)
(c) Voting motivation (“apprentice initiative”)
(6) “Reason for ‘No’: responsibility of firms/no state task”: VOX 2003
326 0.289 0.464 0.175?? 0.183???
(0.052) (0.032) (0.064) (0.065)
Notes: Sample restricted to observations within 50 kilometers of the language border; due to a lack of
municipality identifiers, this restriction was not possible in (1) and (6). Panel A, question (1) refers
to a ten point scale ranging from 1: “Private ownership of business should be” to 10: “Government
ownership of business should be”. Panel A, question (2) refers to a 0 (“One can’t be careful enough”)
to 10 (“One can trust most people”) scale to the question “Would you say, one can trust most people?”.
Answers displayed in panel B are binomial Yes/No. Panel C refers to a 1 (No-votes in vote 503 (see
B.2) indicated as reason for their individual vote either “economy should react by itself” or “firms not
responsible for (apprenticeship-)market” or “can’t be forced by the state” or “other statement concerning
the responsibility of the economy” or “self-responsible” and a 0 otherwise. aOLS regression of answers on
a German language dummy, demographic and municipality (not included in question (1) of panel A due
to a lack of municipality identifier) controls. bThough the Swiss Household Panel has a panel structure,
we only include the latest observation per person.
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donated during the last year. All three indicators display higher values
for individuals in German-speaking regions and are again robust to the
inclusion of covariates in the last column. Overall, financially unrewarded
private commitment seems to be more widespread among German-speaking
individuals. This appears to be in line with a norm demanding the private
provision of goods.26
Finally, panel (c) uses data from an exit poll related to vote 503 (cf.
Appendix Table B.2), which explicitly called for more state responsibility
within the apprenticeship system. We here focus on the motivation of no-
voters.27 Item (6) shows that 29% of all no-voters in Romance-speaking
regions stated that the provision of apprenticeships is not a task the state
is responsible for, while the equivalent share amounted to 46% among no-
voters in German-speaking regions.28 This directly supports the claim that
German speakers are more critical of state engagement in the provision of
apprenticeship positions than their Romance-speaking counterparts.
Altogether, we conclude that German-speaking individuals mistrust
government-owned business more, whereas they display higher trust towards
others and show higher voluntary and financially unrewarded engagement.
Moreover, they are more critical of state engagement in the provision of
apprenticeship positions. We believe that these findings correspond to a norm
demanding private engagement in the provision of goods in two reciprocal
ways. First, this norm might be rooted simultaneously in individuals’
mistrust of government-owned business and their intensive involvement
within their local communities. Secondly, these attitudes and actions sustain
this norm once it occurs.
26See also Appendix Figure B.5 which again highlights differences in the share of people
working voluntarily at the language border
27Table 2.2 exploits the same data source to validate our norm measurement.
28In contrast, Table 2.2 documents no differences across language regions in the
motivation of yes-voters to approve the vote due to a perceived lack of apprenticeship
positions.
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2.6.2 Selection into apprenticeship training, expected
labor market outcomes, and apprentice wages
We next focus on alternative explanatory mechanisms and try to rule out
several alternative mechanisms as far as possible.
Selection into apprenticeship training
A first mechanism that could threaten our identification strategy is differ-
ential selection of pupils from the two language regions into apprenticeship
training and other educational tracks, namely high school.29 More specifi-
cally, given the number of potential apprentice applicants, e.g. pupils with
sufficient cognitive abilities, pupils preferring high school over apprenticeship
lower the number of applicants for apprenticeships and may consequently
decrease the number of apprenticeship positions filled by firms. If these
preferences contrast at the language border, we might wrongly interpret lower
numbers of apprentices as lower apprenticeship provision by firms.
In order to identify whether selection into apprenticeship and high school
differs between the two language regions, we use PISA data from the bilingual
canton of Bern.30
Column (1) of Table 2.9 shows the estimates of running a simple regression
of pupil i’s PISA score on a German-speaker dummy Gi, a dummy Ai taking
the value 1 (zero) if pupil i plans to opt for an apprenticeship (for high
school) after the summer break, and their interaction term Gi×Ai.31 We are
mainly interested in the coefficient associated with the interaction term, as
29In a survey of 5,934 adults, Cattaneo and Wolter (2016) find that apprenticeship
training has lower prestige among Romance speakers than German speakers. This raises
concerns about diverging selection mechanisms across the language border.
30The Canton of Bern is the only bilingual canton covered by the PISA survey and with
observations from both language regions. We thus focus solely on this canton to be able
to hold the institutional setting constant. We pool data from the 2000 and 2009 waves to
increase the sample size.
31We only consider pupils planning to opt either for apprenticeship or for high school.
This approach is inspired by Bolli and Rageth (2016), who compare selection into
apprenticeship training between native and immigrant children.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a positive interaction term would indicate a stronger selection of relatively
high-ability pupils into VET among German-speaking pupils than among
Romance-speaking pupils. However, the interaction term is not significantly
different from zero. We thus conclude that, given pupils’ cognitive ability,
selection into one or other track after compulsory school is similar on either
side of the language border.
Expected labor market outcomes
Another channel potentially shaping the demand for apprenticeships are
expected labor market outcomes typically associated with this educational
track. We therefore use additional data from the Swiss Labor Force Surveys
2010-2014 to link adults’ first completed postcompulsory education with their
contemporary earnings and working status and focus on differences between
the language regions.
In columns (2) to (5) of Table 2.9 we thus check whether labor market
outcomes for the two groups differ between the two language regions.
Similar to column (1), we run a simple regression of individual i’s labor
market outcome on a German-speaker dummy Gi, a dummy Ai with 1
if individual i opted for an apprenticeship and 0 if individual i opted
for high school or another general track after compulsory schooling, and
their interaction term Gi × Ai. Also, we are again mainly interested in
the coefficient associated with the interaction term Gi × Ai.32 This term
discloses whether relative labor market differences between people initially
opting for apprenticeship or high school vary among language regions. While
this is not the case for wages (columns 2 and 3), row 3 of columns (4)
32The estimates of the German-speaker dummy Gi in row 1 display general differences
between German- and Romance-speaking regions which are not statistically significant
when including demographic, sector, occupation, and cantonal controls in columns (3) and
(5). According to the estimates of the apprenticeship dummy Ai in row 2 of column (2),
individuals who initially opted for an apprenticeship track earn less than their counterparts
who initially opted into high schools, but they are 1.2 percentage points less likely to be
unemployed (row 2, column 4). These differences persist when including controls (row 2,
columns 3 and 5).
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and (5) suggest that the relative apprenticeship advantage over high-school
graduates in unemployment rates is 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points larger in
Romance-speaking regions than in German-speaking regions, respectively.
Thus, expected labor market outcomes should at least not shape demand
for apprenticeships more negatively among Romance-speaking pupils than
among German-speaking pupils.
Apprentice wages
We further analyze differences in apprentice wages between the two language
regions in the Swiss Labor Force Surveys 2010-2014. Because apprentice
wages are set relatively competitively in Switzerland, we assume they partly
reflect demand for and supply of apprenticeships. A priori, it is ambiguous
in which language region apprentice wages are higher. A higher supply of
apprenticeships by firms for a given number of apprenticeship applicants
across German-speaking regions would ceteris paribus be expressed by higher
apprentice wages in German-speaking regions than in Romance-speaking
regions. However, high numbers of applicants for firms’ given supply of
apprenticeships in German-speaking regions would ceteris paribus lead to
lower apprentice wages among German-speaking regions.33
Column (6) of Table 2.9 documents 4.7 percent higher apprentice wages in
German-speaking regions than in Romance-speaking regions. This difference
decreases to 3.5 percent once we include demographic controls and the
VET occupation and, moreover, appears to be statistically insignificant
(column 7). Cautiously, we surmise that somewhat higher apprentice wages
among firms in German-speaking regions reflect a higher initial supply of
apprenticeships by firms across these regions.
33Note that in light of lower shares of apprentices across Romance-speaking regions, we
rule out the possibility of a higher supply of or demand for apprenticeships in Romance-
speaking regions than in German-speaking regions.
92 Norms
2.6.3 Number of applications per apprenticeship posi-
tion
Perhaps the most compelling piece of empirical evidence in support of our
claim that the discontinuity in the training probability among employers
is not only driven by the pupils demand for apprenticeships comes from an
additional analysis using data from the fourth survey on the costs and benefits
of apprenticeship training (Gehret et al., 2019). In the survey, among many
other things, employers were asked about the number of applications they
receive for each open apprenticeship position.
Table 2.10: Log number of applications per apprenticeship position
(OLS estimates)
ln(number of applications)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gj -0.180
∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.075) (0.085) (0.137)
Bandwidth full full 20 20
sample sample
Cantonal dummies No Yes No Yes
Firm characteristics No Yes No Yes
Location characteristics No Yes No Yes
Demand controls No Yes No Yes
R2 0.005 0.393 0.051 0.576
Observations 5531 5531 596 596
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Source: Gehret et al. (2019), own calculations.
Table 2.10 shows that employers in the Romance-speaking regions receive
more applications on average than those in the German-speaking regions (see
also Appendix Figure B.6). The difference in the number of applications is
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large and statistically significant, both in the full and the RD sample. In
the full sample, the estimated discontinuity in the number of applications
received is about 18% to about 36.6% lower among employers located on the
German-speaking side of the language border, depending on whether controls
are taken into account or not. Similarly, in the RD sample, the estimated
discontinuity at the language border is about -48.2% without to about -
36% with controls. Assuming that there is no difference in search behavior
across the two language regions, these estimates suggest that the demand for
apprenticeship training (relative to the supply) is higher, not lower, in the
Romance-speaking part of the country.
2.6.4 Alternative educational tracks
Beside apprenticeships, high schools are the most relevant track at the upper-
secondary level. At the national level, roughly 20% of all pupils enter this
track annually. Firms recruiting apprentices after compulsory schooling thus
compete to some extent with high schools for high-ability pupils. High
school rates vary substantially across Swiss cantons and tend to be higher
among Romance-speaking cantons.34 Therefore, one may conclude that
firms in Romance-speaking regions simply do not train because they lack
potential apprentices. However, this subsection examines two alternative
tracks for pupils after compulsory school that could instead provide firms
with apprenticeship applicants. Both these tracks are more common among
Romance-speaking pupils.
34The share of pupils opting for high schools after compulsory schooling varies
from the Cantons of Obwalden (11.0%), Glarus (12.2%), and Schaffhausen (13.0%)
at the lower end to Ticino (27.3%), Geneva (29.4%), and Basel-Stadt (29.6%) at the




The present chapter focus on firms’ provision apprenticeship positions in dual
apprenticeship programs.35 However, pupils opting for an apprenticeship
after compulsory schooling can also enter school-based apprenticeship pro-
grams, which are publicly financed and taught at special schooling facilities.
While these programs equip youngsters with similar vocational skills as
provided during a dual apprenticeship program in those occupations where
both exist, they do not rely on the participation of firms. This makes school-
based and dual apprenticeships close substitutes from the viewpoint of pupils.
Figure 2.5 displays apprentices attaining a school-based apprenticeship
program as a share of the total apprenticeship cohort. Within 20 km of the
language border, this share amounts to 14.0% in Romance-speaking regions
but only 6.9% in German-speaking regions. Although we cannot rule out
that Romance-speaking youngsters, and their parents, partly prefer school-
based apprenticeship programs over dual apprenticeships, we argue that high
numbers of school-based apprentices represent potential applicants for firms
aspiring to train apprentices in Romance-speaking regions.
Entering the labor market without upper-secondary education/training
Another option is to enter the labor market directly after mandatory
schooling, without any additional education or training at the upper-
secondary level.
Panel (a) of Table 2.11 yields a higher participation in the regular labor
market for people between age 16 and 18, and thus at the regular age
of apprentices, in Romance-speaking regions. The statistically significant
difference of 0.7 percentage points is evaluated in a 20 kilometer bandwidth
of the language border and amounts to roughly 10% within this age cohort.
Moreover, this difference is persistent among a Swiss-only subsample (panel
b). This is somewhat surprising, considering that this is reversed for older
35The term dual refers to the fact that apprentices in these programs spend three to four
days per week in the training firm and the other one to two days per week in a vocational
school.
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Notes: The figure shows the share of school-based apprentices, aggregated by the distance
of their place of residence from the language border within bins of 1km width. The dashed
line shows smoothed values from a locally weighted regression.
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Vocational Education and Training (VET) –
Apprenticeships 2016.
cohorts, as panels (c) and (d) display. As in the case of school-based
apprentices, we argue that these youngsters entering the regular labor market
directly after compulsory school represent potential applicants for firms
aspiring to train apprentices in Romance-speaking regions.
2.6.5 Religion
A final alternative explanation is religion. Switzerland is not only lin-
guistically diverse but also heterogeneous in terms of individuals’ religious
affiliation. Although language regions are not religiously homogeneous, they
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Table 2.11: Employment rates for different age cohorts (OLS
estimates)
Full RD sample
Age group sample All Romance German Difference
(a) Ages 16-18
0.070 0.070 0.074 0.066 -0.007??
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
[235,437] [22,942] [10,692] [12,250]
(b) Ages 16-18, Swiss only
0.058 0.061 0.065 0.057 -0.008??
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
[196,610] [19,885] [8,992] [10,893]
(c) Ages 19-25
0.541 0.515 0.455 0.578 0.123???
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
[542,391] [52,585] [26,955] [25,630]
(d) Ages 30-55
0.599 0.590 0.590 0.602 0.012???
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
[2,537,388] [246,513] [114,674] [131,839]
Notes: The table shows employment rates in the full and the RD sample for
different age groups. The square brackets contain the number of observations in
the respective cohort. ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Source: Population Census 2000.
differ on average: 55% of the people living in Romance language regions are
Catholic, and only 21.3% Protestants. In contrast, these shares are almost
reversed in the German-speaking region, with 37.8% Catholics and 42.1%
Protestants (cf. Appendix Figure B.7). If religious affiliation correlates
with, or even causes, private engagement, an imbalance in religious affiliation
at the language border could threaten our identification strategy. Indeed,
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Basten and Betz (2013), who apply a spatial RDD at the border between the
Cantons of Fribourg (mainly Catholic) and Vaud (mainly Protestant), find
stronger preferences for leisure, redistribution, and government intervention
among Catholics. However, differing institutional frameworks across cantons,
including educational institutions, mean that a cantonal border is not very
well suited for evaluating the association between prevalent norms and the
provision of apprenticeship positions (Eugster et al. (2017) proposed a similar
argument).
To test for the influence of religion, we thus exploit another natural
laboratory existing in Switzerland: the religiously divided but entirely
German-speaking Canton of Aargau. The Canton of Aargau lies in the
northeast of Switzerland, covers 3.4% of its territory, and accounts for 7.8%
of its total population. Short distances and common institutions make the
Canton of Aargau a well-integrated labor market, which remains, however,
religiously separated for historical reasons.36
In the contemporary Canton of Aargau, this religious border is known as
the Jassgrenze, and panel (a) of Figure 2.6 shows that it is still visible.37
Across the territories formerly ruled by the Bernese, only 24.5% declare
themselves to be Catholics, but 54.2% do so in the rest of the canton.
Reassuringly for our analysis, these different shares of Catholics neither
translate into diverging levels of our norm measurement Nj[i] nor into
differences in the share of training firms along the Jassgrenze, as shown in
panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.6, respectively.38
36Before its founding in 1803, the canton was split between the city-state of Bern and
the Old Swiss Confederacy. During the Reformation in the 16th century, the Bernese
rulers imposed Protestantism on their territories; the rest territories remained Catholic
(Seiler and Steigmeier, 1991).
37Named after the Swiss card-game Jass and the German word for border (Grenze) due
to the use of different sets of playing cards on either side of this border (panel d of Figure
2.6). The border is also known as the Brünig-Napf-Reuss line, named after the Alpine
pass Brünig, the mountain Napf, and the river Reuss it crosses and follows, respectively.
38Table B.3 displays the corresponding estimates.
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Figure 2.6: Religious affiliation, local norm, training firms, and playing cards
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(d) Playing cards
Notes: The figures show (a) the share of Catholics, (b) mean values of Nj for municipalities
aggregated, (c) the share of training firms, and (d) the share of players using the German
cards, aggregated by the distance from the religious border (Jassgrenze) within bins of
1km width. The dashed lines show smoothed values from locally weighted regressions.
Sources: (a) Population Census 2000; (b) Federal Statistical Office 2017; (c) Business
Census 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008; (d) Swisslos Interkantonale Landeslotterie, Swiss Jass
Championships held online in 2017 and 2018.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we ask whether a local norm favoring more private
engagement enhances firms’ voluntary provision of apprenticeship positions.
To evaluate this hypothesis empirically, we apply a spatial RDD at the Swiss
language border, where voting results reveal remarkable differences in a norm
preferring private provision of goods.
Our empirical analysis establishes two main results. First, individuals
2.7. CONCLUSIONS 99
living in the German-speaking regions favor private provision of goods,
while their Romance-speaking counterparts prefer the state provision of
these goods. Second, our preferred estimate associates a one-standard-
deviation difference in our norm measurement with a 3.6 percentage point
difference in the share of training firms. Considering firms’ average training
propensity of 30% across all Switzerland, this difference seems not only
statistically significant but also economically relevant. This result is robust
to the inclusion of firm characteristics, location characteristics, and variables
mapping the local demand for apprenticeship positions. Moreover, we present
various different specifications and subsample results, which do not alter our
results.
Additionally, we examine various factors along the language border that
potentially drive our results. First, we are concerned that our results
stem from a discontinuity in the demand for apprenticeship positions also
occurring at the language border. However, analyses of labor market
outcomes, apprentice wages, and selection into the apprenticeship track yield
no substantial differences among language regions and thus mitigate concerns
to that effect. In contrast, we find evidence for different strengths of norm
internalization between the language regions: German-speaking individuals
show considerably higher financially unrewarded private commitment and
prefer private- over state-owned businesses more than their Romance-
speaking counterparts. Finally, we show that religious affiliation interacts
with neither our norm measurement nor the firms’ level of apprenticeship
provision, and thus does not threaten our identification strategy.
Overall, the chapter shows how norm-guided behavior potentially limits
the scope of purely financially motivated behavior by firms. In our opinion,
one can draw two policy implications from this result. First, persistent
norms might strengthen the sustainability of the Swiss VET system against
potential shocks to firms’ cost-benefit ratio. Second, behavior bound by
norms might hinder the export of VET to other countries even after they set
up institutional frameworks to foster VET.
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A Distance trend and bandwidth choice
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Distance to language border in km
Notes: The figure shows the share of training firms aggregated, within bins of 1km width,
by their distance to the language border in terms of actual travelling distance. German
(Romance) speaking regions are associated with positive (negative) travelling distances.
The black dashed horizontal lines show subsample means within 20 km bandwidth.
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Notes: The figures show the share of training firms aggregated, within bins of 1km width,
by their distance to the language border in terms of actual travelling distance. German
(Romance) speaking regions are associated with positive (negative) travelling distances.
The black (red) dashed lines show values from a linear regression within 20 (left figure:
25, right figure: 40) km bandwidth.
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Fuzzy / quadratic
Notes: The figures in the upper (lower) row display the coefficients obtained from reduced-
form (fuzzy) RD-estimations of the training dummy Ti on the German language dummy
Gj[i] (on the norm measurement Nj[i] that is instrumented with the German language
dummy Gj[i]). The reduced-form (fuzzy) estimations are specified as in model (6) of
Table 2.4 (Table 2.5). a“omitted”, “linear”, and “quadratic” correspond to the distance to
the language border measurement dj[i]: The estimations yielding the coefficients displayed
in column 1 omit dj[i], the estimations yielding the coefficients displayed in column 2
include dj[i], and the estimations yielding the coefficients displayed in column 3 include dj[i]
and d2j[i], respectively. Moreover, dj[i] and d
2
j[i] are interacted with the German language
dummy Gj[i]. For the corresponding fuzzy RD-estimates see also Table A.1. The grey
dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval.
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulative number of firms, within bins of 1km width, by














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Additional tables and figures






Notes: This figure maps the four different language regions (German, French, Italian, and
Romansh) of Switzerland. The black lines delineate cantonal borders.
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Figure B.2: Distance to language border in kilometres
Notes: The figure shows the minimum travelling distance from a given municipality to
the language border. Areas shaded in dark (light) blue are far away from (close to) the
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Notes: The figure shows the spatial distribution of Nj[i] at the municipality level. Areas
shaded in dark (light) blue correspond to regions with a strong (weak) norm towards
private engagement. Black lines delineate cantonal borders.
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Distance to language border in km
Notes: The figure shows the share of individuals working voluntarily, aggregated in bins
of 1km width, by their distance to the language border in terms of travelling distance.
German (Romance) speaking regions are associated with positive (negative) travelling
distances. The dashed line shows smoothed values from a locally weighted regression.
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Distance to language border
Notes: The figure shows the log number of applications per vacant apprenticeship
positions, aggregated in bins of 1km width, by their distance to the language border
in terms of actual travelling distance. German (Romance) speaking regions are associated
with positive (negative) travelling distances. The dashed line shows smoothed values from
a locally weighted regression.
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Figure B.7: Protestantism and catholicism in Switzerland
Notes: The figure shows the religious affiliation at the municipality level in 2000. Black
lines delineate cantonal borders.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics (RD sample only)
All Romance German Differencea
(a) Main variables
Training firm 0.322 0.302 0.342 0.040???
Norm towards private engagement 0.568 0.501 0.629 0.128???
(b) Firm characteristics
Number of employees 13.7 14.1 13.3 -0.85
% For-profit firms 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.02???
% Public firms 0.13 0.14 0.12 -0.02???
(c) Location characteristics
Log(number of firms) 7.60 7.74 7.47 -0.27
Log(same-sector firms) 5.85 6.01 5.71 -0.30
Log(Inhabitants) 7.05 7.08 7.01 -0.07
Population density 269.6 242.4 293.9 51.5
% Employed 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.01
% Employed in 2nd sector 0.34 0.34 0.34 -0.00
% Empolyed in 3rd sector 0.47 0.47 0.47 -0.00
Median income in CHF 6748.9 6619.6 6864.3 224.8
(d) Apprenticeship demand controls
Distance high school 17.0 17.3 16.7 -0.60
Distance dual VET school 12.2 11.0 13.3 2.3???
Distance school-based VET 15.7 11.9 19.1 7.1???
% Age 15-25 0.11 0.10 0.11 -0.01
N (firms) 69,619 34,127 35,492
N (municipalities)b 371 175 196
Notes: The table shows mean values across the RD sample (bandwidth of 20 km around the
language border). aEstimated differences of firm characteristics are clustered at firm level;
estimated differences of location characteristics and apprentice supply controls are evaluated
on municipality level and clustered at LM-region level if conducted on LM-region level. ???,
??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. bThe
number of municipalities does not correspond to the total number of municipalities because
in this table of covariates we only consider municipalities with a least one firm and which
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Table B.3: Reduced form RD-estimates: evaluated at the
“Jassgrenze” in the Canton of Aargau (OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cj[i] -0.006 0.001 0.031 0.031
(0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.030)
dj[i] 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
dj[i] × Cj[i] 0.003 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20
Census year dummies No Yes No Yes
Firm characteristics No Yes No Yes
Location characteristics No Yes No Yes
Demand controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 47991 47991 47991 47991
R2 0.000 0.089 0.001 0.089
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
and are clustered by municipality.

Chapter 3
A task-based approach to hori-
zontal mismatch
3.1 Introduction
Many economists claim that technological change has accelerated recently
and transformed the labor market quite dramatically (Berger and Frey, 2016;
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012). Frey and Osborne (2017) estimate the
probability of substitution for US occupations and postulate that 47% of the
total US employment is at high risk. Using the same approach, Deloitte
(2016) calculate similar numbers for Switzerland, Bonin et al. (2015) for
Germany. However, Frey and Osborne’s (2017) approach might focus too
narrowly on the substitution effects of new technology and underestimate
its complementarity to human capital. Autor (2015) and Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018) describe how this complementarity between automation
and labor increases productivity, raises earnings, and augments demand for
labor. Accordingly, they argue that new technologies do not lead to fewer
jobs but alter their nature (see also Bessen, 2016; Evangelista et al., 2014;
Graetz and Michaels, 2015; Gregory et al., 2016; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2016). In
a labor market where the importance of certain occupations erodes and the
characteristics of others change rapidly, individuals working in an occupation
different from that they learned, termed occupational horizontal mismatches,
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become more likely.
In this chapter, I analyze first how recent technological change affects
individuals’ horizontal mismatch probabilities and second the extent to which
these horizontal mismatches translate into wage penalties. In order to trace
this mechanism and to identify its causal effect on wages, I propose an
instrumental variable (IV) approach. The task composition of individuals’
learned occupation serves as the instrument for the endogenous mismatch
variable in this case. This empirical strategy leans on the task-based
approach developed by Autor et al. (2003), which shows that technology
increases and decreases demand for complementary and substitutable tasks
and occupations bundling them, respectively.
Applying this strategy to a sample of more than 10,000 observations
of roughly 1,200 Swiss males in the years 1999-2016 reveals a mismatch
wage penalty of roughly 12%. This estimated mismatch wage penalty
pertains to individuals who primarily learned substitutable occupations and
are thus negatively affected by task shifting technological change. In contrast,
I find no mismatch wage penalties for individuals who learned mostly
complementary or unaffected occupations. Comparisons of different types
of mismatches and different strategies (ordinary least square OLS, fixed-
effect, and IV) to identify them, presented in this chapter, suggest that these
distinctions are relevant for any conclusion on mismatch wage penalties.
This chapter relates to the existing mismatch literature, which can
broadly be divided into two strands (for an overview see Somers et al. (2019)).
One strand relies merely on OLS estimations and generally associates
horizontal mismatches with a wage penalty. Various personal characteristics
and the strength of the mismatch thus determine the magnitude of this
association. Robst (2007b) estimates wage penalties of roughly 11%
for employees with formal qualifications that are “not related” to their
occupation and roughly 2% for employees with formal qualifications that are
“somewhat related”. Similarly, Bender and Heywood (2009), Nordin et al.
(2010), Bender and Roche (2013), and Yakusheva (2010) find wage penalties
that increase with individuals’ mismatch intensity. Zhu (2014) explains
the small wage penalty of 1.2% for Chinese males and 1.5% for Chinese
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females with an educational system that provides graduates with mostly
general skills. Similarly, Nordin et al. (2010) show that employees holding
degrees providing mostly job-specific skills suffer from the largest wage
penalties when experiencing horizontal mismatch. Bender and Heywood
(2009) highlight how the specificity of acquired human capital increases
potential wage penalties at later stages of PhDs’ careers. Meanwhile, wage
penalties seem to disappear over time as mismatched individuals acquire
occupation-specific human capital within their new occupation (Malamud,
2010).
Another strand of the mismatch literature applies fixed-effect estimations
to account for unobservable personal characteristics, e.g. ability. Schweri
et al. (2019) estimate no mismatch wage penalty for Swiss males either con-
sidering themselves mismatched or being objectively mismatched (different
learned and current occupations). Bender and Heywood (2009) apply fixed-
effect estimations to a sample of US doctoral graduates and find a small wage
penalty for males and a small but statistically insignificant wage penalty for
females. However, I argue that these fixed-effect estimations suffer from one
main shortcoming: while some individuals become mismatched due to lay-
offs, others might choose voluntarily to become mismatched, for instance
because they concurrently realize a wage gain. Accordingly, Robst (2007a)
attributes an overall negative effect for males of 10.2% and an overall negative
effect for females of 8.9% to different types of mismatches: male employees
experiencing a mismatch because “no matching job is available” suffer from
a wage loss of 26.5% (female employees: 18.5%), and employees experiencing
a mismatch because of the “job location” earn 29.3% (21.1%) less than their
matched counterparts. Contrarily, male employees becoming mismatched
because of payment or promotion opportunities realize a wage gain of 6.1%
(9.1%).
The contribution of this chapter to this existing mismatch literature
is twofold. First, I propose a mismatch measurement that goes beyond a
mere binary mismatch measurement. Instead, I use detailed survey data on
occupational skill portfolios to estimate the strength of horizontal mismatches
between any pair of learned and current occupations. Thus, I allow for wage
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penalties that vary with the magnitude of human capital loss induced by
horizontal mismatches. Applying such a continuous horizontal mismatch
measurement is motivated by the work of Guvenen et al. (2015), Bender
and Heywood (2009), Nordin et al. (2010), Bender and Roche (2013), Robst
(2007b), and Yakusheva (2010), who argue that employees who can partly
make use of their acquired skills despite being horizontally mismatched must
only accept a small wage penalty. By comparing my results with estimated
wage penalties based on a mismatch dummy, I show that understanding
horizontal mismatch as a binary concept might overstate mismatch wage
penalties. Moreover, the continuous mismatch measurement partly mitigates
concerns arising from potential measurement error likely inherent in any
occupational coding in survey data. Second, I propose an IV approach
to estimate a wage penalty stemming causally from horizontal mismatches.
To the best of my knowledge, all attempts to estimate causal mismatch
wage penalties rely on fixed-effect estimations. However, Section 3.4 of
this chapter demonstrates theoretically how fixed-effect estimations merely
reveal an effect on average that potentially underestimates wage effects for
involuntarily mismatched individuals. Comparisons of IV estimations and
fixed-effect estimations applied to the same sample in Section 3.5 underpin
this empirically.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
introduces the task-based approach and relates it to the concept of horizontal
mismatch. Section 3.3 describes the three data sources used in this
chapter. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents
the estimation results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical background
The task-based approach was introduced by Autor et al. (2003) “to study
how computerization alters job skill demands (p.1279).” They argue that
“present computer technology is more substitutable for workers in carrying
out routine tasks than non-routine tasks, it is a relative complement to
workers in carrying out non-routine tasks” (p. 1285). In light of falling
computer prices, both these mechanisms increased the relative demand for
workers executing nonroutine tasks, typically college graduates. This was
especially striking because most previous literature described an increasing
college premium (for an overview see Katz, 1999) but failed to provide
insights on technology-related mechanisms enhancing it.
Beside substitutable “cognitive and manual routine tasks” and comple-
mentary “analytical and interactive non-routine tasks”, Autor et al. (2003)
introduced a fifth task category: manual nonroutine tasks that are little
affected by new technology. Either these tasks are not substitutable because
they are too complex to be executed by machines (e.g. cleaning of different
room types), or technology is barely complementary to the execution of
these tasks because they require interpersonal communication that neither
machines nor computers can deliver (e.g. psychological consultation). This
general pattern of a strong increase in the demand for nonroutine analytical
and interactive tasks, a stable or slightly increasing demand for nonroutine
manual tasks, and a shrinking demand for cognitive and manual routine tasks
was first described for the US by Autor et al. (2003), for Germany by Spitz-
Oener (2006), and for the UK by Goos and Manning (2007); for an overview
see Autor (2013).
In this chapter, I strongly lean on the task categorization introduced
by Autor et al. (2003) but distinguish only three task types. I consider
tasks in which technology supports people who carry them out to be
complementary. This complementarity between humans and technology
increases the efficiency of these tasks’ execution and thus the return for
individuals performing them. In Autor et al.’s (2003) categorization, these
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tasks are referred to as “analytical nonroutine” and partly as “interactive
nonroutine” tasks. Substitutable tasks are executable by computers or
machines without or with little help from humans and hardly restricted
by financial, legal, or ethical constraints. Humans performing these tasks
tend to be replaced by machines, and their expected return decreases. The
substitutability of these tasks is what classifies them as “cognitive routine”
or “manual routine” tasks in Autor et al.’s (2003) categorization. Finally,
technology plays little or no role in the execution of unaffected tasks. This
little impact accounts for both the demand for and the return on these
tasks. Autor et al.’s (2003) categorizes these tasks as “manual nonroutine”
and partly “interactive nonroutine” tasks. Such a three-type categorization,
which is somewhat similar to that proposed above, can be found in Autor
and Handel (2013).
























Notes: The figure shows the indexed shares of complementary, substitutable, and
unaffected tasks over the sample period. The calculation of the task shares is explained
in Section 3.3.3.
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To categorize these three tasks types, I exploit the Swiss Job Market
Monitor, which contains a representative sample of job vacancies and lists
the most important task requirements for every vacant position; for details
see Section 3.3.3. Figure 3.1 displays the development of the three task
types described above in the Swiss labor market between 1999 and 2016. As
expected, tasks complementary to new technology increased their share by
8.8%, while tasks substitutable by new technology decreased their share in
the labor market by 13.4%. The share of tasks unaffected by new technology
increased slightly (+4.6%). This pattern fits the findings in the literature
discussed above and previous findings on task shifts in the Swiss labor
market (Aepli et al., 2017). As for example Manning (2004) (for Switzerland:
Oesch and Rodriguez Menés (2010) and Aepli et al. (2017)) do, I argue
that technological change affecting firms’ production processes at least partly
triggers these task shifts.1
Most task-based literature exploits these shifts in task demand to explain
how technology either affects the employment structure (e.g. Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011; Autor et al., 2003; Autor, David and Dorn, 2013; Goos
and Manning, 2007; Gregory et al., 2016; Spitz-Oener, 2006) or shifts the
earning distribution due to varying task returns (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor,
2011; Dustmann et al., 2009; Firpo et al., 2011). The present chapter
applies the task-based approach to an intersection of these two labor market
1However, technological change, understood in a narrow sense, might not be the only
driver for these task shifts in labor markets across highly developed economies. For
example, Goos et al. (2014), Harrison and McMillan (2011), and Pierce and Schott
(2016) stress the importance of reallocation of industrial production to China or Eastern-
European countries for the disappearance of relatively simple, manual routine tasks
in developed countries; for Switzerland see Waser and Hanisch (2011). However, the
reallocation of industrial production to other countries also often requires some sort of
new technology, such as transportation, ICT, or transfer of relatively new technology
to these countries. Speaking of technological change thus includes outsourcing to other
countries to at least some extent. Therefore, a more accurate term could be task-shifting
technological change. Moreover, demand factors are likely to play a role. For example,
ageing societies increase the need for care professions (Degen and Hauri, 2017), which
largely consist of manual nonroutine tasks that are unaffected.
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developments: horizontal mismatches. In the present chapter, I understand
horizontal mismatches as the situations of individuals whose educational
field or learned occupation does not match their current occupation (for
an overview see Somers et al., 2019). More generally speaking, this refers to
a mismatch between individuals’ acquired skills (supply-side), their human
capital, and the tasks demanded in the labor market (demand-side). These
mismatches are presumably associated with wage losses and thus affect both
the occupation people work in and how much they earn for their labor.
Technology affects these horizontal mismatches in two ways. First,
technology is considered to be the main demand-side driver for task shifts
(Manning, 2004), whereas international trade and product demand shifts
play a minor role (OECD, 2005). Thus, given the supplied skills, task-
shifting technology change affects the match between the demanded tasks
and the supplied skills. In the mismatch literature, Bender and Heywood
(2011) report high mismatch probabilities for engineers and hard scientists,
which they attribute to rapid technological change within these fields.
Similarly, Witte and Kalleberg (1995) argue that skills acquired during an
apprenticeship that become obsolete due to changing task requirements foster
occupational mismatches. Second, when technology alters returns to tasks, it
triggers occupational mobility, so that individuals select into tasks displaying
increasing returns (e.g. Autor and Handel, 2013). In general, this arguably
increases the overall match quality, as task prices enhance their efficient
allocation. However, high-ability workers selecting into well-paid positions
might in turn push other workers out of their traditional occupations and
thus trigger mismatches among them.
Section 3.4.4 describes specifically how task shifts are related to horizontal
mismatches. Section 3.5.1, in what is the first-stage in my IV approach,
estimates the direction and magnitude of this relation.
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3.3 Data
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on three data sources. The
Swiss Household Panel (SHP) observes the population of interest and is
described in Section 3.3.1. I derive a continuous mismatch measurement
between any occupation pair from the German BIBB/BAuA Employment
Survey (BIBB/BAuA-ES). Section 3.3.2 presents this data source and
highlights the benefits of such a continuous measurement. To determine the
occupational exposure to technology, I rely on the Swiss Job Market Monitor
introduced in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Swiss Household Panel
The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) is the main data source used in this
chapter; it surveys a representative sample of Swiss households between
1999 and 2016. Although respondents were asked about other household
members in some domains, I only rely on the actual respondents’ information
for the analysis below, and thus my observation units are individuals. Beside
detailed demographic information, the SHP covers various information on
individuals’ labor market status, such as individuals’ wage, education, firm
tenure, and hierarchical level (see Table 3.1). These variables allow me to
estimate a basic Mincer equation that forms the basis of the econometric
strategy introduced in Section 3.4. Moreover, the SHP collects a set of
employer characteristics, including the overall number of employees and
the firm’s industry. To construct my main independent variable, the
mismatch variable, I rely on a subsample of individuals for whom the SHP
includes retrospective information on education and work episodes. This
biographical subsample contains 28,469 observations stemming from 3,249
working individuals.
Due to women’s selective participation in the labor market, I restrict the
sample to males between the ages of 20 and 65 with either a VET, a tertiary-
B (further education for individuals with a VET degree), or a tertiary-A
(university or university of applied science) degree. Additionally, I exclude
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Matched Mismatched Difference
Individual characteristics
Age 45.3 44.4 46.0 -1.63???
Have children 0.48 0.52 0.45 0.06??
Married 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.03
Foreign 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00
VET 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.01
Tertiary-B 0.35 0.32 0.38 -0.06??
Tertiary-A 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.06??
Director 0.14 0.13 0.15 -0.02
Supervisor 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.01
Further Educ. 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.04??
Employment in % 96.5 96.4 96.6 -0.22
Firm informations
<10 Emp. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.01
10 - 49 Emp. 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.03?
50 - 99 Emp. 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.00
100+ Emp. 0.48 0.46 0.49 -0.03
Industrial sector 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.01
Service sector 0.66 0.64 0.67 -0.03
Wage and mismatch
Log monthly wage 8.97 8.94 8.99 -0.05??
Mismatch dummy 0.52 0.00 1.00 -1.00???
Occ. distance 0.53 0.00 1.00 -1.00???
Task shares learned occupation
Complementary 0.37 0.38 0.36 -0.01
Substitutable 0.42 0.40 0.44 -0.04?
Unaffected 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.02
Task shares current occupation
Complementary 0.44 0.40 0.47 -0.07???
Substitutable 0.30 0.36 0.25 0.10???
Unaffected 0.26 0.24 0.27 -0.03??
N(person-year) 10,471 4,988 5,483 -
N(person)a 1,224 457 525 -
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Most variables contain some missing values
which are coded as such but not displayed in the table. This is why not all displayed
shares sum up to 1. aPerson observations are considered matched (mismatched) if a
person is matched (mismatched) in every year she/he is observed.
Sources: SHP 1999 - 2016, SJMM 1999 - 2016, and BIBB/BAuA 2006/2012.
3.3. DATA 127
410 individuals with a workload below 50%, and 468 individuals with an
annual income below 24,000 or above 300,000 Swiss Francs, respectively.
Overall, this lowers my sample to 10,471 observation stemming from 1,224
individuals. For roughly half of these person-year observations, the learned
and the current occupation are not the same, i.e. they are mismatched, as
Table 3.1 highlights.2
3.3.2 Occupational distance measurement
Lazear (2009) argued in a seminal paper that all skills are basically general,
but firms combine (“weight”) them differently in their production processes.
This varying skill demand across firms enhances the specificity of skills and
thus of human capital; the more specific an individual’s skill combination,
the more specific his or her human capital. Geel et al. (2011) apply Lazear’s
(2009) skill-weight approach to three waves of the German BIBB/BAuA-
ES dataset and determine occupations’ specificity. The BIBB/BAuA-ES
interviews employees, among other topics, about how intensely they perform
various tasks at their workplace. Geel et al. (2011) argue that these task
items approximate the skill portfolio that workers need to perform their jobs
and, when aggregated within occupations, the skill portfolio of an occupation.
In the empirical part of their paper, they then show how German graduates
who learned a rather specific VET occupation shy away from leaving this
occupation, presumably because the wage loss is expected to be large due to
their specific skill combination.
In the vein of Geel et al. (2011), I argue in this chapter that the skill com-
position of two occupations determines the strength of a potential mismatch
between them. This seems intuitive: the closer the skill combination of two
occupations is, the smaller the wage penalty for an individual who works in
one of these occupations but has learned the other one. Accounting for the
potential heterogeneity of mismatches is not new in the mismatch literature.
Guvenen et al. (2015), Bender and Heywood (2009), Nordin et al. (2010),
2Additionally, Figure A.2 in the Appendix displays the temporal evolution of
mismatches during the analysis period.
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Bender and Roche (2013), Robst (2007b), and Yakusheva (2010) all show
that the mismatch wage penalty increases with the strength of the perceived
mismatch.3
Besides accounting for the potential heterogeneity of mismatches, such
a continuous mismatch measurement is beneficial for another reason. Oc-
cupational coding in any survey likely contains some measurement error
(Bound et al., 2001, p.3802); for example different interviewers might assign
similar information to different occupational codes. In case this measurement
error is random, it biases the estimated wage penalty estimate towards zero
(Angrist and Pischke, 2014; Bound et al., 2001). Though any continuous
mismatch measurement relying on learned and current occupation codes also
suffers from this measurement error, it seems plausible that wrongly coded
individuals are misclassified into occupations close to their true occupation.
Measurement error in occupational classification appears thus less severe
when relying on a continuous rather than a binary mismatch measurement
that weights all mismatches equally.
For the concrete construction of my continuous mismatch measurement,
I rely on the same data as Geel et al. (2011) but employ the latest waves
of 2006 and 2012,4 and proceed as follows: (i) For each of 16 task items
(see Table 3.2), I aggregate the answer (“How often does this task occur
during your work?” 0=never; 0.5=seldom; 1=often) of 24,975 individuals5
in the BIBB/BAuA-ES at the level of the 144 observed 3-digit German
occupations. (ii) Within every occupation, I divide each task item value by
the sum of all 16 task item values. Thus, every German occupation consists
of 16 task item shares that sum up to one. (iii) Based on occupational
3In contrast, applying a binary mismatch concept, i.e. indicating mismatch with a
dummy Dit that takes the value 1 if a person’s current occupation does not correspond
to any occupation this person has learned and 0 otherwise, cannot account for the
heterogeneity of mismatches. See also the discussion in Section 3.4.2.
4https://www.bibb.de/veroeffentlichungen/de/publication/show/7094 and
https://www.bibb.de/veroeffentlichungen/en/publication/show/2274.
5I exclude East Germany, observations with wages in the bottom or top 1 percentile,
individuals working less than five hours per week, and observations with no occupational
information.
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Table 3.2: Task items in the BIBB/BAuA 2006/2012 surveys
SHP sample statistics
Standard
Items as in BIBB/BAuA 2006/2012 Mean deviation Min. Max.
Manufacture, production of goods and merchandise 0.313 0.255 0.015 0.875
Measuring, testing, quality control 0.633 0.170 0.264 0.909
Monitoring, control of machines, plants, processes 0.411 0.221 0.085 0.889
Repair, overhaul 0.358 0.180 0.046 0.826
Retail, procurement, selling 0.311 0.136 0.090 0.757
Transport, storage, dispatch 0.374 0.140 0.136 0.861
Advertising, marketing, public relations 0.260 0.148 0.057 0.772
Organizing, planning and preparing work processes 0.548 0.109 0.246 0.826
Development, research, construction 0.287 0.136 0.050 0.766
Training, teaching, educating 0.424 0.189 0.100 0.986
Collecting information, researching, documenting 0.657 0.183 0.219 0.933
Advising and informing 0.102 0.134 0.013 0.687
Hosting, accommodating, preparing food 0.186 0.200 0.017 0.927
Nursing, caring, healing 0.295 0.136 0.013 0.735
Securing, protecting, guarding, monitoring 0.743 0.196 0.183 0.999
Cleaning, waste disposal, recycling 0.380 0.191 0.045 0.819
N(Occupations) 86
Notes: Task items values refer to 0=never, 0.5=seldom, and 1=often and are aggregated at the 3-digit level of 144
German occupations. These values are then converted to the 86 Swiss occupations (SSCO 3-digit level) observed in
the SHP.
frequencies, I assign these task-item shares to a maximum of five learned
occupations and to the current occupation of each individual at the 3-
digit level of the Swiss Standard Classification of Occupations 2000 (SSCO
2000).6 (iv) The occupational distance between any learned occupation
6Concerning the transferability of task items from German to Swiss occupations, I
argue that, due to similar economic structure and a similar education system (e.g. the
importance of the vocational track), German occupations resemble Swiss occupations more
than, for example, US-occupations. Consequently, Marsden (1999) argues in his theory
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(locc = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and any current occupation (cocc) equals the sum of
their absolute differences across each of the 16 occupational task-item shares,
formally for individual i’s learned and current occupation: OccDisti,locc =∑16
j=1 |itemlocci,j − itemcocci,j |. (v) The occupational distance relevant to the
mismatch analysis is the smallest difference between any of individual i’s
learned occupations at time t and individual i’s current occupation at
time t, formally: OccDistit = min{OccDistit,locc=1, ..., OccDistit,locc=5}.
(vi) Finally, I normalize this continuous mismatch measurement over the
sample to mean one for all individuals considered mismatched, i.e. for
OccDistit > 0. Thus, any estimated wage penalty based on this continuous
mismatch measurement can be interpreted as switching from a match to an
average mismatch in terms of occupational distance OccDistit. Figure 3.2
displays the distribution of this occupational distance for the mismatched
subpopulation, i.e. with OccDistit > 0.
For comparison purposes, I primarily display estimates based on a
conventional mismatch dummy, Dit. However, I suggest focusing on
estimations applying the occupational distance as a continuous measurement
for horizontal mismatch.
3.3.3 Occupational task shares
In order to determine the occupational task composition in the Swiss labor
market, I exploit the Swiss Job Market Monitor (SJMM), conducted annually
by the University of Zurich. The SJMM is a representative monitor of vacant
positions published by firms on online job portals, in newspapers, and on their
websites. Beside general job requirements and characteristics, the SJMM lists
the task considered to be the most relevant for a vacant position out of a set
of 21 possible tasks. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only information
of employment systems that the German labor market, which is based on occupational
qualifications, allows a high interfirm mobility of skilled workers and adjusts fast to
technological change. In contrast, the labor force in the US labor market receives more
on-the-job training and stricter guidelines. According to Marsden (1999), the Swiss labor
market belongs to the same category as the German labor market. The scheme for recoding
German occupations to Swiss ones is available upon request.
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Occupational distance
Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the occupational distance measurement over
the subsample of mismatched individuals (5,483 person-year observations). Person-
year observation of matched individuals excluded (n=4,988). The calculation of the
occupational distance measurement is explained in Section 3.3.2.
available on the task content of Swiss occupations. The sample I use consists
of 43,932 observations collected during 1995 and 2015. 42.4% of these job
vacancies were published on firm websites, 36.5% in newspapers, and 21.1%
on job portals.
The procedure of building broader task categories based on surveys that
collect individual task data is called a survey-based7 task-based approach,
and was first introduced by Spitz-Oener (2006); moreover, it can be found
in Autor and Handel (2013). Both these works are based on the conceptual
7Other task-based approaches rely on experts’ assignments of tasks based on
descriptions or curricula of occupations, e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor et al.
(2006), and Goos and Manning (2007). For a discussion on the two different approaches
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framework of Autor et al. (2003), and they assign the observed task items to
three broad categories. The task assignment in the present chapter relies on
the expertise of three labor market economists at the Swiss Federal Institute
for Vocational Education and Training (SFIVET).
Specifically, I proceeded as follows: (i) every expert independently
assessed each of the 21 SJMM task items to one of the three task types
introduced in Section 3.2: complementary, substitutable, and unaffected.
(ii) After taking the mean of these experts’ assignments, every SJMM task
item, and thus every job advertisement, is either considered as completely or
partly complementary, substitutable, or unaffected to or by new technologies,
respectively (Table 3.3).8 (iii) I aggregate the three task types among the
43,932 job ads in my sample at the 3-digit SSCO 2000 level. Hence, every one
of the 87 occupations observed in the SJMM consists of a complementary, a
substitutable, and an unaffected task share that sum up to one.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that substitutable tasks represent a majority in
agricultural (SSCO-1-digit: 1) and industrial occupations (2 and 4), while
complementary tasks are frequent in IT and technical occupations (3).
Unaffected tasks dominate in the remaining occupations, together with
sizeable shares of substitutable tasks in trade (5) and hospitality occupations
(6) and sizeable shares of complementary tasks in consulting (7) and social
occupations (8). Aggregating over the whole sample, Table 3.1 shows that
substitutable tasks account for 42% of all tasks among learned occupations,
whereas complementary and unaffected tasks are less relevant across learned
occupations, with shares of 37% and 21%, respectively. Current occupations,
however, display higher shares of complementary tasks (44%) and unaffected
tasks (26%) at the expense of substitutable tasks (30%).
8In fact, 9 task items were assigned to the same category by all three experts, while
the other 12 items were assigned to two different categories, and none of the items was
assigned to three distinct categories.
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Figure 3.3: Task shares per 1-digit occupation











Notes: The figure shows the task shares at the level of eight SSCO 1-digit occupations. The
calculation of the task shares is explained in Section 3.3.3. Occupations are: 1 Agricultural
and forestry professions, livestock breeding professions, 2 Production occupations in
industry and trade (excluding construction), 3 Technical and IT professions, 4 Professions
in the building and construction industry and mining, 5 Trade and traffic professions,
6 Occupations in the hospitality industry and professions for the provision of personal
services, 7 Professions in management and administration, banking, insurance and law, 8
Health, teaching and cultural professions, scientists.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Formalization of the hypothesis
To estimate the effect of horizontal mismatch on wages, I start with the
following equation:9
log(Wageit) = α + βDit + γxit + ψzf [it] + φi + θt + εit
9For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to mismatch as a binary measurement in this
Section. However, most estimates presented in Section 3.5 use the occupational distance
as the main independent variable; Section 3.3.2 comprises the argumentation behind this.
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Wageit measures individual i’s net monthly wage at time t. Dit is the
mismatch dummy, which takes a value of 1 if person i’s current occupation
is not equal to any of this person’s learned occupation(s) on the 3-digit
SSCO 2000 level at time t. Individual i’s characteristics entering xit are
age, age-square, a dummy for being foreign, a dummy for having children, a
dummy for being married, a categorical variable for the main three linguistic
regions of Switzerland (German, French, Italian), a dummy for receiving
further education in the past year, firm tenure and its square term, degree
of employment in percent, dummies for being in a director or supervisor
position, and a dummy for having a temporary contract. The term zf [it]
captures the size of the firm f that individual i is employed at at time t by
seven categories and an industry dummy for firm f (total twelve industries).
The term φi represents unobserved person-fixed effects for person i and the
term θt time-fixed effects for year t. Due to human capital losses in case of
a horizontal mismatch, I expect a negative association between individuals’
mismatch dummy Dit and their wageit, i.e. β < 0.
3.4.2 Potential sources of bias
OLS estimations derived from the equation shown above may suffer from
three sources of bias: heterogeneous horizontal mismatches, heterogeneity
in unobserved person fixed effects, e.g. ability, and optimizing behavior in
switching jobs.
First, the degree of human capital loss between someone’s learned and this
person’s current occupation may vary for two reasons: (i) The loss of human
capital generally increases with the occupation specificity of the mismatched
person’s human capital (Nordin et al., 2010; Zhu, 2014). For instance, a
person with a degree in medicine, which is considered to provide very specific
occupational skills, can on average transfer less human capital when switching
jobs than a person with a degree in business administration. (ii) The loss of
human capital increases with the occupational distance between the learned
and the current occupation of the mismatched person. For instance, an
engineer who works as a technician loses much less of his human capital than
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if he worked as an office clerk. It therefore seems likely that people with more
general skills are overrepresented in the mismatched population and that
they choose occupations whose skill requirements are close to those of their
learned occupations. The continuous mismatch measurement introduced in
Section 3.3.2 accounts for this potential source of bias.
Second, unobserved personal characteristics φi likely affect mobility in
the labor market. The most prominent example in the literature is ability.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) show how individuals adversely select into job
changes when outside employers cannot observe their ability. The same
mechanism might lead to adverse selection of less able workers into mismatch
(Boudarbat and Chernoff, 2012; Kucel and Vilalta-Bufi, 2012). However, this
could also be reversed: high-ability workers might receive outside offers from
firms regardless of their formal qualifications. Either way, an endogeneity
bias potentially arises from individuals’ unobserved ability. Formally, this
biases β in the equation above upward if cov(Dit, φi > 0) and downward if
cov(Dit, φi < 0).
10 Note that an upward bias corresponds to underestimating
the negative wage effect and vice versa, since I presume β < 0. The mismatch
literature usually deals with this second source of bias by applying fixed-effect
estimations.
Third, wage offers arguably strongly affect individuals’ job search be-
havior and labor market mobility (Mortensen, 1986; Rogerson et al., 2005).
Thus, simultaneous changes in the dependent variable, wage, and the
independent variable of interest, the mismatch indicator, give rise to
endogeneity concerns. For example, it seems likely that a proportion of
the mismatched individuals become mismatched exactly because they can
realize a wage gain through becoming so. As a consequence, the concept of
mismatch, with its negative connotation, may be misleading. Presumably,
people do not hesitate to accept a job offer at a higher wage, despite the fact
that the job offered does not match their formal qualifications. Supporting
this claim, Robst (2007a) finds that employees selecting into mismatch
for payment and promotion opportunities earn substantially more than
10Note: this holds only for β < 0, e.g. a mismatch wage penalty, and φi > 0, e.g. ability.
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their matched counterparts. This leads to an underestimation of mismatch
wage penalties in the model shown above compared to a scenario in which
individuals are randomly assigned to mismatches. Section 3.4.3 elaborates
more on this issue and Section 3.4.4 proposes an IV strategy to deal with it.
3.4.3 Fixed-effect estimations
Given the panel structure of the SHP, fixed-effect estimations are one
obvious and promising strategy for addressing the second source of bias
described above. Fixed-effect estimations allow it to keep unobservable
personal characteristics (e.g. ability) fixed when analyzing wage effects
of mismatched individuals. Exploiting the same dataset as in the present
chapter and applying fixed-effect estimations, Schweri et al. (2019) neither
find wage penalties for males considering themselves as mismatched nor males
objectively being mismatched. Bender and Heywood (2009) apply fixed-
effect estimations to a panel dataset of US doctoral students and reveal a
small wage penalty for males but no wage penalty for females.
However, I argue that wage effects thus identified are most likely average
effects, which aggregate different patterns leading to mismatch or match
situations together with their distinctive wage implications. I claim that
this appears because fixed-effect estimations fail to account for the likely
dependency between individuals’ switches into or out of mismatches and
their wage expectations. This endogeneity concern corresponds to the third
source of bias described above. To understand this concern in the context of
horizontal mismatches, I now describe the four possible interactions between
switches into or out of a mismatch situation and individuals’ wages (see also
Table 3.4). Moreover, I set out the implications of these four interaction
cases for an identification within a fixed-effect setting:
• A person works in her or his learned occupation. Then the person
accepts a position in an occupation different from any of her or his
learned occupations offering a higher wage. Thus, I refer to this case as
becoming voluntarily mismatched.11 Because I observe a wage increase
11Note: I define the terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” in a purely monetary way. A
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Table 3.4: Four mismatch cases
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Share of task j in Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
learned occ. T j,loccit mismatch mismatch match match
j = complementary 0.386 0.322 0.408 0.360
(0.302) (0.290) (0.288) (0.274)
j = substitutable 0.413 0.486 0.375 0.447
(0.336) (0.336) (0.314) (0.320)
j = unaffected 0.201 0.192 0.217 0.193
(0.237) (0.220) (0.222) (0.214)
OccDisti in t 0.989 1.044 – –
(0.414) (0.526)
OccDisti in t− 1 – – 0.763 0.771
(0.441) (0.391)
Number of cases 122 76 83 52
Share of all cases 0.366 0.228 0.249 0.156
Di,t −Di,t−1 +1 +1 −1 −1
Wagei,t −Wagei,t−1 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
E[Wagei,t|Di,t = 1] + − − +
−E[Wagei,t−1|Di,t−1 = 0]
Notes: The four cases are described in Section 3.4.
Sources: SHP 1999 - 2016, SJMM 1999 - 2016.
and the mismatch dummy Di switches from 0 to 1, the estimated wage
effect of becoming mismatched yielded by fixed-effect estimations is
positive. In my sample, I observe 122 such cases, accounting for 36.6%
of all switches from match to mismatch or vice versa.12
switch accompanied by a wage increase is considered voluntary and a switch accompanied
by a wage decrease is considered involuntary. Obviously, this omits other potential reasons
for an occupational switch, such as any intrinsic motivation.
12It is possible that in some cases individuals underwent unemployment spells while
switching from match to mismatch or vice versa. In this case, the switch from the
occupation before to the occupation after the unemployment spell is relevant. The
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• A person works in her or his learned occupation. Then the person loses
her or his position and accepts a position in an occupation different from
any of her or his learned occupations and offering a lower wage. Thus,
I refer to this case as becoming involuntarily mismatched. Because I
observe a wage decrease and the mismatch dummy Di switches from 0
to 1, the estimated wage effect of becoming mismatched yielded by
fixed-effect estimations is negative. I observe 76 such cases in my
sample, accounting for 22.8% of all switches from match to mismatch
or vice versa.
• A person works in an occupation different from any of her or his learned
occupations. Then the person accepts a position in any of her or his
learned occupations offering a higher wage. Thus, I refer to this case
as becoming voluntarily matched. Because I observe a wage increase
and the mismatch dummy Di switches from 1 to 0, the estimated wage
effect of becoming mismatched yielded by fixed-effect estimations is
negative. I observe 83 such cases in my sample, accounting for 24.9%
of all switches from match to mismatch or vice versa.
• A person works in an occupation different from any of her or his learned
occupations. Then the person loses her or his position and accepts a
position in any of her or his learned occupations offering a lower wage.
Thus, I refer to this case as becoming involuntarily matched. Because
I observe a wage decrease and the mismatch dummy Di switches from
1 to 0, the estimated wage effect of becoming mismatched yielded
by fixed-effect estimations is positive. I observe 56 such cases in my
sample, accounting for 15.6% of all switches from match to mismatch
or vice versa.
In a fixed-effect setting, Cases 2 and 3 reveal a mismatch wage penalty,
while Cases 1 and 4 reveal a wage increase for being mismatched. Con-
unemployment spell is simply omitted because my sample only consists of employed
individuals. However, Table 3.10 indicates that the coefficients yielded by my wage
estimations are insensitive to the inclusion of individuals undergoing an unemployment
spell during the sample period.
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sequently, any overall effect provided by fixed-effect estimations merely
represents an effect on average that is too small for one subpopulation and
wrongly identified for another subpopulation. Conclusions derived from these
fixed-effect estimations are therefore potentially misleading. If, for example,
the effect of a mismatch wage penalty is mainly driven by graduates who find
their first position in their learned occupation (Case 3), one cannot derive
any conclusion, or one may even derive a false conclusion, for individuals who
are involuntarily mismatched due to a layoff (Case 2). Moreover, fixed-effect
estimations are based on individuals switching from match to mismatch or
vice versa during the sample period. In total, I merely observe 333 (198 to
mismatch and 135 to match) such switches stemming from 248 individuals.
In contrast, individuals being mismatched (n=525) or matched (n=457)
throughout the entire sample period do not contribute to any effect yielded
by fixed-effect estimations. This is especially worrying if the subpopulation
of individuals mismatched or matched throughout the entire sample period
differs systematically from individuals switching within the sample period.
3.4.4 IV approach
This section introduces an IV approach to address the sources of bias
described in Section 3.4.2 and the remaining shortcomings of fixed-effect
estimations described in Section 3.4.3. The first part of the section discusses
the choice of the instrument and its hypothesized first-stage relation to the
endogenous mismatch variable. In addition to this first-stage relation, an
instrument needs to satisfy the independence assumption and the exclusion
restriction to be valid. These two requirements are not formally testable
and thus demand a critical examination (Angrist and Pischke, 2014; Imbens,
2014). The remaining parts of this section provide this.
First-stage
Leaning on the task-based approach, Section 3.2 highlights how technological
change affects demand differently for three task types (complementary,
substitutable, and unaffected) in the labor market, and therefore also for
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occupations bundling these tasks (Figure 3.1). The same Section 3.2
pointed out how task-shifting technological change potentially increases or
decreases horizontal mismatches between demanded tasks and supplied skills
in the labor market. Based on this general pattern, I propose two specific
mechanisms that presumably underpin an association between the task shares
of individuals’ learned occupations and their mismatch probability.
First, interoccupation employment shifts lower the number of positions
in occupations bundling substitutable tasks, while positions in occupations
bundling complementary tasks become widely available. These interoccupa-
tion shifts result in an oversupply of individuals with learned substitutable
occupations and thus trigger mismatches among them. However, numbers of
positions in occupations bundling complementary or unaffected tasks increase
or remain stable. This leads to low mismatch numbers among individuals
who learned these occupations.
Second, demand rises for complementary tasks within occupations (in-
traoccupation) at the expense of substitutable tasks. Consequently, returns
to complementary tasks rise, while returns to substitutable tasks decline
across occupations.13 This enhances varying occupational mobility patterns
depending on the task composition of individuals’ learned occupations. On
the one hand, the increasing demand for mostly complementary skills across
various occupations provides well-paid open positions for individuals with
these complementary although they lack the formal qualifications for these
occupations. This might pull individuals into mismatches which are, however,
perceived as voluntary.14 On the other hand, the demand for skills executing
substitutable tasks deceases even within occupations bundling these tasks
to a large extent. This lowers the demand for individuals with mostly
substitutable skills both generally and within their learned occupations.
Thus, intraoccupational task shifts might push these individuals out of their
13Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dengler and Matthes (2015) described these intra-occupation
task shifts among German occupations.
14Early works underpinning how occupational mobility does not necessarily lead to wage
decreases, even though movers are expected to lose some of their specific human capital,
include Johnson (1978), Topel and Ward (1992), and Neal (1999).
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learned occupations and lead to mismatches that are perceived as involuntary.
Neither a pull- nor a push-mechanism concerns individuals in primarily
unaffected learned occupations. Demand for their skills outside their learned
occupations and thus the number of outside options pulling them out of their
learned occupation remains stable. Meanwhile, the task composition of their
learned occupations does not shift towards more complementary tasks. This
limits the attractiveness of their learned occupations for individuals with a
more complementary skill bundle and therefore also their potential for being
pushed out of their learned occupation.
Considering the continuous mismatch measurement introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, both of these effects on the extensive margin, being mismatched,
reinforce themselves on the intensive margin, which accounts for the
magnitude of a perceived mismatch in terms of occupational distance.
Individuals who learned complementary occupations are, if mismatched,
likely to find a position in a close occupation, due to a similar occupational
task composition, for which demand also increased. In contrast, lower
demand for occupations bundling substitutable tasks might force individuals
who learned these occupations to move to rather different occupations if they
are mismatched.
Overall, I primarily expect task-shifting technological change to in-
crease mismatches among individuals who learned occupations bundling
substitutable tasks. Second, task-shifting technological change triggers
two opposing effects for individuals who learned rather complementary
occupations, and it remains a priori ambiguous which effect dominates.
Third and finally, as by definition technology has little impact on unaffected
tasks, I assume individuals who learned occupations bundling these tasks
are seldom prone to mismatches. These hypothesized associations between
the task composition of individuals’ learned occupations and their mismatch
incidence represent the first-stage of my IV setting. Section 3.5.1 applies
OLS estimations to evaluate them.
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Independence assumption
The independence assumption requires the instrument to be randomly or
as good as randomly assigned (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The first-best
solution to meet this requirement is by design. Prominent examples of
such instruments are draft lotteries (e.g. Angrist, 1990), giving birth to
twins (Angrist et al., 2010; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980), and random
variation in newborns’ gender composition (Angrist and Evans, 1998). In
contrast, the task share of someone’s learned occupation is obviously not
randomly assigned. For example, substitutable tasks often bundle in blue-
collar occupations, which are accessible without a university degree. Hence,
the task share of someone’s learned occupation correlates with education and
affects the dependent variable wage.
Thus, I need to relax the random assignment assumption and require
it “to hold only within subpopulations defined by covariates” (Imbens,
2014, p.27).15 Optimally, these covariates include all factors that affected
an individual’s occupational choice and are thus determined prior to the
instrument (Deuchert and Huber, 2017). One such factor is a person’s
gender, assuming males choose more manual occupations ceteris paribus.
However, this control is redundant due to the sample’s restriction to
males only. Another factor determining someone’s occupational choice is
school performance. Most occupations bundle people of similar school
performances, and many occupations require a certain level of education.
Thus, I would like to control for a person’s school performance prior to
any occupational choice, for instance at the end of compulsory school.
Unfortunately, the Swiss Household Panel does not contain this information.
The strategy to mitigate the issue is twofold.
In all estimations, I control for different educational categories. These
educational attainment categories aim to approximate an individual’s school
performance prior to his or her occupational choice. I surmise that the task
share of an individual’s chosen occupation is as good as random once I control
15Baiocchi et al. (2010) use matching methods for the same purpose.
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for educational attainment.16
In Section 3.5.3, I present IV estimations within educational subgroups.
The motivation for this is similar to that above: the task share of someone’s
learned occupation is plausibly closer to random within youngsters opting
for VET (e.g. becoming a commercial clerk or an electrician) than between a
youngster opting for VET and a youngster applying for university. Moreover,
these subsample estimations permit to identify varying mismatch wage
penalties across different educational cohorts.
Exclusion restriction
The exclusion restriction requires that the instrument affects the outcome
only through the endogenous variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In a
violation of this restriction, it seems likely that the task share of individuals’
learned occupations directly affects their wages. Specifically, I assume the
channel through which the task content of individuals’ learned occupations
affects their current wages works through the task content of their current
occupations.17 This enables this direct link to be clipped by controlling for
the share of task j of individuals’ current occupations cocc at time t, T j,coccit ;
whereby the share of task type j of individuals’ learned occupations locc
at time t, T j,loccit represents the instrument. Deuchert and Huber (2017)
underpin theoretically how the exclusion restriction can be sustained by
controlling for any direct effects.
Taking these requirements into account and replacing the mismatch
dummy Dit with the preferred continuous mismatch measurement OccDistit,
16Obviously, this is a rather strong claim and I thus encourage attempts to measure
how individuals are affected by task-shifting technological change in a way that is more
endogenous to their occupational choice.
17Note that I already set out above why controlling for educational attainment, among
other factors, is necessary in the present IV setting. Though I argued this is the case due
to the nonrandom assignment of the instrument, one could also argue that education is
another channel through which individuals’ learned occupations affect their wages directly.
In this sense, controlling for educational attainment also helps clip any direct link between
the instrument and the outcome variable and thus satisfy the exclusion restriction.
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the equation shown above transforms into the two following equations:
log(Wagecoccit ) = β0 + β1 ̂OccDistit + β2xit + β3zf [it] + β4T j,coccit + εit,
where ̂OccDisti is instrumented as follows:
OccDistit = α0 + α1T
j,locc
it + α2xit + α3zf [it] + α4T
j,cocc
it + υit
Wageit,cocc is individual i’s wage in current occupation cocc at time t.
As set out above, individual characteristics xit crucially include educational
dummies (VET, VET high school, VET high school with baccalaureate,
technical or vocational school, Tertiary-B track, university of teacher
education, universities of applied science, universities, and post-graduate
degrees). Adding the share T j,coccit of task j of individual i’s current
occupation cocc at time t sustains the exclusion restriction. The occupational
distance OccDistit is now instrumented with the respective share of task j




Table 3.5 exploits the association between the task shares of individuals’
learned occupations and their mismatch incidence in three ways. First,
columns (1) to (3) regress the mismatch dummy Dit on the task shares of
individuals’ learned occupations (extensive margin). Second, columns (4) to
(6) restrict the sample to mismatched individuals and yield the correlation
between the task composition of their learned occupations and the strength
of their mismatch in terms of occupational distance OccDistit (intensive
margin). Third, columns (7) to (9) display the first-stage estimates by
regressing the preferred mismatch measurement OccDistit on the task shares
of individuals’ learned occupations. I now discuss these first-stage relations
18Note that individuals’ learned occupations are also potentially time-variant due to
new formal qualifications acquired during the sample period.
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together with the three hypotheses concerning their direction presented in
Section 3.4.4.
According to column (1), the association between the complementary task
share of individuals’ learned occupations and their mismatch probability is
rather weak and statistically only significant at the 10%-level. This seems
to support the ambiguous relation between the complementary task share of
individuals’ learned occupations and their mismatch probability hypothesized
in Section 3.4.4. Individuals with complementary learned occupations are
able to avoid mismatches due to broadly available positions within their
learned occupation. However, these individuals also profit from an increased
demand for their skills in other occupations, which might allow them to
realize a wage gain while becoming mismatched. In contrast, and in line
with the hypothesis presented in Section 3.4.4, the substitutable task share
of individuals’ learned occupations and their mismatch probability correlates
positively (column 2). According to the point estimate in column (2), a one-
standard-deviation (0.26) higher substitutable task share is associated with
a higher mismatch probability of 15 percentage points. Presumably, the
scarcity of positions in occupations bundling substitutable tasks augments
the mismatch probability of individuals who learned these occupations. The
negative coefficient in column (3) suggests the opposite for individuals who
learned rather unaffected occupations.
In columns (4) to (6), I regress individuals’ occupational distance
OccDistit on the three types of task shares of someone’s learned occupations
while restricting the sample to mismatched individuals, OccDistit > 0. This
allows me to interpret the resulting estimate as the first-stage association
on the intensive margin. According to column (5), individuals with
substitutable learned occupations struggle to find close occupations in case
of a mismatch. This seems plausible, because these close occupations likely
bundle mostly substitutable tasks as well and therefore face the same decline
in demand. In contrast, columns (4) and (6) suggest that mismatched
individuals with complementary and to an ever greater extend unaffected
learned occupations tend to move to close occupations in terms of OccDistit.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bundling complementary or unaffected tasks become widely available or at
least remain stable. However, the lower coefficient in column (4) than in
column (6) somewhat contradicts this argument. One explanation could be
that individuals with complementary learned occupations disproportionately
possess skills that are demanded throughout various occupational fields.
Therefore, these individuals receive more attractive job offers in occupations
that are relatively unrelated to their learned occupations than do individuals
with unaffected learned occupations.
Accounting for the association between the task share of individuals’
learned occupations and their mismatch probability on both the extensive
margin and the intensive margin simultaneously yields the preferred first-
stage estimates in columns (7) to (9). Overall, the displayed coefficient
in column (8) indicates high occupational distances for individuals with
learned occupations bundling substitutable tasks, while individuals with
learned occupations bundling tasks unaffected by new technology display
smaller occupational distances in column (9). To be precise, an additional
standard deviation in the share of substitutable tasks in individuals’ learned
occupation increases their occupational distance by 29.3 percentage points,
whereas the equivalent for the share of unaffected tasks decreases occu-
pational distance by 23.4 percentage points. In contrast, the correlation
between the complementary task share of individuals’ learned occupation
and their occupational distance is about five times smaller and statistically
less significant (column 7).
Considering the general rule that F-statistics above 20 indicate sufficient
explanatory power at the first-stage (Bound et al., 1995), only the share
of substitutable and the share of unaffected tasks are valid instruments,
while the share of complementary tasks has insufficient explanatory power
for individuals’ mismatch probability. In forthcoming analysis, I therefore
employ the share of substitutable and unaffected tasks as instruments and




Table 3.6 presents the main results relying on the continuous mismatch
measurement (see Section 3.3.2) as the dependent variable.19 The table
displays OLS, fixed-effect, and IV (first-stage and 2SLS) estimations as
described in Section 3.4.
The OLS estimate in column (1) of Table 3.6 reveals a very small
positive average wage difference of 0.7% between a matched and an average
mismatched person in terms of occupational distance, all else being equal.
The fixed-effect estimate in column (2) accounts for unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals selecting into mismatch and is slightly negative but close
to zero as well. This suggests that no wage penalty stems from becoming
horizontally mismatched. However, as highlighted in Section 3.4, I argue
this fixed-effect estimate merely yields an average effect by mixing different
underlying mechanisms pointing in distinct directions.
Thus, I draw attention to the IV estimation results in columns (3) to
(8) of Table 3.6. Column (4) utilizes the share of substitutable tasks as an
instrument and yields a mismatch wage penalty of 11.9% for a person in
an average mismatch in terms of occupational distance.20 This estimate is
statistically significant at the one percent level and economically relevant.
With an annual gross wage of roughly 117,000 (median: 105,000) Swiss
francs, this amounts to 13,900 (12,500) Swiss francs wage penalty per year.
In contrast, column (6) uses the share of unaffected tasks as an instrument
to yield a smaller mismatch wage penalty (-6.2%) that is statistically
insignificant. This result arises due to the relatively small and imprecise
reduced-form estimate exploiting the unaffected task share displayed in
19Table A.1 contains an extended output and shows the coefficients of various control
variables.
20Note that the median of the occupational distance measurement for the mismatched
individuals is 0.96 and thus very close to the mean of one. In conclusion, the effective
mismatch penalty exceeds the estimated 11.9% for roughly half of all mismatched





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































column (3) of Table A.2.
How can these different mismatch wage penalties shown in Table 3.6
be explained?21 Following Imbens (2014) and Angrist and Pischke (2014),
I interpret the negative effect yielded in column (4) and the small and
imprecisely estimated effect yielded in column (6) as representing local
average treatment effects (LATE) for different subgroups, or compliers as
Imbens (2014) and Angrist and Pischke (2014) call them. Compliers suffering
from the mismatch wage penalty yielded in column (4) are mismatched
individuals with highly substitutable learned occupations who would not
be mismatched had they learned less substitutable occupations. Task
shifting technological change increased their mismatch probability and
their occupational distance in case of a mismatch by shortening available
positions both within their learned occupations and within close occupations.
Moreover, a general shift away from substitutable tasks limits their returns
to skills needed to execute these tasks across occupations. Therefore,
individuals with mostly substitutable learned occupations (compliers in
column 4 of Table 3.6) receive relatively poor outside options and thus suffer
from a mismatch wage penalty.
Conversely, the LATE yielded in column (6) of Table 3.6 pertains
to individuals with learned occupations bundling few unaffected tasks.22
However, it remains ambiguous how returns evolved for these other-than-
unaffected-tasks in the general labor market and thus how outside options
for these compliers created. Hence, having few skills to execute unaffected
tasks and being mismatched is not sufficient to suffer from a mismatch
wage penalty. Moreover, these compliers arguably represent a mixture
of individuals with complementary and substitutable learned occupations.
21From an econometric point of view, this is straightforward: The IV estimate equals
the ratio of the reduced form to the first-stage estimate. While the first-stage estimates are
both statistically significant different from zero (Table 3.5), the reduced form estimates of
Table A.2 display a negative and statistically significant association between T locc,jit and
wageit for j = substitutable but not for j = unaffected .
22They comply with being mismatched by having learned occupations bundling few
unaffected tasks, whereas they would not be mismatched had they learned more unaffected
tasks.
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In Section 3.2, I argued that the former likely select into mismatches
due to valuable outside options whereas the latter tend to be mismatched
involuntarily. Arguably, this further contributes to the insignificant reduced-
form association between the share of unaffected tasks of individuals’ learned
occupations and their wages (column 3 of Table A.2), and thus to the
statistically insignificant mismatch wage effect for this subgroup in column
(6) of Table 3.6. However, one should notice that the 95% confidence intervals
of the point estimates in columns (4) and (6) overlap. Thus, one cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the two estimated effects are statistically not
different.
In column (8), I exploit the shares of substitutable and unaffected
tasks simultaneously as instruments. The mismatch wage penalty revealed
amounts to roughly 10%. Again, at the 95% level, this estimate is
not significantly different from the point estimates in columns (4) and
(6). Column (7) reveals the corresponding first-stage and points to the
same conclusion as columns (3) and (5): having learned a complementary
occupation is positively correlated with occupational distance, while having
learned an unaffected occupation is associated with a low occupational
distance between learned and current occupations.
Mismatch dummy
Table 3.7 employs the classical binary mismatch variable. Consistent with the
higher average wages among mismatched individuals yielded in Table 3.1, the
OLS estimate displays a positive correlation between the mismatch dummy
and wages (column 1, Table 3.7). However, this positive association vanishes
when applying fixed-effect estimations and thus accounting for unobservable
personal characteristics in column (2) of Table 3.7.
Turning to the IV estimations in columns (3) to (8), the much higher
coefficient using the binary mismatch variable in Table 3.7 compared to the
same specifications in Table 3.6 is striking. It thus seems questionable how
credible a mismatch wage penalty of 24% is (column 4, Table 3.7). The

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from model (4) of Table 3.6; in both cases the substitutable task share of an
individual’s learned occupation is regressed on his or her wage. Consequently,
this difference is entirely driven by the underlying first-stage estimations.23
Table 3.5 displays these diverging first-stage estimates for the binary (Dit,
column 2, Table 3.5) and the continuous (OccDistit, column 8, Table 3.5)
mismatch measurement. Note the much lower R2 in column (2) of Table 3.5
compared to column (8) of Table 3.5. Apparently, the substitutable task
share of an individual’s learned occupation contains more explanatory power
for mismatches measured continuously than captured by a binary variable.
Again, I conclude that the use of the continuous mismatch measurement adds
additional important information that the the mismatch dummy misses.
3.5.3 Subsample results
Education cohorts
Recently, Hanushek et al. (2017) argued that vocational education’s advan-
tages in smoothing the school-work transition at the beginning of individuals’
careers turns into a disadvantage in both employment and wages at later
career stages. One mechanism postulated by Hanushek et al. (2017) to
explain this pattern is the higher specificity of human capital acquired
during a vocational education compared to the rather general human capital
acquired at a high school. Individuals with a vocational degree easily find a
position directly after graduation but face difficulties adjusting their specific
human capital to changing demands in the labor market occurring during
their career, e.g. due to technological change. Conversely, individuals
with general human capital often face difficulties bringing their general
skills to a specific position right after graduation, but they adapt more
easily to a changing labor market and thus their employment and wage
perspectives develop well over their lifecycle.24 Horizontal skill mismatches
23Again, the IV estimate equals the ratio of the reduced form to the first-stage
estimation.
24Partly supporting these hypotheses, Korber and Oesch (2019) find substantially lower
earnings for Swiss individuals with a vocational degree once they enter their thirties.
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among individuals with a vocational degree might be one channel through
which Hanushek et al.’s (2017) arguments materialize.
Table 3.8 tests this claim by estimating mismatch wage penalties among
education cohort (vocational education and training VET, Tertiary-B, and
Tertiary-A) subsamples.25 All OLS and fixed-effect estimations show close-
to-zero and statistically insignificant effects as in the full sample estimations
in Table 3.6. IV estimations in columns (3), (6), and (9) rely on the share
of substitutable tasks as an instrument that yielded a statistically significant
mismatch wage penalty in the full sample (column 4 of Table 3.6).
Overall, the findings presented in Table 3.8 suggest that horizontal
mismatches triggered by task-shifting technological change do not represent
a channel through which Hanushek et al.’s (2017) argument materializes.
Although the mismatch wage penalty for individuals with a VET degree is
somewhat smaller than for their counterparts with a tertiary degree, these
differences are statistically not significant. Furthermore, one should note
the relative weak first-stage association among individuals with a tertiary-A
degree, which leads to the very imprecise IV estimate in column (9).
Age cohorts
Table 3.9 presents subsample estimations for individuals who are younger
than 46 and individuals who are 46 or older. Simple conditional comparisons
of matched and mismatched individuals in columns (1) and (4) reveal that
mismatched individuals only earn less than their matched counterparts at
later stages of their work careers. Interestingly, fixed-effect estimations
controlling for heterogeneity in unobservable personal characteristics reveal
However, they do not find diverging employment chances across education cohorts over
the lifecycle.
25VET refers to people who completed some sort of apprenticeship training. The
Tertiary-B track represents a tertiary track that usually requires the prior completion of
an apprenticeship. The Tertiary-A track includes universities, which are either accessible
for high-school graduates or apprentices with a baccalaureate, and universities of applied
science, which require an apprenticeship with a baccalaureate or a high school degree and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the opposite (columns 2 and 5). One explanation for this pattern might
be that individuals’ accumulated informal human capital dominates at
later career stages over formally acquired degrees and thus leads to the
diminishing of a mismatch wage penalty in the later stages of someone’s
career. Presumably, wage negotiations between firms and young job seekers
are mostly based on formal degrees: What else can firms observe? As a
consequence, young people suffer from a wage penalty if they cannot find a
position matching their formal degree. At later stages of individuals’ careers,
firms and job seekers are increasingly able to base their wage offers on
informally accumulated human capital, which becomes increasingly visible
through job references and previous occupationally relevant performance.
Therefore, firms are willing to pay relatively high wages irrespective of the
formal qualification a job applicant has or has not.
The IV estimates are somewhat stronger among the older cohort (column
6 of Table 3.9) compared to the younger cohort (column 3 of Table 3.9).
However, the confidence intervals of the estimates widely overlap. It seems
that task-shifting technological change triggering mismatches is a threat for
individuals at various stages of their career.
Unemployment spells
Task-shifting technological change arguably increases not only horizontal
mismatches but also unemployment. However, observations during an
unemployment spell drop out of my sample because I am unable to define
the mismatch status of unemployed individuals. Assuming unemployment
is financially more harmful than being mismatched, this leads to an
underestimation of the overall financial losses suffered by individuals who lose
a position in their previously learned occupation and become mismatched
or unemployed. Table 3.10 tackles this concern by applying the main
estimations presented in Table 3.6 to a subsample of individuals who were
always employed when being observed. The results in Table 3.10 are almost
identical to those in Table 3.6 and thus mitigate concerns that previously














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter investigates whether horizontally mismatched individuals suffer
from a wage penalty. The answer, on average and as revealed by OLS
estimations, is no. Individuals who work in an occupation for which they
have no formal degree earn, conditionally on observables, even more than
similar individuals. When fixed-effect estimations are used, thus accounting
for unobservable covariates such as ability, this positive association vanishes.
However, in the present chapter, I argue that this is not the end
of the story. Descriptive evidence on individuals’ wage evolution when
becoming matched or mismatched suggests that fixed-effect estimations
aggregate heterogeneous occupational mobility patterns and thus merely
yield a mismatch wage effect on average. Presumably, some individuals select
into mismatches to realize a higher wage, while others are negatively affected
by a mismatch incidence and suffer from a wage penalty.
To cope with this heterogeneity and to isolate the most relevant mismatch
incidences from a policy perspective, I propose an IV approach. In times
of task-shifting technological change, I surmise that individuals’ mismatch
probability is positively correlated with the substitutability of their learned
occupations’ task bundle. In contrast, individuals who learned occupations
bundling few affected tasks are more likely to stay in their learned occupation.
Based on this pattern, I regard the task composition of individuals’ learned
occupations, conditional on their educational attainment and the task
composition of their current occupation, as a valid instrument for the
endogenous mismatch variable.
Applying this IV approach to a sample of roughly 10,500 person-year
observations, I estimate a negative wage effect of roughly 12% for mismatched
Swiss males. However, this a mismatch wage penalty is only revealed
when exploiting the share of substitutable tasks across individuals’ learned
occupations as an instrument. This seems plausible: the estimated 12%
mismatch wage penalty refers to a LATE for the subgroup of compliers who in
this setting are mismatched individuals with learned occupations displaying
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high shares of substitutable tasks who would not be mismatched had they
learned less substitutable occupations.
In conclusion, mismatches represent a labor market phenomenon with
diverse aspects. Many individuals accept mismatches to increase their
salaries. Based on classical economic theory, in which a wage increase
amplifies a better employee-employer match in terms of human capital
allocation, the term mismatch is therefore often misleading. However, the
analysis in this chapter shows that some mismatches are associated with
wage losses. From a policy perspective, these mismatches might be the
most relevant because they are not only monetarily harmful to affected
individuals but, due to a suboptimal allocation of human capital investments,
also to the economy as a whole. To isolate these harmful mismatches,
one needs to disentangle diverging sources and mechanisms contributing to
the phenomenon of mismatch. This in turn requires accurate estimation
strategies. The main contribution of this chapter is to propose one such
estimation strategy and hopefully to guide the path for more to come.
162 Mismatch
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Average monthly income Unemployment rate
The figure plots the average monthly gross income (lefts scale) and the unemployment
rate (right scale) over the sample period.
Source: SHP 1999 - 2016, own calculations.
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2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Share mismatched Becoming mismatched
Becoming matched
The figure plots the share of mismatched individuals (lefts scale) and share of individuals
switching to match or mismatch (right scale) over the sample period, respectively.
Source: SHP 1999 - 2016, own calculations.
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Table A.1: Main results – extended output
Wagei
IV IV IV IV
First First First First
stage 2SLS stage 2SLS stage 2SLS stage 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
T j,loccit , j = comp. -0.225
∗∗
(0.100)
T j,coccit , j = comp. 0.182
∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.039)
T j,loccit , j = subs. 1.113
∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.107)
T j,coccit , j = subs. -1.361
∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -1.138∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.041) (0.111) (0.038)
T j,loccit , j = unaff . -1.203
∗∗∗ -0.874∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.149)
T j,coccit , j = unaff . 1.323
∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.133) (0.045) (0.124) (0.039)
OccDistit -0.315 -0.119
∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.098∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.033) (0.043) (0.029)
Age 0.033∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
Age2 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign 0.062 -0.032 0.094 -0.043∗ 0.050 -0.040∗ 0.088 -0.043∗
(0.065) (0.034) (0.060) (0.025) (0.062) (0.024) (0.058) (0.024)
Children 0.000 0.044∗∗∗ -0.002 0.047∗∗∗ -0.005 0.040∗∗∗ -0.007 0.046∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.017) (0.034) (0.013) (0.035) (0.013) (0.033) (0.013)
Married -0.075 0.034 -0.076∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.070 0.052∗∗∗ -0.073∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.027) (0.045) (0.017) (0.045) (0.016) (0.044) (0.017)
Further Educ. -0.045∗∗ 0.019 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.041∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.022) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009)
Employment in % -0.001 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 0.010∗∗∗ -0.001 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tertiary-Ba -0.023 0.147∗∗∗ -0.060 0.129∗∗∗ -0.059 0.182∗∗∗ -0.067∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.025) (0.041) (0.017) (0.041) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016)
Tertiary-A -0.189∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.025) (0.046) (0.022) (0.051) (0.024)
Constant -0.032 8.919∗∗∗ -0.003 9.151∗∗∗ -0.146 8.912∗∗∗ -0.141 9.108∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.138) (0.244) (0.108) (0.245) (0.106) (0.234) (0.105)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0873 0.474 0.213 0.566 0.183 0.551 0.314 0.571
Observations 10471 10471 10471 10471 10471 10471 10471 10471
F-stat 8.112 62.25 50.41 52.24
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at individual level. T j,loccit refers
to the respective average share of task j of individual ii’s learned occupations. aTo simplify the presentation of education
cohort differences I only include three broad educational dummies (VET, tertiary-B and tertiary-A) in the presented
extended output, whereas I include eight educational dummies in all other estimations.
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Table A.2: Reduced form estimates
Wagei
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T j,loccit , j = comp. 0.071
∗∗
(0.035)
T j,loccit , j = subs. -0.132
∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038)
T j,loccit , j = unaff . 0.075 0.047
(0.052) (0.051)
Constant 8.929∗∗∗ 9.152∗∗∗ 8.921∗∗∗ 9.136∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105)
Personal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Educational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
T j,coccit j = comp. j = subs. j = unaff . j
1 = subs.
j2 = unaff .
R-squared 0.569 0.585 0.563 0.585
Observations 10471 10471 10471 10471
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered at individual level.
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No. 2714 .
Brunner, B. and Kuhn, A. (2018). Immigration, Cultural Distance and
Natives’ Attitudes Towards Immigrants: Evidence from Swiss Voting
Results. Kyklos , 71(1), 28–58.
Brynjolfsson, E. and McAfee, A. (2012). Race against the machine: How
the digital revolution is accelerating innovation, driving productivity, and
irreversibly transforming employment and the economy . Digital Frontier
Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 171
Burke, M. A. and Heiland, F. (2007). Social dynamics of obesity. Economic
Inquiry , 45(3), 571–591.
Burke, M. A. and Young, H. P. (2011). Social norms. In Handbook of Social
Economics , volume 1, pages 311–338. Elsevier.
Cameron, A. C. and Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-
robust inference. Journal of Human Resources , 50(2), 317–372.
Cattaneo, M. A. and Wolter, S. C. (2016). Die Berufsbildung in der
Pole-Position. Die Einstellungen der Schweizer Bevölkerung zum Thema
Allgemeinbildung vs. Berufsbildung. SKBF Staff Paper 18 .
Cole, H. L., Mailath, G. J., and Postlewaite, A. (1995). Incorporating concern
for relative wealth into economics models. CARESS Working Papres ,
pages 12–21.
Cole, H. L., Mailath, G. J., and Postlewaite, A. (2001). Investment and
concern for relative position. Review of Economic Design, 6(2), 241–261.
Cottier, L. (2018). Culture, financial constraints, and retirement decision.
Labour Economics , 53, 128–145.
Degen, K. and Hauri, D. (2017). Beschäftigungsboom: Grund zur Freude?
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